Anyone For 8% Market Share?

Barclays' withdrawal from the asset-based small business lending market is a real shot in the arm for peer-to-peer finance.

The head of the Barclays Business unit is quoted as saying, “It’s the leasing and hire purchase side [where] we found our proposition was not that compelling, comprehensive and competitive. Our market share was small, about 8pc.”

Those are my gob-smacked italics.

According to the same article, the Finance and Leasing Association "said asset finance represents the majority of debt-financed business, and that its members provided £1.7bn of funding to support business investment in December, 5pc higher than the same month in 2009."

Barclays says it can target this £21bn market segment with unsecured loans. But of course it's talking through its hat. The Basel III head-wind blows strongest in the unsecured lending space. So even if Barclays can magic the £1.7bn asset-based portfolio into unsecured loans, it doesn't seem a great alternative use of capital.

But it's an interesting strategy if you're lending some of your own cash on a peer-to-peer platform, instead of leaving it in a savings account.

Barclays stands to lose out on both fronts.

Image from Gogherty.com.

Hey Eric: Lend Your Euros Directly To Other People

Like previous financial crises, this one won't end until individual and collective confidence in banks and the financial system is restored. And while it's all very well for the Eurozone's political masters to be demonstrating their 'political will' to hold the Eurozone together at individual taxpayers' expense, their latest attempt at restoring confidence has not exactly impressed Spain's debtors...

But such bail-out headlines merely the typically dominant institutional narrative. The real question is whether the Euro and EU institutions actually have the confidence of EU citizens - especially taxpayers. A recent poll suggests they do not: only 42% of Europeans trust the European Union - reflecting a general disenchantment with EU institutions over the past few decades. Meanwhile, in sharp contrast, bottom-up facilitators that enable citizens to participate in shaping and personalising their own services have done very well.

This is reflected in the behaviour of EU citizens on the economic front. The implications of the one-size-fits-all Eurozone monetary policy seem to be regarded as just as unfair by German taxpayers and the French savers supporting Eric Cantona's suggestion for mass bank-withdrawals on 7 December as by those hitting the streets of Greece and Ireland. The Guardian quotes Valérie Ohannesian, of the French Banking Federation, as saying Cantona's appeal is "stupid in every sense". Yet, crucially, she did not explain why people should feel more confident about leaving their money on deposit, or why it is fair that banks receive taxpayer bail-outs while taxes increase and spending is cut. In the absence of any other narrative, each bail-out undermines our confidence even further, to the point where we hit the streets and seriously consider suggestions like Eric Cantona's.

But it doesn't have to be this way. There is a bottom-up narrative emerging, and our politicians need to focus on it.

Eric Cantona's confident call for mass withdrawals hints at the fact that people are prepared to put their money where their mouth is. But it would be futile for those with surplus cash languishing in low interest savings accounts to withdraw it all and hide it under their beds. Instead, they should join those who already put their money to work helping others, by lending it directly on peer-to-peer lending platforms to creditworthy people and businesses at a decent rate that also represents a decent return.

Swiss Tailwind For Personal & Small Business Social Finance

Banks will find it more costly and less profitable to offer short term unsecured personal and small business finance under Basel III rules, according to a recent McKinsey report.

To comply with the new rules, Banks face a long review of their businesses and products to reduce risk, use capital more efficiently and minimise the need for market funding by the end of 2012.

Which is more great news for participants in the 'capital light' social finance business models, like Zopa and Funding Circle in the UK.

As I mentioned in the context of the proposals to regulate vertical shadow banking functions, people using these 'horizontal intermediaries' benefit from:

1. Loan amounts being split into small one-to-one loans at inception, rather than having to wait for the slicing, re-packaging and grading involved in asset-backed securitisation;
2. A direct, one-to-one legal relationship between borrower and lender for the life of the loan, enabling better control over debt adjustment and collection, where that becomes necesary;
3. Lenders retaining day-to-day control of the management of their money and credit risk, minimising the capital required by the intemediary;
4. The intermediary not needing to slice and re-package debt to alter loan maturities, since lenders can manage this by assigning loans of unwanted duration to other lenders;
5. The intermediary having no balance sheet risk, and therefore no temptation to engage in expensive and complex regulatory, tax or other arbitrage;
6. Transparency in the original underwriting decision and loan performance against grade - making lenders' due diligence easy, and removing the moral hazard of the kind we see in vertical intermediation models, where the endless slicing and re-packaging makes due diligence hard.

