Who's Greg Smith and WTF is a "Structured Product"?

Another mysterious product warning

Yesterday came the 'news' that sales of "structured products" by investment banks to retail and small business customers have soared, in spite of FSA warnings about them. Today, in perhaps unrelated news, came Greg Smith's resignation letter from Goldman Sachs, where he was executive director and head of the firm’s US equity derivatives business in Europe, the Middle East and Africa:

"I don’t know of any illegal behavior, but will people push the envelope and pitch lucrative and complicated products to clients even if they are not the simplest investments or the ones most directly aligned with the client’s goals? Absolutely. Every day, in fact." 

Which begs the question what a "structured product" actually is, and whether small business customers and their advisers had any idea what they were buying - or that they weren't supposed to be buying them.

The explanation of "structured products" at the official MoneyAdviceService is not terribly helpful (a general comment on the site that I've made before). We're told these products involve a 'note' and a 'derivative'. But under the bold heading "How Your Capital is Protected" it says rather ironically that:

"Even if a product offers ‘capital protection’ it can sometimes fail, causing you to lose some or all of your original money."

Oh come on, you say, the Money Advice Service?! Surely the global investment banks aren't going to be selling to 'Moms and Pops'!

But that's exactly the concern. I'm sorry, but just how sophisticated do you believe the average owner/director of an unlisted business really is when it comes to finance deals involving derivatives? One chap said his firm was sold "a £601,000 amortising, enhanced collar swap" and thought it had the same effect as a household mortgage. Yet businesses are being told to go to court against investment banks if they think they've been ripped off, rather than look to the regulator.

But does the regulator really understand these products well enough to be of any help? It seems to be speaking another language altogether. The first footnote to the FSA's industry consultation paper on the subject purports to explain structured products, but somehow I doubt the average banker would understand exactly what qualifies and what doesn't, let alone its customers:

"This publication deals with structured investment products (capital-at risk and non-capital-at-risk) and structured deposits.

We define a structured capital-at-risk product (SCARP) as in our Handbook i.e. as a product, other than a derivative, which provides an agreed level of income or growth over a specified investment period and displays the following characteristics:
(a) the customer is exposed to a range of outcomes in respect of the return of initial capital invested;
(b) the return of initial capital invested at the end of the investment period is linked by a pre-set formula to the performance of an index, a combination of indices, a 'basket' of selected stocks (typically from an index or indices), or other factor or combination of factors; and
(c) if the performance in (b) is within specified limits, repayment of initial capital invested occurs but if not, the customer could lose some or all of the initial capital invested.

A non-SCARP structured investment product is one that promises to provide a minimum return of 100% of the initial capital invested so long as the issuer(s) of the financial instrument(s) underlying the product remain(s) solvent. This repayment of initial capital is not affected by the market risk factors in (b) above.

We define a structured deposit as in our Handbook i.e. as a deposit paid on terms under which any interest or premium will be paid, or is at risk, according to a formula which involves the performance of:
(a) an index (or combination of indices) (other than money market indices);
(b) a stock (or combination of stocks); or
(c) a commodity (or combination of commodities)."

All clear then?
 
Image from HappyPlace.

No More Undue Deference

By now we've witnessed the disasters that resulted from a lack of critical thought amongst auditors, ratings agencies, the Federal Reserve, the IMF, the UK Parliamentary Fees Office, the HBOS audit committee, and Gordon Brown's cabinet. So you would've thought a few lesssons had been learned. Yet I was peeved to hear last week that the protocol for meetings within the Bank of England demands complete deference to its officials - even an expert from another regulator must not speak unless asked to, and their unsolicited questions or observations are pointedly ignored.

Now, I'd like to think that somehow overstates the position - especially in light of Mervyn King's increasingly vociferous assaults on the banks he oversees - and I'm very happy to be put right in a comment. But I also fear someone will laugh and point out that every wing of the civil service works the same way and probably many other large organisations to boot. 

But if this is true, it does not bode well for the levels of co-operation and cohesion that will be required amongst the UK's new financial authorities.

I'm not advocating a culture of disrespect, impoliteness or disobedience - the opposite of deference. I'm against undue deference - the kind that amounts to acquiescence, capitulation, complaisance, condescension, docility and submission. If organisations are going to adapt to facilitate solutions to our problems rather than their own, they should welcome thoughtful contributions from every angle, not allow their management to hide behind phoney rules. 

In short, like Australian troops during the 'Great War', we should only salute officers who earn our respect.

Image from The Philosopher's Magazine.

Greed, Fear And The Child Benefit

The UK's Child Benefit spending programme is too broad. It was conceived amidst the devastation of 1945 - a far cry from where we are today - and it benefits people who don't need it... except to compensate them for paying higher taxes. 

