Does Debt Due Diligence Scale Well Enough?

I've often made the point that we will only curb excessive fees and risk-taking in the financial markets by vastly simplifying products and making them more broadly accessible. In debt terms, think of this as the 'flat' distribution of risk - or parcelling each loan amount into tiny loans at inception, like at Zopa - rather than the hierarchical or vertical distribution of risk in today's bond markets - where a series of separate loans is packaged into 'tranches' that a bank and credit rating agency estimate will perform similarly, and bonds are issued (and derivatives concocted) according to the varying grades of likely default risk.

The critical potential downside to hierarchical risk distribution is being illustrated by the ongoing 'fraudclosure' and 'forced repurchase' problems in the US mortgage-backed securities market. A root cause may be that due diligence on the scale at which loans must be packaged to fuel the existing bond markets may not scale well enough to provide adequate risk estimates, particularly when the loans have a short history or there is a lengthy chain of loan ownership or loan servicing obligations. Of course, we have a similar challenge on a grander scale in the market for credit default swaps and collateralised debt obligations. But that's a layer above where the current problems are occuring.

The 'fraudclosure' problem arises from allegations in a large number of cases that subsequent loan-owners have not satisfied the formal requirements involved in foreclosing on problem loans. JP Morgan analysts reportedly believe that delays in foreclosures while the technical issues are addressed "will damage senior-ranked non-agency mortgage securities, costing as much as 4 cents on the dollar for certain bonds if postponements take six months."

The 'forced repurchase' saga centres on allegations that certain loans that were sold did not meet underwriting or appraisal standards under the relevant debt sale agreements. The same JPMorgan analysts reportedly believe the banks' losses from repurchases of such loans "will likely total $55 billion to $120 billion, or potentially $10 billion to $25 billion for the next five years."

The fact that these risks have gone unnoticed on this scale until recently suggests a substantial flaw in the due diligence methodology employed in the securitisation and/or subsequent 'collateralisation' process. And one wonders whether any different methodology has since been used by those reporting on whether or not they have an issue amongst their existing holdings, and the scale of any such issue. The explanation of one methodology allegedly used by an anonymous 'whistleblower' to package loans into bonds, was published today by Zero Hedge, and makes interesting reading. In short, the person says:

"...we worked with underwriters of the deal to perform due diligence. That is where this process breaks down. They use sampling to verify the makeup of the pools. There is a lot of pressure to get the deals done in a timely manner so they don’t have time to check every asset. The most I’ve ever checked on a deal is 30%. We’ve done some pools that came back very different from what the trader originally told us.

...

Don’t get me wrong, I’m not saying that all deals are incorrect, most aren’t. I’m saying that many are, and we have no way of knowing which deals are tainted. Fortunately, most deals have been seasoned a bit which make them easier to value, but the foreclosure documentation is just one instance where my shady scepticism has been vindicated. I knew there was shit floating around in the pools we were putting together, but the sampling technique and level of due diligence was never going to clean it out."

In other words, the scale of bond issuance, pressure of time and the cost of 'full' due diligence seem to encourage costly short-cuts which generate hugely uncertain outcomes.

But this seems to be far less of a problem where loans are appraised and parcelled out at inception according to transparent underwriting standards. Lenders' experience at Zopa is instructive here. But I would say that, wouldn't I? Funding Circle and the Receivables Exchange are examples in the small business finance space, as is the idea of reverse invoice discounting.

Of Exhaust Pipes, Tyres And Social Lending

I was lucky enough to be invited to Tuesday night's Financial Services Club talk by Giles Andrews, CEO of Zopa. It was a real treat to hear an update on progress at the 'old firm', especially when Giles showed the unmistakable 'hockey stick' inflection point in the £100m of social lending on Zopa since March '05. Zopa estimates that its members have cornered a 1% share of the personal loan segment of the UK lending market, but with an average default rate of 0.7%.

In an intriguingly fresh take on the social lending phenomenon, Giles explained that savings and loans are in the same class of vulnerable, cosy-little-profit-centre for retail banks that exhaust pipes and tyres once occupied for car dealerships before Kwikfit came along. And just as Kwikfit's focus on price and convenience enabled it to steal an unassailable march on the incumbents in the car servicing market, Giles estimates that in another 5 years Zopa members could easily achieve a 10% share of the personal loan segment of the UK lending market - and people's participation in social lending of all forms could account for half of all UK personal loans.

Given everything else likely to be going on in the retail banking market over the next 5 years, I guess banks could be forgiven for leaving a little more money on the table for the rest of us.

Of course, economically, the reality of social lending is starkly different from the cosy-little-retail-bank-profit-centre represented by traditional savings and loans. Individual lenders and borrowers divide most of the 'spread' between social lending and borrowing rates, not Zopa itself - and certainly not retail banks.

In addition to the economics, Giles believes that transparency is a key driver of Zopa's success. That's not an empty statement, given that members set their own terms and seasoned Zopa members moderate their discussion boards rather than Zopa staff. Zopa also encourages members to use Twitter for informal requests, queries or non-sensitive admin, because it's faster and more accessible, efficient and transparent than email or spending ages holding on the phone or visiting a physical branch.

With these competitive advantages, social lending is definitely here to stay.

Here is Chris Skinner's in depth report on the evening.

Six Months Is Still A Long Time In Social Lending

Two interesting tables from P2P Banking. The first shows all 'social lending' from the time Zopa kicked off in the UK in March 2005 until 28 October 2008 (Virgin Money figures include CircleLending friends & family loan volumes from 2001-'07). The second shows volumes for the six months to end July 2009, with strongest growth in the UK and Germany.

The subdued activity in the US is partly due to regulatory issues, and the burden of complying with the overblown securities registration and marketing regime for such a simple activity as low value lending between individuals. Unless you adopt the Virgin model, of course, which merely documents loans agreed in principle off-line. That's a different business, really, and not one that appears to be growing much on these figures.

Predictions for 2008 Revisited - Financial Services 2.0

I reckon my predictions for 2008 are looking like a pretty good bet:

"Gartner warns banks not to attempt to copy social banking practices, unless they can clearly establish a strategic intent centered on social welfare, as opposed to
traditional commercial return. Instead, banks should look to partner financial social networks, offering capabilities like transaction processing and risk management."

;-)

Credit Crunch Reveals Just How Much the Banks are in it for Themselves

The credit crunch is doing a great job of opening up opportunities that the banks can't service because they're too busy lining their own pockets rather than focusing on the consumer.

Resigned to the fact that retail banking “...is going to be less profitable than it is and is going to be growth constrained,” as the Chairman of HSBC put it last November, now the banks have been asking their otherwise idle credit teams to use your credit data in reviewing the current and likely future profitability of their customers.

The results? Rising fees and the withdrawal of products from low risk but unprofitable customers.

Nice one guys.

No wonder Gartner has warned banks "not to attempt to copy social banking practices, unless they can clearly establish a strategic intent centered on social welfare, as opposed to traditional commercial return."

Of course, it's not news that banks are more intent on their own profitability than solving their customers' critical needs. Until 2000, they enjoyed comparative immunity on this front because some of their activities are key to our economic stability. Then the FSA was given powers which reflecting society's concern that banks must minimise consumer detriment as well as systemic risk.

The problem for banks is that Web 2.0 'consumer empowerment' and the run on Northern Rock have unleashed our expectations when they are least able to cope.