For these reasons, one might expect banks to allow their depositors to lend directly to their personal loan and small business customers. But it seems unlikely the banks could feed themselves on the scale of fees their nimble competitors can afford to charge. And they would soon face calls to allow the peer-to-peer approach for mortgages and larger corporate loans - by which time other nimble providers may well beat them to those segments too...

Image from Gogherty.com.

Of Sunlight, Shadow Banking and Horizontal Intermediation

Huge thanks to Gillian Tett for pointing out in Friday's FT the report on "Shadow Banking" by staff of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. It even comes with a handy map, which she points out:

"...is a reminder of how clueless most investors, regulators and rating agencies were before 2007 about finance. After all, during the credit boom, there was plenty of research being conducted into the financial world; but I never saw anything remotely comparable to this road map."

The NY Fed's report defines "traditional banks" as depository institutions that are insulated by public sector insurance from sudden 'runs' on deposits. Whereas "shadow banks" - finance companies, credit hedge funds, broker-dealers and an alphabet soup of intermediaries - operate without any such public sector insurance. I'll come to what shadow banks actually do shortly. But the fundamental problem, as the report makes clear, is that the shadow banking system has indeed gained access to the public purse during the financial crisis, via bail-outs of some of their subsidiaries (bank subsidiaries, in the case of 'financial holding companies' or retail/commercial banking groups; and industrial loan companies and federal savings banks, in the case of diversified broker-dealers or investment banks):

"The liquidity facilities of the... government agencies' guarantee schemes were a direct response to the liquidity and capital shortfalls of shadow banks and, effectively, provided either a backstop to credit intermediation by the shadow banking system or to traditional banks for the exposure to shadow banks."

In other words, public sector guarantees are necessary to stop 'runs' on the shadow banking system in the same way they avoid 'runs' on deposit-taking banks.

In these circumstances, you could be forgiven for thinking it crazy for the shadow banking system to go unregulated. But who are the shadow banks? What do they really do? Does each function really need to be regulated? If so, why? How? This has been the focus of the European regulatory agenda (including a focus on unregulated derivatives) during the past few years, and the harsher elements have met fierce resistance with allegations that the realities, wider implications and scope for unintended consequences are not well understood by legislators and regulators.

So the publication of the detail in NY Fed's report is very much worthwhile.

The NY Fed concludes that 'some' but not all segments of the shadow banking system are of "limited economic value". It says that "equally large segments of it have been driven by gains in specialisation" and would be more aptly described as a "parallel banking system." Nevertheless, the report concludes that "private sector balance sheets will always fail at internalizing systemic risk. The official sector will always have to step in to help."

So how does the shadow banking system work? Well, instead of making loans to hold onto them, like traditional banks, the shadow banking system involves the making of loans for sale through a series of intermediaries - "shadow banks" - each of which specialises in one step in "a vertically integrated, long, intermediation chain":

"These steps essentially amount to the “vertical slicing” of traditional banks’ credit intermediation process and include (1) loan origination, (2) loan warehousing, (3) [Asset-backed Security or ABS] issuance, (4) ABS warehousing, (5) ABS [Collateralised Debt Obligation, or CDO] issuance, (6) ABS “intermediation” and (7) wholesale funding... Typically, the poorer an underlying loan pool’s quality at the beginning of the chain (for example a pool of subprime mortgages originated in California in 2006), the longer the credit intermediation chain that would be required to “polish” the quality of the underlying loans to the standards of money market mutual funds and similar funds."

In reality, these chains could involve many more steps and "CDOs squared", depending on how many times the loans had to be "polished". The various exhibits in the report illustrate the eye-watering complexity very well.

Having studied the various processes, the NY Fed believes that "regulation by function is a more potent style of regulation than regulation by institutional charter." Figuring out which functions contain the root cause of our current financial woes is therefore necessary.

