Defending Humanity Against The Techno-Optimists

I've been involved in tech since the mid-90s, have experienced the rise and burst of many 'bubbles', and have been writing about SiliCon Valley's war on the human race since 2014. But the latest battles involving crypto and AI are proving to be especially dangerous. A cult of 'techno-optimism' has arisen, with a 'manifesto' asserting the dominance of their own self-interest, backed by a well-funded 'political action committee' making targeted political donations. Laws and lawsuits are pending, but humanity has to play a lot harder on defence... To chart a safe route, we must prioritize the public interest, and align technology with widely shared human values rather than the self-interest of a few tech enthusiasts, no matter how wealthy they are.

As Michael Lewis illustrated in The New New Thing, SiliCon Valley has always had its share of people eager to get rich flogging a 'minimum viable product' that leaves awkward 'externalities' for others to deal with. Twenty five years on, we are still wrestling with disinformation and other harmful content that flows from social media platforms, for example, never mind the 'dark web'.

Regardless of the potential downsides, the 'Techno-optimist manifesto' seeks to elevate and enshrine the get-rich-quick-at-others'-expense approach in a set of beliefs or 'creed' with technology as a 'god':

"Technology is the glory of human ambition and achievement, the spearhead of progress, and the realization of our potential." a16z

The techno-optimist creed commands followers to view the world only in terms of individual self-interest, to a point verging on malignant narcissism:

"We believe markets do not require people to be perfect, or even well intentioned – which is good, because, have you met people? Adam Smith: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own self-interest. We address ourselves not to their humanity but to their self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities, but of their advantages.” a16z

In other words, techno-optimists aren't interested in humanity, good intentions or benevolence. They are only self-interested and believe that you and everyone else is, too. It's you against them, and them against you. In this way, the techno-optimists absolve themselves of any responsibility to care about other humans, because other humans are merely self-interested and technology is the pinnacle of everyone's self-interest. 

The cult only needs to focus on building new tech. 

The only remaining question relating to other humans is whether your self-interest is aligned with the techno-optimist's chosen technology. If not, you lose - as we'll see when it comes to their use of your cryptoassets or your copyright work or personal data where it is gathered among the training data they need to develop AI systems...

You might well ask if there are any constraints at all on the techno-optimists' ambition, and I would suggest only money, tech resources and the competing demands of other techno-optimists.

They claim not to be against regulation, so long as it doesn't throttle their unrestrained ambition or 'kill' their pet technology. To safeguard their self-interest, the techno-optimists are actively funding politicians who are aligned with their self-interest and support their technology, and attacking those who are not... with a dose of nationalism for good measure:

“If a candidate supports an optimistic technology-enabled future, we are for them. If they want to choke off important technologies, we are against them,” wrote Ben Horowitz, one of [a16z's] founders, in a Dec. 14 post, adding: “Every penny we donate will go to support like-minded candidates and oppose candidates who aim to kill America’s advanced technological future.” Cointelegraph

"Fairshake, a political action committee [PAC] supported by Coinbase and a16z, has a $73 million war chest to oppose anti-crypto candidates and support those in favor of digital assets... Fairshake describes itself as supporting candidates “committed to securing the United States as the home to innovators building the next generation of the internet.” Cointelegraph

Nationalistic claims are typical of such libertarian causes (Trump's "Make America Great Again") and invite unfortunate comparisons with European politics of the 1930s, as George Orwell pointed out in his Notes on Nationalism in 1945:

Nationalism is not to be confused with patriotism... two different and even opposing ideas are involved. By ‘patriotism’ I mean devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life, which one believes to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people. Patriotism is of its nature defensive, both militarily and culturally. Nationalism, on the other hand, is inseparable from the desire for power... 

A nationalist is one who thinks solely, or mainly, in terms of competitive prestige. He may be a positive or a negative nationalist — that is, he may use his mental energy either in boosting or in denigrating — but at any rate his thoughts always turn on victories, defeats, triumphs and humiliations. He sees history, especially contemporary history, as the endless rise and decline of great power units, and every event that happens seems to him a demonstration that his own side is on the upgrade and some hated rival is on the downgrade. 

But finally, it is important not to confuse nationalism with mere worship of success. The nationalist does not go on the principle of simply ganging up with the strongest side. On the contrary, having picked his side, he persuades himself that it is the strongest, and is able to stick to his belief even when the facts are overwhelmingly against him. Nationalism is power-hunger tempered by self-deception. Every nationalist is capable of the most flagrant dishonesty, but he is also — since he is conscious of serving something bigger than himself — unshakeably certain of being in the right..."

Yet in 2014, Google's CEO at the time, Eric Schmidt, 'warned' us that humans can only avoid the much vaunted Singularity - where computers out-compete humans to the point of extinction - by finding things that 'only humans can do and are really good at'. Ironically, by dedicating themselves utterly to the god of technology, the techno-optimist is actually asserting the 'self-interest' of machines! 

