Big Media: Inside The Propaganda Machine

You know something's hokey when the Financial Times, a leading paywall operator, devotes a whole page to the war on content sharing 'online piracy battle' just days after the big set back for SOPA/PIPA. Here's the lead article, snuggled between two stories from the 'front line' ("Parameters shift in online piracy battle" and "Upload websites bar file sharing"):

"Digital revenues set to offset CD fall"

It's then you realise you're inside the propaganda machine for the Big Media faithful:

"Keep sluggin' it out, people! 

Less content sharin' means more money for us!"

Think about that.

Because these are the same institutions who were leeching public money out of New Labour in 2009 for help with copyright enforcement, with tales of 'losing £1bn in music sales in the next 5 years'. Whereas only 3 years later, the FT reports they have this to say:

[Rob Wells, of Universal Music] "Some of those big global subscription players are only playing on a small playing field... As they mature, they are more likely to be bundled with internet service provider or operator subscriptions which is where we start to see real anti-trust investigations scale. The future is looking extremely bright."

"We are going from headwind to tailwind," said Edgar Berger, chief executive at Sony Music International. "There is no question the music industry is going to be in great shape shortly, it will become a growing business again. The internet is a blessing for the music industry."

Big Media is not in the business of solving consumer problems. It's a cabal of institutions out to solve their own problem of how to return to rampant profitability at the captive consumer's expense. And they won't give up trying to stop you sharing content 'til your MP3 player looks like this:

Avoiding The Dire Strait of Retail Banking

So, competition in banking has worsened, according to research cited by the FT this week, and Which? is back on the warpath against "complicated and exorbitant" unauthorised overdraft charges.

Accenture's research found that in 2011 only 11% of customers switched at least one product and only 6% switched their current account - and 90% of us "had no desire to change providers". 

Financial services consultancy Oliver Wyman chipped in with this gem:

"if [banks] made their charging structures completely transparent, no one would want to pay them."

Forrester, the research firm, found that less than 25% of UK customers thought "their bank put their interests above the desire to generate profits."

Yet more reasons for levelling the playing field between banks and alternative finance models.

War On Your Internet Use Rages On

"Get back on the sofa!"

President Obama may have thrown his weight against the latest attempts by the traditional media to outlaw individual people sharing content - the "Stop Online Piracy Act" and "Protect IP Act" (beware moral panic). But history tells us the war ain't over yet. 

As Clay Shirky eloquently explains below, the latest so-called anti-'piracy' bills in the US are Big Media's attempt at a nuclear strike on content sharing after last year's bills misfired and a previous surgical strike missed the target (the Digital Millennium Copyright Act). In short, Big Media won't give up until our computers are as interactive as an analogue TV - "Get back on the sofa!"

We need to care about such US legislation, because it targets US internet services and features that make the internet useful for individual people all over the planet. But this is not just a US problem. In the UK, for instance, we are blessed with our very own Digital Economy Act [crowd cheers]. 

The war on content sharing comes down to two things: political donations and votes. Currently, it's billed as a struggle between internet companies and entertainment businesses. But that analysis ignores the giant individual in the room: a few carefully directed £/$'s and a vote from each of us should ensure that our politicians work hard to protect our right to share. 

 Image from Geek.com.

Flaws In Bank Capital Models, Revisited

We saw a little sunlight on shadow banking back in 2010. But it transpires things went a little dark again for a while and, hey presto! Our banks may be holding insufficient capital. 

The latest burst of sunlight - at least for us mere mortals - came yesterday in two posts by FT Alphaville - one on 'BISTRO-style' high-cost credit protection transfer deals done by banks during 2010, and the other on how the FSA has responded.

But this is not about sub-prime malarkey, and the risk of mis-pricing towers of CDOs. This is about banks trying to reduce the amount of capital they need to hold for regulatory purposes to guard against failure... and getting it wrong to the point that it "could become systemic". 

Apparently, the banks strike deals with unregulated shadow banks which attempt to "...structure the premiums and fees so as to receive favourable risk-based capital treatment in the short term and defer recognition of losses over an extended period, without meaningful risk mitigation or transfer of risk... The underlying assets that have been used in these securitised deals include leveraged loans, loans to small and medium-sized enterprises and even books of derivatives counterparty risk." 