The NY Fed believes the current financial crisis grew out of mispricing of ABS CDOs, (steps 5/6 above), which caused problems up and down the chain:

"...the growth of ABS CDOs not only masked but also created an underlying pricing problem in the primary ABS market (Adelson and Jacob, (2007)). In particular, in the early days of securitization, the junior tranches of home equity deals were purchased by real money investors. However, these investors were pushed aside by the aggressive buying of ABS CDOs, which resided on the trading books of large broker-dealers. The mispricing of the junior ABS tranches permitted issuers to distribute loan pools with increasingly worse underwriting. ABS CDOs suffered from the same underlying problem as the underlying ABS, which required the creation of CDO-squared products."

In essence, poor quality debt was re-packaged again and again in order to remove the risk, but the risk was misunderstood and the resulting instruments were mispriced each time.

Notwithstanding these pricing problems, the NY Fed's regulatory vision is that vertical credit intermediation can reduce the costs of screening and monitoring borrowers in the traditional banking model, and facilitates investor diversification, by transforming credit quality, maturity dates and adding liquidity. And the grading of securities by a "credible rating agency" can reduce information asymmetries between borrowers and savers.

Yet this assertion meets a series of fundamental challenges, not all of which are explicit in the report:

1. The separation of lender and borrower, and fragmentation of the original loan note makes it harder to adjust loans when borrowers get into trouble (explored in Confessions of a Subprime Lender and evident from the 'fraudclosure' and 'forced repurchase' problems in the US).
2. The process of transforming 'maturity' (changing the date when loans or debt instruments are due to expire) creates balance sheet risk for the intermediary.
3. It is unclear whether ratings, accounting and audit functions really do remove information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders. Do we have "credible" ratings agencies, when only three dominate the market and they are paid by the issuers of the securities they grade? Similar problems exist in the accounting and audit markets - hence the calls for reforms in these areas.
4. There are huge challenges to undertaking adequate due diligence on large volumes of underlying original loans.
5. Pressure to reduce the amount of capital required to operate this vertical chain of intermediaries results in a game of regulatory, tax, capital and ratings arbitrage that spans the globe and creates endlessly complex corporate structures.
6. Various factors lead to underestimation of the capital required for the private and implicit public sector guarantees required to support it. This is further complicated by the fact that "...the performance of highly-rated structured securities... in a major liquidity crisis... become highly correlated as all investors and funded institutions are forced to sell high quality assets in order to generate liquidity."
7. The knowledge that the market can ultimately 'put' problem securities on the taxpayer (whether this is explicit, implicit, direct or indirect) creates a moral hazard that seems to increase in line with the demand for the securities until the system irretrievably melts down.

These fundamental challenges and the length of time it is taking to confront them underscore the need to find alternatives to the vertical model for credit intermediation. The situation is all the more urgent, given that the huge taxpayer bail-outs of the past few years have only reduced the liabilities in the shadow banking system from $20 trillion in March 2008 to about $16 trillion in Q1 2010, when liabilities in the traditional banking system were about £11 trillion.

One alternative is horizontal credit intermediation, which is a feature of the new peer-to-peer funding platforms - like Zopa, Lending Club and Funding Circle - that each borrower's loan amount is provided via many tiny loans from many different lenders at inception.

That approach does deal with the fundamental challenges outlined above, mainly because the margin between lending and borrowing rates are too slim to support more than one intermediary. The one-to-one legal relationship between borrower and lender/loan owner is maintained for the life of the loan via the same loan origination and servicing platform (with a back-up available), allowing for ready enforcement. The intermediary has no balance sheet risk, and has no temptation to engage in regulatory, tax or other arbitrage. Loan maturities do not need to be altered to achieve diversification across different loans, loan terms and borrowers. The basis of the original underwriting decision remains transparent and available as the basis for assessing the performance of the loan against its grade, as well as for pricing the loan on any resale or refinance, making due diligence easy. To the extent that credit risk were to concentrate on certain borrowers or types of borrowers, those risks would remain visible throughout the life of the loan, rather than rendered opaque through fragmentation, re-packaging and re-grading. The scope for moral hazard is contained by the transparency around loan performance.

This also reflects a trend towards the democratisation of markets that impact consumers.

But I would say that, wouldn't I?

Kick Out the Kick-out Bond

John Kay has seized upon the 'kickout bond' as an excellent example of how our creaking financial regulatory framework works against consumers.

John focused on the product as offered by RBS and distributed by Barclays Wealth, but even the Skipton Building Society is at it.