Of course, technology is not inherently good or bad. That depends on their human creators, deployers and users. There's a long list of problems in the techno-optimist manifesto which they claim technology itself has 'solved' but self-evidently has not, either because the technology was useless without human involvement or the problems persist.

And what of their latest creatures: crypto and AI?

While 'blockchain' or distributed ledger technology does have some decent use-cases, the one that gets the techno-optimists most excited is using crypto-tokens as either a crypto-currency or some other form of tradeable crypto-asset. They insist that the technology is so distinct that it must not be subject to existing securities laws. Yet they use the terminology of existing regulated markets to describe roles in the crypto markets that are really only corruptions of their 'real world' counterparts. Markets for cryptocurrencies and cryptoassets are riddled with examples of fraud and market manipulation that were long ago prohibited in the regulated markets. A supposedly distributed means of exchange without human intervention is actually heavily facilitated by human-directed intermediaries, some of which claim to operate like their real world equivalents that safeguard their customers' funds, while actually doing the opposite. The shining example of all these problems, and the numerous conflicts with the participating techno-optimists' self-interest, is the FTX scandal. And there are many others.

As for AI, again there are decent systems and use-cases, but the development of some AI systems relies on huge sets of 'training data' that would be prohibitively expensive to come by, were they not simply 'scraped' from the internet, regardless of copyright or privacy concerns: the technological equivalent of toxic waste. The creators of several of these 'open' AI systems defend their activity on techno-optimist grounds. Midjourney founder David Holz has admitted that his company did not receive consent for the hundreds of millions of images used to train its AI image generator, outraging photographers and artists; and OpenAI blithely explained in its submission to a UK House of Lords committee:

“Because copyright today covers virtually every sort of human expression – including blogposts, photographs, forum posts, scraps of software code, and government documents – it would be impossible to train today’s leading AI models without using copyrighted materials.”

So, there we were in 2014 being warned to be creative, but it turns out that the techno-optimists believe that your self-interest and the rights that protect your work can simply be overridden by their 'divine' self-interest. 

Needless to say, many humans are not taking this lying down (even if some of their governments and institutions are).

In January 2023, illustrators sued Midjourney Inc, DeviantArt Inc (DreamUp), and Stability A.I. Ltd (Stable Diffusion), claiming these text-to-image AI systems are “21st-century collage tools that violate the rights of millions of artists.”  A spreadsheet submitted as evidence allegedly lists thousands of artists whose images the startup's AI picture generator "can successfully mimic or imitate." 

The New York Times has sued OpenAI and Microsoft for copying and using millions of its copyright works seeking to free-ride on its investment in its journalism by using it to build 'substitutive' products without permission or payment.  

Getty Images has also filed a claim that Stability AI ‘unlawfully’ scraped millions of images from its website. 

Numerous other lawsuits are pending; and legislative measures have either been passed (as in the EU and China) or regulators have been taking action under existing law (as the Federal Trade Commission has been doing in the US). 

Meanwhile, the right wing UK government has effectively sided with the techno-optimists by leaving it to 90 regulatory authorities to try to assess the impact of AI in their sectors, and even cancelled plans for guidance on AI copyright licensing that copyright owners had requested. 

As the Finance Innovation Lab (of which I’m a Senior Fellow) has pointed out, the AI governance debate is dominated by those most likely to profit from more AI - and the voices of those who may be most negatively impacted are being ignored. Government needs to bring industry, researchers and civil society together, and find ways to include the perspectives of the wider public. To chart a safe route forward, it is essential that we prioritize the public interest, and align technology with societal values rather than the self-interest of the techno-optimists. 

Commercially speaking, however, there's also the point that consumers tend to reward businesses that act as 'facilitators' (who solve our problems) rather than 'institutions' (who solve their own problems at our expense). Of course, businesses can start out in one category and end up in another... The techno-optimists' commitment to their own self-interest (if recognised by consumers) should place them immediately in the second category.

Meet The Schadenfreuders

As the majority of voters in the western liberal democracies - ironically labelled the "liberal elite" - work their way along the 'change curve' after shocks like Brexit and the rise of Corbyn, Trump and others, their initial shock, denial, anger and blame is giving way to resignation and acceptance... and with it a little pleasure at the growing misfortunes of the 'winners'.

I'm the first to admit that the premise of "Lipstick on a Pig" was that 'people power' would be wielded more wisely than the power of the institutions they topple.  Yet I also pointed out that we are badly short of scepticism, that democracy should be a messy process, and that greed and stupidity are still winning. Pragmatism, after all, is not a destination but represents the constant struggle of "intelligent practice versus uninformed, stupid practice".

So it's all part of the familiar trends toward greater personal control that the Brexiteers can't agree what Brexit means; Corbyn is not proving the electoral champion that his supporters had believed; and Trump has had to concede that the US will in fact pay for any 'Wall' along its southern border, in the hope that Mexico will pay later... 