In guidance issued last May that took effect in September, the FSA revealed its assessment of the models banks have used to calculate the benefit of these deals in terms of reducing the amount of regulatory capital they need to hold:

"The underlying formula contains an implicit assumption that there is no systematic risk in tranches of diversified portfolios that attach at a level of credit enhancement above the capital requirement on the underlying portfolio. However, the performance of senior tranches of many securitisations since 2007 has shown this assumption to be flawed. In addition, where a firm’s [internal rating] model proves [later] to have under-estimated capital requirements on the underlying portfolio, the [model] leverages any undercapitalisation."

As Alphaville notes, this "ultimately means that banks come out with an answer that says they can hold even less regulatory capital" than they should. And the FSA states: "Therefore, the potential scale of firms’ use of the [models] for capital relief purposes is significant and the impact of any undercapitalisation due to the deficiencies in the [models] could become systemic." My emphasis.

That could mean another giant bailout is in the works, since the shadow banking sector was back to its pre-crisis size of $60trn by the end of 2010.

Yet again, the FSA has found itself outpaced by events, albeit perhaps the latest gap narrowed compared to the lag in response to the sub-prime crisis. And I guess it will be 2013 before we find out what flaws there were in bank capital models used during 2011.

But we should be wary of expecting too much of the regulators, given the culture they're up against... We're on our own: pay less, diversify more and be contrarian.

Red Tape in Retail Financial Services

I'm off to Number 10 today, to talk about red tape that's constraining disruptive business models in financial services. In the interests of transparency, I've summarised my thoughts for both the legal community here, as well as below. I'll be submitting a more detailed paper in the coming weeks, both to the Red Tape Challenge and the BIS Taskforce on alternative business finance. I'm interested in any comments you may have.

In its invitation to submit evidence of ‘red tape’ that is inhibiting the developmentof ‘disruptive business models’, the Cabinet Office notes the example of Zopa, “a company that provides a platform for members of the public to lend to each other, who found that financial regulations simply didn’t know how to deal with a business that didn’t conform to an outdated idea of what a lender is…” 

Financial regulation similarly fails to deal with a range of non-bank finance platforms that share some of the key characteristics of Zopa’s person-to-person lending platform. Accordingly, financial regulation is failing to enable the cost efficient flow of surplus funds from ordinary people savers and investors to creditworthy people and businesses who need finance. In particular, the current framework: 

1. generates confusion amongst ordinary people as to the basis on which they may lawfully participate on alternative finance platforms (even though some are licensed by the Office of Fair Trading); 
2. does not make alternative finance products eligible for the usual mechanisms through which ordinary people save and invest, exposing lenders to higher ‘effective tax rates’; 
3. discourages ordinary savers and investors from adequately diversifying their investments; 
4. incentivises ordinary savers and investors to concentrate their money in bank cash deposits, and regulated stocks and shares; 
5. inhibits ordinary savers’ and investors’ from accessing fixed income returns that exceed long term savings rates; 
6. inhibits the development of peer-to-peer funding of other fixed term finance (e.g.mortgages and project/asset finance, and even short term funding of invoices); and
7. protects ‘traditional’ regulated financial services providers from competition. 

These regulatory failings could be resolved by creating a new regulated activity of operating a direct finance platform, for which the best-equipped regulatory authority would be the Financial Services Authority (as replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority). Regulation of the platform would be independent of any regulation that may apply to the type of product offered to participants on the platform (e.g. loans, trade invoices, debentures to finance renewable energy and lending for social projects). Proportionate regulation that obliges platform operators to address operational risks common to all products would also enable economies of scale and sharing of consistent best practice, and leave product providers and other competent regulators to focus solely on product-specific issues (e.g. consumer credit, charitable purposes). 

Similarly, there is no reason why products distributed via these platforms should not also be eligible for the usual mechanisms through which ordinary people save and invest, such as ISAs, pensions and enterprise investment schemes.