It is not possible to do the product any justice by summarising it in plain English. By all means study it yourself. But my reaction, like John Kay's, is to wonder why a retail bank or building society would offer an investment product with apparently massive bonuses when they can borrow money - or attract deposits - by offering very modest savings rates? If they've done their homework, this product should be very, very unlikely to cost them any more. In fact, the structure and layers of intermediaries involved should mean additional revenue based on fee and dealing charges and returns below the trigger for any 'bonus' payments. As Mr Kay says:

"Like so many structured products, these bonds are bought only by people who do not really understand what they are doing."

Why the FSA allows a product of this complexity to be offered to unwitting investors, yet refuses to provide guidance for the launch of simple, transparent, low cost funding platforms is utterly beyond me.

Remember: you're on your own - pay less, diversify more and be contrarian.

Strength in Diversity

Following the discussion on the concept of a Social Finance Association, it was interesting to read the guest post on Zopa's blog by Rob Garcia, Senior Director of Product Strategy at Lending Club, attempting to classify types of social finance as 'crowdfunding', 'microfinance' or 'peer-to-peer lending or investing'.

Having had to spend far too long studying the distinctions between US and UK regulation in this area, I must respectfully disagree that 'crowdfunding' necessarily involves 'pooling' or a lack of nexus between 'funder' and 'fundee'. Similarly, any of these models should be capable of operation on either a for-profit or not-for-profit basis, or for any purpose, social or otherwise. The essence should be that each facilitator enables people - rather than the facilitator itself - to determine the allocation of their own funds directly to other people, businesses or projects, whether the businesses or projects are operated for-profit, social purposes or otherwise). In other words, people remain in day-to-day control of the management of their money, not the facilitator.

While precise distinctions between the various different social finance models may be important at one level, and a diverse range of business models is certainly good sign for the strength of the sector, the sector must also be ready to differentiate itself from traditional financial institutions and models - unless it wants to be regulated in the same way.

Social finance models were vital alternatives before the global financial crisis, let alone now and for the foreseeable future while traditional institutions adjust to new capital and regulatory constraints. But the existing regulatory framework makes it painfully slow and expensive to launch social finance platforms. To help foster confident innovation and competition, and enable the new sector to flourish quickly enough to provide much needed funding, financial regulators should clarify what is permissible within or outside the scope of regulation.

Image from the Trade Association Forum.

Social Impact Bonds: Enough Social Impact?

The "Social Investment Bank" is an interesting experiment that's taken more than three years to bring to pilot stage. Its vision is to leverage money in dormant bank accounts ("unclaimed assets") to help the non-profit sector (aka "the third sector") "to grow and meet its goal of supporting marginalised communities in a way that neither the state nor the private sector can." To leverage the unclaimed funds, the SIB will raise money from 'non-government' investors by issuing "social impact bonds" - each being "a contract between a public sector body and Social Impact Bond investors, in which the former commits to pay for an improved social outcome."

For example, the pilot project "will prepare around 3,000 short term prisoners for their lives post-release [from Peterborough prison] and will work with them to prevent a return to a life of crime... If ... re-offending drops by more than 7.5 per cent within six years, investors receive a payment [from the Ministry of Justice] representing a proportion of the cost of re-offending. The payment will increase based on the reduction in re-offending with the total cost of the project capped at £8m. Social Finance [expects to raise £5m] from social investors that will be used to pay for the services in the prison and outside in the community."

There is a bit more complexity in the way it is explained here and in the Guardian, but perhaps you get the drift.

I'm not sure that I share the reported view of "sceptics" that this is "about city slickers making a fast buck," though the board and executives have some roots in the City and are offering "commercial investors, and high net worth individuals... greater financial return as the social return improves." This is "a risky business", as the Guardian article notes, so it's probably a bit hot for you and me anyway, even on such small numbers and moving at such a glacial pace. Public sector figures are notoriously, shall we say, inexact. And, by definition, we're talking about an area where the public sector body concerned doesn't have a good grip on the situation now, and obviously will be starved of funds to monitor closely in future (otherwise, there will be duplication in resources).