In other words, the recent populist 'victories' have merely wrung the same old institutional failings out of the same old political parties. And those who fell for the latest examples of 'stupid practice' will need to learn that lesson before we will begin to see the triumph of intelligent practice from genuine 'facilitators'. 

The question is how many more opportunities for schadenfreude there will be in the meantime...

I love the Germans. They've got a word for everything (as Nigel Farage will surely know).

Will You Share Your NHS Records?

You may have received a letter from your local NHS trust, giving you the chance to opt out of the NHS plan to share your health records with Big Pharma and others. 

I've found the process incredibly light on detail about how your data will actually be used, and I don't see how it can be said that any consent you give this way is fully-informed. You can't be expected to give a single 'yes' or 'no' for all your records in such a wide variety of circumstances. 

The issue of consent is not only a question of privacy, but also a question of the value that Big Data derives by exploiting your data without recompense, as explained here. The NHS scheme is just another Big Data play that takes a free ride on your data, and nowhere near the kind of mutually beneficial and trustworthy ecosystem that it's possible to construct today.

For instance, with your own data account you would be able to receive a request to use some of your health records for each specific project. You might choose to 'donate' some of your anonymised data to help find a cure that will be available to everyone at cost price. But you might put a high price on your data if it is to be mined by Big Pharma to create a premium branded drug. 

Hell, for enough dough you might even add your name and a nice photo!

Such a system would not need to be created specifically for your health records, nor paid for by the NHS. In fact, given the NHS record on technology projects it would be best developed by others.

At any rate, I plan to opt out of sharing my health records until the NHS cooperates with a more flexible, user-centric system.

P2P Goes Cloud-to-Cloud

In Part 2 of my response to Google's 'computers vs people' meme, I explained that humans can win the war for economic control of their data by transacting on peer-to-peer marketplaces. That's because the P2P platforms don't derive their revenue primarily by using their users' data as bait to attract advertising revenue. Instead, they enable many participants to transact directly with each other in return for relatively small payments towards the platforms' direct operational costs, leaving the lion's share of each transaction with the parties on either side. This post covers some technological developments which move the P2P front line deep into Big Data territory.

Perhaps the ultimate way to avoid Big Data's free ride on the ad revenue derived from your data is to cut your reliance on the World Wide Web itself. After all, the Web is just the 'human-readable' network of visible data that sits on the Internet - just one of many other uses. As I've mentioned previously, having your own pet 'open data spider' that gathers information based on your data without disclosing it would transform the advertiser's challenge from using Big Data tools to target you with their advertising, to enabling their product data to be found by your spider as and when you need it.

But that would not necessarily solve the problems that arise where your data has to be shared.

Fortunately, all but the most hardcore privacy lobbyists have finally moved beyond debating the meaning of "privacy" and "identity" to realise two important things. First, 'personal data' (data that identifies you, either on its own or in combination with other data) is just one type of user-related data we should be concerned about controlling in a Big Data world. Second, it's critical to our very survival that we share as much data about ourselves as possible to the right recipient in the right context. The focus is now firmly on the root cause of all the noise: lack of personal control over our own data. 

Perhaps the leading exponents of this turnaround have been those involved in the Privacy by Design initiative. As explained in their latest report, they've become convinced by a range of pragmatic commercial and technological developments which together produce a 'personal data ecosystem' with you at the centre. You are now able to store your data in various 'personal cloud' services. 'Semantic data interchange' enables your privacy preferences to be attached to your data in machine-readable form so that machines can process it accordingly. Contractually binding 'trust frameworks' ensure data portability between personal clouds, and enable you to quickly grant others restricted access to a subset of your data for a set time and revoke permission at will. The advent of multiple 'persistent accountable pseudonyms' supports your different identities and expectations of privacy in different contexts, allowing for a lawful degree of anonymity yet making your identity ascertainable for contractual purposes. You can also anonymise your own data before sharing it, or stipulate anonymity in the privacy preferences attached to it, so your data can be processed in the aggregate for your own benefit and/or that of society.

All that's missing is a focus on determining the right value in each context. I mean, it should be a simple matter to attach a condition to your data that you are to be paid a certain amount of value whenever Big Data processes it. But 'how much'? And are you to be 'paid' in hard currency, loyalty points or cost savings?   

The ability to put a value on your data in any scenario is not as far away as you might think. The Privacy by Design report notes that the personal data ecosystem (PDE) is "explicitly architected as a network of peer-to-peer connectivity over private personal channels that avoid both information silos and unnecessary “middlemen” between interactions."

Sound familiar?

As explained in the previous post, P2P marketplaces already enable you to balance your privacy and commercial interests by setting a value on your data that is appropriate to the specific context. Your account on each platform - whether it's eBay or Zopa or one of many others - is effectively a 'personal cloud' through which you interact with other users' personal clouds to sell/buy stuff or lend/borrow money on service terms that leave most of the transaction value with you and the other participants.