In other words, higher income earners are fussing over the withdrawal of the Child Benefit because they don't trust the government to reduce their taxes if the Child Benefit is removed. Their focus is on being 'no worse off'. Officials know this, because this phenomenon is relied upon to 'sell' new spending programmes.

So, like the plan to raise the personal tax allowance, narrowing the Child Benefit provides a golden opportunity for the government to restore faith with those who pay taxes, rather than to continue the proud tradition of cynically preying on their greed and fear. 

That means the government has to be really clear about how a more efficient benefits system is going to mean lower taxes.

Does Ownership Structure Matter In The Long Term?

Thanks to The Foundation for another entertaining Forum last night - this time on whether ownership structure is the only thing that matters for long term growth.

The discussion opened with some insights on ownership from Michael Green of Philanthrocapitalism fame, Luke Mayhew, former managing director of John Lewis (who also chairs the remuneration committees of some large corporations), and the inimitable Anthony Hilton, Financial Editor of the Evening Standard. 

And there was plenty of vibrant discussion about the merits of competing forms of business ownership, whether by employees, shareholders, customers, partners, joint venturers and even benevolent dictators. 

But it was clear that how a business is owned has little to do with long term growth.

Anthony Hilton said it all in his answer to my question whether solving the problems of customers or potential customers mattered more in the long term than ownership structure. He said that customers don't matter at all, as the City has done very well over the past 50 years dreaming up any old product and shoving it down peoples' throats.

To the extent that you believe that this demonstrates long term success, then I would only observe that City firms characterise every form of ownership. So ownership structures themselves have played no particular role in the City's exploitation of its customers.

But of course you might share my view that it would be wrong to judge the City has having done 'very well' with this strategy, as it is hardly in the best of health.

So ownership is just one of many dynamics that a business has to manage. 

If you are looking for the most important dynamic, then I believe it is whether a business is focused on solving its customers' problems, rather than solving its own problems at its customers' expense.

In other words, the key to long term growth is to be a facilitator, rather than an institution.

Image from The Philosopher's Magazine.

A Dogmatic Approach To Social Housing

For today's post, I'm again drawn to the Red Book and the 'problem' of social housing.

Remember, the game here is not to solve anyone's housing problem. It's to get the Labour Party elected to run the country. So it becomes necessary to explain the social housing problem in that light, rather than in a way that might elucidate its root causes and allow us to figure out a solution.  The facts should not be allowed to get in the way of a good story.

Why social housing? Because, as Dr Eoin Clarke explains, Labour's figures show it was deserted by a disproportionately large number of private renters, compared to property owners, in 2010 compared to 1997.  I can't vouch for any causal connection, but let's roll with it.

The primary challenge for the Labour Party is that this slide in support appears to have beeen a problem of its own making. Dr Clarke explains that in his view, "The Right to Buy scheme launched by Margaret Thatcher in 1981 was initially a good thing." And by the time she left office in 1990, the government was building social housing at about the same rate as it was being sold. That continued during the Major government, although both social housing sales and builds decreased steeply. 

Dr Clarke then asserts that the reason for the decline in sales and new builds of social housing was that Thatcher wouldn't let councils keep the sales proceeds - although that doesn't explain why the programme seemed to go okay for its first 9 years so I suspect something else was going on...

But never mind all that. Here's what happened next, according to Dr Clarke: from 1997 to 2010 there was virtually no social housing built at all, social housing sales boomed and the population grew by 4.41 million. House prices "rocketed". Young families had no option but to rent and "their rent payable was often extortionate... That," confirms Dr Clarke "is the legacy of New Labour's handling of housing."

Enough said, one would have thought. Yet against this background, Dr Clarke then asserts:

"Thus, it is fair to conclude that Margaret Thatcher's Right to Buy scheme was, on balance, a disaster for British housing."

"... we don't trust the Tories to build adequate stocks of social homes, because in their last 18 years of power they only built one for every four they sold."

Huh? Where does that come from?

Ironically, a little later, in her later essay on "Understanding the Psychology of the Working Class Right Wing", Rhiannon Lockley has this to say:

"...the key achievement of propaganda is to make the belief being transmitted internalised to the point where its origin is lost and it is accepted as natural and self-discovered by the individual...  The volume and diversity of negative messages about scapegoated groups in the right-wing media today does much to achieve this, and it is also supported by the factual style of reporting whch presents arguments as definite rather than exploratory."

All of which leaves the following questions: Is there a social housing problem? If so, what is it? How big is it? What are its root causes? What improvements could we make to address those causes? What controls could we put in place to show that it doesn't happen again?

But whatever you do, don't ask a dogmatist.