If I were a sceptic, however, I might prefer to consider this initiative as consistent with New Labour's reputation for public sector financial engineering, albeit gratefully endorsed by the Coalition as a "Big Society" initiative that might partially compensate for public funding cuts, at least in the justice budget. A sceptic might also consider that the focus on areas of apparent public policy failure begs certain questions that I'm sure have already been answered, or will be during the pilot:

1. Is it purely for lack of funds that the government doesn't grasp the nettle and reform the public policy areas in question? In other words: If the bonds don't sell, will no one implement the proposed fixes?
2. Does this proposal merely allow the public sector to outsource its accountability for difficult policy areas to a special purpose vehicle?
3. Does this proposal encourage public sector bodies to dump more of their work into the "too hard" basket and hope it will be picked up by taxpayers or private investors directly? Note the irony, for instance, in the quote from "Paddy Scriven, general secretary of the Prison Governors' Association, [who] has welcomed the scheme but warned those running it not to "cherry-pick" the least difficult offenders and leave the hardline cases to the prison and probation services." Isn't it his members' job to reduce recidivism?
4. If the bonds for one type of project perform well for investors, will the government ensure the policy lessons are learned and reap the savings, or allow repeat projects/returns?

Personally, I am left with two concerns, which are really two sides of the same coin, as it were:

1. The nature and scale of the risks to capital may be hugely under-estimated, giving rise to complaints and compensation awards that are underwritten by the taxpayer; and

2. The nature and scale of the risks to capital may be hugely over-estimated, giving rise to windfall gains to investors, again, underwritten by the taxpayer.

Yes, like all investment banks, this one comes with a taxpayer guarantee. Which means we're all on the hook for this in the end, whichever way it goes.

Don't get me wrong. It's fantastic that we are getting excited about making improvements and saving costs in these very difficult areas of public policy. And we should never lose sight of the root causes of apparently intractable social problems, nor cease in trying to resolve them. I just don't see the need for all the chicanery around getting the liability for fixing them off the public books when the liability sits there anyway.

Worse still, it distracts our great regulatory minds from the real challenge of how to finance growth in the 'real economy' while the government and our ailing banks attempt to rebuild their balance sheets. To that end, rather than tinkering with yet another public sector investment bank, surely the government will achieve greater lasting social impact by clearing the way for genuinely private, social funding initiatives aimed at creditworthy people and small businesses, as well as alternative energy and other socially productive projects.

It took about 6 months to actually plan and launch Zopa, for example, and it's members generated about £100 million in the time it's taken to get the SIB to pilot phase. There are at least a dozen other examples out there, which have either launched or are in development, some of whom are no doubt engaged in needless technical analysis - as Zopa was - because the authorities lack the time or other resources to publish helpful guidance on how such platforms ought to be structured.

Image from The Tool Factory blog.

A Social Finance Association?

The past 5 years have seen the launch of many innovative business models aimed at enabling people to provide funding directly to other people and businesses via online finance platforms, rather than 'traditional' financial institutions. The terms 'crowdfunding' or 'social finance' seem to encompass most models out there.

The 'social' element is critical to the success of these models, because there are very real social and economic benefits to people - rather than financial institutions - sharing most of the margin between savings/investment rates and funding costs.

But I've witnessed firsthand how social finance platforms and their members tend to wrestle with the problem that social finance does not fit neatly into our financial regulatory framework, which is designed, ironically, to force recalcitrant 'traditional' providers to deal fairly with consumers. We are also currently victims of the delay and uncertainty caused by reforms to that regulatory framework. Because when they aren't rescuing banks or attending to 'business as usual', the key regulatory staff are understandably taken up with figuring out the new regulatory regime rather than vetting the legality of innovative business models that may remain outside the regulatory perimeter.

These problems add a huge amount of time and expense to starting and developing a social finance business, precisely at the time when banks are both lending less and paying lower savings rates.

Of course, it's common for the participants in new market segments to jointly discuss the development of the sector, including the characteristics and boundaries of regulatory 'safe harbours' and if/how they ought to be regulated. An appropriate forum for such discussion makes it easier to innovate and compete. But it also creates an efficient contact point with regulatory officials and opinion formers for discussing policy and regulatory concerns which individual participants wouldn't otherwise voice for practical reasons of time and cost, or for fear of inviting adverse attention.

There is no need for incorporation or office space. Trade associations often begin on ad hoc, unincorporated basis in response to a threat or opportunity that presents to all the participants.

Has that moment arrived for social finance?

Image from the Trade Association Forum.