The wider developments in semantic data interchange, trust frameworks etc., that are noted in the Privacy by Design report enable these clouds or marketplaces to be linked with other personal clouds, either directly or through the 'personal information managers',  as envisaged in the Midata programme. 

Ultimately, we could use one or two personal information managers to host and control access to our data and derive income from the use of that data by transacting on different P2P platforms dedicated to discrete activities. Not only would this make it simpler to understand and verify whether the use of our data is appropriate in each context, but it would also enable us to diversify our sources of value - a concept that is just as important in the data world as it is in financial services. You don't want all your data and income streams (eggs) in the one cloud (basket).

The Privacy by Design report claims that "all these advancements mean that Big Privacy will produce a paradigm shift in privacy from an "organisation-centric" to a balanced model which is far more user-centric".

I agree, but would add a cautionary note.

In the context of the 'computers vs people' meme, I'm concerned by references in the report to "cloud-based autonomous agents that can cooperate to help people make even more effective data sharing decisions". Has Privacy by Design been unwittingly captured by the Singularity folk?

I don't think so. Such 'cloud-based agents' are ultimately a product of human design and control. Whether the technologists at the Singularity University choose to believe it or not, humans are in fact dictating each successive wave of automation. 

At any rate, we should take advantage of technology to keep things personal rather than submit to the Big Data machines.

Humans Win In The P2P Economy

There's been a lot of heat rising from Google CEO Eric Schmidt's recent assertions about a "race between computers and people" that obliges people to avoid jobs that machines can do. Initially, I suggested this was somewhat disingenuous, given the belief amongst the Silicon Valley elite that machines will achieve the 'Singularity', a state of autonomous superintelligence in which point they will outcompete humans to the point of extinction. Merely pushing people into a narrower and narrower range of 'creative' jobs only furthers that cause, since their creative output attracts the vast advertising revenues Big Data needs to build ever smarter machines.

But I also suggested there's an antidote, and today I want to focus more on that.

Not all Internet platforms finance themselves primarily by using free content as bait for advertising revenue. Since eBay enabled the first person-to-person auction in 1995, the 'P2P' model has spread to music and file sharing, voice and data communications, payments, donations, savings, loans, investments and so on. There are now too many such platforms to list. Even political campaigning has become a person-to-person proposition. In Japan a person can offer to care for another person's elderly parents in his city, if someone else will care for his own parents in another.

Like their meat-space counterparts - the 'mutual society' and the 'co-operative' - online P2P platforms enable people to transact and communicate directly with each other in return for relatively small payments towards the platforms' direct operational costs of facilitating the connection. The P2P model vastly limits the need for advertising, since the platform either enables participants to find each other or automatically matches and connects them using the data the participants enter. Through central service terms, each participant agrees with the others how the platform works and how their data is to be used. Typically, every participant has their own data account in which they can view their transaction history. Some platforms will allow that data to be downloaded, along with all the transaction data on the platform, and this is to be encouraged. Low charges make this a high volume business, like Big Data, but platform operators are able to achieve profitability without commanding the lion's share of the margin in each transaction. This helps explain why eBay is solidly profitable but has a lower market capitalisation than, say, Facebook or Google. It's a leaner intermediary - a facilitator rather than institution. That Wall Street attaches a lower value to a comparatively democratic and sustainable business model tells you all you need to know about Wall Street.

Google and Facebook might argue they are a kind of P2P platform. But aside from a few services, like App sales, they don't directly facilitate the negotiation and conclusion of transactions, so they cannot justify a transaction fee. Perhaps they might say they own the web pages and the servers or virtual 'land' on which their advertising is displayed. But that doesn't ring true. They provide the tools for users to create web pages, but if users did not build them there would be no facade on which to display ads, and no one to look at them. Besides, the supply of creative tools is a one-off, while users supply limitless amounts of data in return. Meanwhile, the advertising revenue that was once merely enough to sustain the Big Data ecosystem now dwarfs the value derived by all participants except the platform operators themselves. Any essence of mutuality - and humanity - has been lost in exactly the same way that banks grew from their mutual origins to capture more and more of the 'spread' between savings and loans. And just as banks now allocate most of the money they create to add financial assets to their balance sheets, rather than financing the productive economy, the Big Data platforms are investing in more ways to capitalise on free user data to lure advertising spend, rather than figuring out new ways to leave most of the value with their users.

Dealing with people and businesses over P2P platforms is a good way to use your own data to claw some of that value back.

Banks Can't Even Be Bothered For The Rich

Oh those poor, poor bankers. Now, we're told by Spear's, that the new 'retail distribution' rules have made their lives so complicated they even have to stop fleecing servicing wealthy customers. Bernie Madoff must be relieved to have got out before the well ran dry.

Ironically, for a magazine that bills itself as "the essential resource for high net worths", Spear's argues the bankers' case. The article seeks to persuade wealthy readers to stop being so demanding if they wish to avoid being 'managed out' by private bankers who find them too costly to serve. In particular, customers must stop expecting services aligned to their needs and behave in a way that suits the banks: 

• agree what the banker will do for you up front, then wait for the quarterly reports and limit any discussion to those times instead of pestering for more frequent advice;

• don't change your instructions (the banks already chew through 3% of your return by making 'adjustments' to your portfolio, so don't make it worse); and

• behave as if you're part of a team - cut your banker some slack when he is slow to realise gains or avert losses and, most importantly, recommend him to your friends (bankers just love the bandwagon effect).

Puzzling, until you realise where Spear's probably gets most of its advertising revenue.

Definitely a sign that yet another area of the financial services market is ripe for innovation by facilitators.

The Reform Of Our Institutions Won't Come From The Top

It's been a difficult month to finish this post. Every day another dollop of decrepitude is revealed amongst our rotting institutions. Systemic slaughter in the NHS. The convenient collapse of a major police corruption trial through 'missing' evidence. Police concealing the misuse of private investigators and spying on victim's families for the chance to undermine public sympathy. Sunlight on vast pay-offs to the departing management of the Savile-stricken BBC. The lengths to which the unions will go to control the Labour Party and use it to enshrine their own power. The Church of England deciding to turn money lender. And, surprise, surprise yet another massive bank fine...because, yes, any bank that relies on a public guarantee of its liabilities and massive tax subsidies through ISAs and so on should regard itself as a public institution.

It's a core theme of this blog to contrast the decline of faith in institutions that have evolved to suit themselves at our expense, with the rise of facilitators who exist to help us solve problems more effectively for ourselves.

Our institutions won't align with the interests of the those who rely on their services while they suppress evidence of their ineptitude, or while trustees and management quibble over their extent of their responsibilities, or while politicians spend their time blaming each other for the mess. These are sure signs that our institutions are stuck in denial and that the MPs and Ministers whose job it is to supervise them are stuck in their own cycle of blame.

Until our institutions understand and accept the need to align with the consumers of their services, rather than the desires of their pompous managers, they will not evolve into efficient, facilitative organisations worthy of our trust and respect.

But I don't believe that our so-called political leaders or the managers of our institutions have either the self-awareness or the skills needed to achieve this evolution. They are merely products of 'the system' that so desparately needs to evolve.

Sustainable reform will only come come from the grassroots rather than the top down. It will only come when each of us takes personal responsibility for turning things around, whether by exposing institutional failings or genuinely working to solve other people's problems rather than merely our own. 

In other words, both the problem and the solution are in our hands.

What Happened To 'Class A' Political Journalism?

My appetite whetted by this week's local electoral melodrama, I've been searching for some Class A political journalism to feed my lust for pragmatism. 

There were little flashes of it from a few of the TV people. Michael Crick, who blew the lid off the Andrew Mitchell stitch-up, was rude as hell to Farrago, no doubt furious at having stuck to him like a leech in the hope of discovering anything coherent and coming up empty-handed. That left the usually mild-mannered Gary Gibbon to go after the rest of the gang. Desperation set in after the AutomEtonian responded to every single question with the line that this week was simply about local councils. He genuinely seemed to forget he was the Prime Minister, and I guess it's easy to see why. This seemed to put Gary in such a foul mood that he went after Flash Nick and Millibore like a mortar crew on speed. Each prevarication was interrupted with a fresh round down the tube, and another explosion of disbelief at the factually-twisted response. 

The only problem with the Gibbon assault was the apparent premise of the questions on capital spending: that it's the job of the state to fill every hole in the infrastructural landscape. Creating a whole new mountain range out of UK public debt is strange medicine indeed, whatever the cause. Ironically, Flash Nick went closest to a straight response, saying that while they'd barely invested a bean of new public money, the coalition has done a great job of attracting private capital to public projects. If that's true, then let's hope they've overcome the planning fallacy, and the PFI vultures leave a little flesh on the state carcass for the rest of us. 

As for Ed, well... 

In the end, the howling in my soul could only be quieted by re-reading "Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72". Forty years on, nothing has changed. The vicious wheels of the party political machines are still flattening the best interests of the citizens into the road in the rush for power and patronage, and Thompson's substance-fuelled take on the political animal is so brutally right that the recognition will make you laugh like a hyena. This, for example, could have been written today:

"This also reinforced my contempt for the waterheads who ran Big Ed's campaign like a gang of junkies trying to send a rocket to the moon to check out rumours that the craters were full of smack."

Now why doesn't anyone write about politics like that anymore?

Is it merely because today's journalists are sober, or have they abandoned hope that we can produce anything different to the current stage-managed pantomime?

Thatcher Failed To Make It Personal

Whether you loved or loathed her, you have to be impressed that 23 years after she was hunted out of office Margaret Thatcher's funeral is as divisive as a Poll Tax riot.

Clearly Britain has failed to 'move on' from the Thatcher years, which suggests to me that the work she started was on the right track but is seriously incomplete. I mean, if her policies had been just plain wrong-headed or disastrous, Britain would have dropped them like hot coals - or the notion of 'light touch' banking regulation. Instead, we're still trying to balance Thatcher's blast of economic reality with its personal and social impact.

Whatever your politics, it's clear from all the recent commentary that Thatcher was focused solely on improving the way the failing British economy 'works'. She spent her energy arguing relentlessly with people about the nature of the problems, their causes and the improvements that should be made to resolve them. The resulting policies obviously appeared 'right wing', but this was largely by comparison with the dogmatic lunacy espoused by the economic lemmings in charge of the Labour Party and trade unions at the time. Their policies seemed predicated on the private sector operating as a charity for the public sector, rather than economic sustainability. Thatcher's opponents were not arguing either on the same rational terms or with the same rigour. Her disciplined approach ruthlessly exposed dogma, from both left and right, and homed in on the most feasible economic solution. Then she rammed it home...

While Britain's reward was increased productivity and employment, far too many of its people were ill-equipped to cope with this fairly brutal brand of politics. Thatcher is infamous for the quote that "there's no such thing as society" which is often unfairly given without the qualification she gave it. But even the full quote reveals a serious flaw in her approach:

"They are casting their problems at society. And, you know, there's no such thing as society. There are individual men and women and there are families. And no government can do anything except through people, and people must look after themselves first. It is our duty to look after ourselves and then, also, to look after our neighbours."  Women's Own, 1987.

Thatcher's words "and then" raise the issue of when, which we naturally interpret as 'when we have enough for ourselves'. But enough is never enough. Our society is obsessed with personal rights and entitlements, rather than the duties and obligations which must be performed if those entitlements are to be delivered. After all, who ultimately bears the responsibility for delivering everyone's rights and entitlements if not each of us personally? Thatcher was right to the extent that the state cannot perform our personal obligations for us - ultimately, it can only act as a facilitator for our own endeavours - but it was a mistake to assume that society would automatically benefit if each of us looked after ourselves as a first step. Perhaps this was as much a flawed belief in the 'efficient markets hypothesis' as that of Alan Greenspan (and Gordon Brown) a decade later.

At any rate, we are now faced with the fact that, in Thatcher's own terms, we are not looking after a fairly large number of our neighbours. While it's worth noting that Thatcher's governments produced consumer-oriented legislation such as the first Data Protection Act (1984), the Hospital Complaints Procedure Act (1985) and the Consumer Protection Act (1987), it took British society several more decades to establish even a basic sense of 'customer service', and most of the UK's institutions are still not designed around the 'customer'.

In my view, we will continue to struggle with significant social imbalances until we grasp the idea that society and the economy only 'work' if each of us - whether acting as individuals or employees of corporations or the public sector - acts in ways that are sustainable for both ourselves and society at the same time. It's not a matter of looking after ourselves first "and then" our neighbours, as an afterthought. Our activities have to be aligned to be sustainable. And only by focusing on our duties and obligations to everyone else will we secure our own rights and entitlements. That is the fundamental concept behind what I would call “the Personal State”. It's time we built it.

Image from DelhiNewsRecord.

LSE Gets It: More Pragmatism, Less Politics

Having recently made the same point, I'm encouraged to see the London School of Economics setting out in detail some of the ways in which the UK could benefit if pragmatic political consensus were to replace party-political dogma. 

However, it would be wrong to think that this approach is only needed in the areas of education, infrastructure and innovation, on which the LSE's report focuses in particular. It's a general shift in attitude that is required in every aspect of our lives. 

This doesn't simply mean that politicians and civil servants should adopt a different top-down attitude. It means inverting the institutional narrative altogether. Politicians and the public sector must adopt a pragmatic, bottom-up view of what works and what does not work at the individual level, for the common good. The public sector must monitor and disclose publicly whether - and, if so, how - its activities, regulations and incentives distort all kinds of local and national markets in favour of private and public sector institutions, thereby constraining innovation and competition. Critically, this extends to the wasteful way in which the public sector purchases its own goods and services.

In practical terms, that shift in attitude requires the civil service and politicians to focus on obtaining data, defining problems, measuring their scale, analysing root causes and implementing lasting solutions. After all, hard choices are easier for more people to accept when they can be shown to be driven by harsh reality rather than party political dogma.

While, fortunately, there's plenty of evidence to suggest that this change is already underway as part of longer term trends discussed on this blog, the voices of institutions like the LSE are critical to those trends becoming mainstream behaviour sooner.  Let's hope similar reports follow from others shortly.

Pragmatism Grows At Night

In "India Grows at Night" the writer and commentator Gurcharan Das shares his insights into how India's growing, pragmatic middle class can achieve the country's necessary political and economic reforms. While inspired by Das's presence in Tahrir Square two years ago, these insights also resonate with the plight of Western democracies whose growth is inhibited by extractive private and public sector institutions.

The title of the book comes from Das's belief that India's knowledge economy powered her economic growth because: 

"Bureaucrats did not know how to regulate it and could not choke it with red tape, in the way they stifled India's industrial revolution through licences, permits and inspectors... India's knowledge economy literally grew at night while the government slept."

But India's problems are not over. Das explains that the "puzzle is... how can a vibrant democracy with a rising economy and an energetic civil society have allowed the state and governance to decay"?  He then describes the evolution of the Indian state from before British rule until today, tracing the tensions between social and official structures, and the shortcomings of the political system and key market failures.

Despite different starting points, this 'decay' also awaits Western democracies who have not been alert to the need for ongoing political and economic reforms. There's an ominous familiarity, for instance, in the complaint that the Indian state is preoccupied with the quantity of schools and other public services rather than their quality - "which is what really drives shared prosperity." The problems in our financial system are well rehearsed.

Das's description of the reasons for India's institutional decay is also echoed in Phillip Blond's explanation of the 'political bankruptcy' in Western countries. I understand them both to be saying that right wing policies allow the concentration of wealth amongst relatively few extractive institutions and their management and investors, rather than creating an environment in which widespread entrepreneurship can flourish. Meanwhile, left wing policies that are designed to 'redistribute' income through taxation and public spending are grossly inefficient by comparison to markets. The self-interest of partisan politics has gone too far, and legislators have no real commitment to the common good. Electoral battles fought along social and cultural lines distract everyone from critical long term issues, as well as being dangerously divisive. As a result, we lack appropriate regulatory frameworks and incentives to address market problems that stifle innovation and competition. Not only does institutional decay reflect the bankruptcy of dogma-ridden political parties, but as that decay constrains growth the economy itself drifts into liquidation.

Das argues that successful reforms will only be achieved through more active political participation by the members of the rising middle class, since they are the most conscious of the problems and the most impatient for the necessary reforms. He argues that the intransigence of existing Indian political parties creates the need for an entirely new, 'bottom-up', liberal political party. Das explains that this is a 'classical' rather than a 'social' liberalism - tolerant on social and cultural matters, yet wary of state intervention where the private sector and the market can be more effective.

This also seems to reflect the "renewed political idealism" and "participative democracy" for which Phillip Blond argues. 

In UK terms, this would seems to place Das's vision for a 'liberal party' somewhere between the Tories and the Liberal Democrats. And it seems quite telling that UK voters have forced those two political parties into coalition.

However, I disagree that the formation of a new political party or even a new political idealism is a necessary pre-condition for achieving political and economic reform.

As discussed in Lipstick On a Pig, the bottom-up approach that Das refers to has already been unleashed, largely enabled by the Internet's 'architecture of participation'. The 'Arab Spring' and developments in sub-Saharan Africa emphasise both the global nature of this phenomenon and its effective political impact. This process of 'democratisation' requires no more structure than the social media and a city square, and its power lies in the fact that it isn't confined to politics or economics. Greater transparency, knowledge and reform in one area creates the desire for change elsewhere. The result is both seismic and chaotic, yet significant reform is bound to be 'messy', not orderly and neat. As a result, I've suggested we're seeing the evolution of a "personal state" in which we're acting pragmatically as individuals in a highly collaborative fashion through the services of facilitators, rather than passively relying on our institutions to set the pace of reform.

New political parties and ideals might well emerge in this environment, but they will be a symptom of reforms achieved by each of us acting personally, not the cause.   

Big Data: Is Reputation Really Portable?

At the recent London New Finance session on Big Data in Finance, Mark Hookey of Demyst.data suggested that a more accurate profile of a person is obtained by observing the breadth of the person's behaviour, rather than the depth of their history in any one area. The challenge is knowing which types of data from each area of the person's behaviour are representative (and having permission to use that data). He conceded that the profile is probabilistic rather than predictive.

Rachel Botsman has also talked about the concept of 'reputation capital', which is a product of all who have trusted you, when and why. She says it's only a matter of time before we are able to aggregate, monitor and use our ratings on the many sites on which we interact, so that we extract more value from the total of our "reputation capital". Rachel suggests this capital will be more powerful than our credit score. Rachel also suggests we'll be able to intentionally 'shape' our reputation, and so build-up our reputation capital (or reduce it). Two challenges she suggests are:

• knowing which data should be included in the data set that comprises your total reputation -  the same challenge facing Demyst.data and others Rachel mentions; and

• how to enable 'digital ghosts' to leverage their reputation capital (subject to privacy and data protection), since they don't interact online and therefore do not personally generate their own reputational data. 

But even if you do manage to identify the limited set of data that best represents a person's behaviour in a given context: 

• how relevant is that behaviour in any other context?

• what more does 'total reputation' tell you about a person in a given context than what you can see of their behaviour in that context?

As we observed in the programme on Rethinking Personal Data, the significance and value of personal data can't be captured in a single dollar amount, or a 'yes'/'no' answer to whether it can be used. Instead, the value and utility of personal data is a hugely complex dynamic that varies by: 

• the context or the activity we are engaged in;
• which persona we are using at that moment;
• the actual data being used or provided;
• the permissions given;
• the rights that flow from those permissions; and 
• the various parties involved.

It follows that a reputation derived from a specific activity is also purely contextual, and attempts to rely on a 'good' reputation in one context as suggesting good behaviour in another are flawed. At best, as Mark Hookey conceded, the total profile or reputation data might indicate probable behaviour in another context to a greater or lesser degree, but it won't be predictive. And the person relying on the reputational data still has to know or discover the reliability of making the association.

Of course, we already know how unreliable a reputation from one context can be in a different context. Brands are key reputational badges, and while sticking a trusted brand from one industry on a new product in another market or industry might work from time to time, generally it's not a sure-fire thing. If the brand is extended to enough products that fail, the brand eventually becomes diluted, or less trusted, as the failures outweigh the power derived from success in the original context.

Indeed, I believe that internet technology is liberating us from the tyranny of a single reputation, such as a credit score.

The highly contextual nature of both identity and the behavioural data generated suggests that if you want a good reputation for doing something, then you simply need to do it and do it well. Other people will only rate you highly if you do things they find helpful (assuming you can't simply buy ratings). In other words, the vast array of reputational data available on the internet is enabling us to distinguish the facilitators, who solve other people's problems in a specific context or market, from the 'institutions' who merely claim they're here to help, but actually exist to solve their own problems at other people's expense.

So, no, reputation is not really portable. And the idea that disparate reputations can be unified or expressed as a total amount of 'reputation capital' that can be reliably leveraged over time, regardless of context, is similarly flawed.

Image from MasCanc.

The Personal State

This decade is not going well for Britain’s institutions. The 2010 election did not magically restore our faith in a scandal-ridden Parliament. Bail-outs failed to improve the conduct of UK banks. Our public sector finances are in an appalling state. And as more sunlight has revealed the self-serving conduct of our mountainous bureaucracies, the gradual melting of our trust in them has become an avalanche. We want to know how rotten our institutions really are. More importantly, however, we want new models that work. 

As explained in “Lipstick On a Pig”, this plunge in faith in our institutions coincides with trends that are democratising the means of producing goods and services. Using digital technology we are personalising the one-size-fits-all experience traditionally offered by the likes of record labels, publishers, retailers, banks and political parties, and manufacturing our own physical products using desktop industrial machines. Rather than merely accepting what is ordained from the top down, both individually and as members of the ‘crowd’ we are shaping products, markets and political policies to solve the problems we encounter in our day-to-day activities. 

This process of ‘democratisation’ is being facilitated by organisations that are intently focused on helping us solve those problems. I call these organisations ‘facilitators’ to distinguish them from ‘institutions’, which exist to solve their own problems at our expense. The characteristics that I believe mark an organisation as being either a facilitator or an institution fall within broader themes of alignment, openness, flexibility, transparency and responsibility. In other words, a 'facilitator' solves its customers’ problems openly, flexibly and transparently, and takes responsibility for the impact of its activities on the wider community and society. 

Why are these features so critical? You might argue, for example, that focusing on ‘creating shareholder value’ or maximising management and staff compensation have proved to be more successful for some organisations than focusing on customers. As Anthony Hilton, Financial Editor of the Evening Standard, once said, “The City has done very well over the past 50 years dreaming up any old product and shoving it down peoples' throats.” 

But if that’s such a successful strategy, why are those City firms suddenly the subject of scandal after scandal and fine after fine for mis-selling and other misconduct? Why aren’t they able to recover quickly from their mistakes and move on? Why is Parliament labouring over new banking and financial services legislation? Why are people taking to the streets in protest? 

Because these firms are not 'facilitators'. 

In “Lipstick on a Pig” I explored the distinction between facilitators and institutions in the context of financial services, which then marked the latest consumer frontier. That sector also provides a great illustration of how organisations that produce complex products with hidden fees that their own staff can neither explain nor justify to customers become hooked on revenue and profits that disappear when the regulators finally wake up. How clubbing together with competitors leaves the whole club vulnerable to the same event or the consequences of the same mistake. How ignoring complaints and covering up problems leaves an organisation unable to understand the causes of issues it needs to fix. And how, when it finally emerges that the institution is not managed in the interests of the wider community, that community will no longer support it.

Since then, however, the frontier has expanded to confront the public sector and how society works – or doesn’t - as a whole. So I've been focused on the extent to which the public sector shares the same institutional characteristics that afflict our banks, and how facilitators are emerging in that wider context to help people solve their day-to-day problems that are being ignored. 

Whether an organisation is a facilitator or an institution is ultimately a matter of personal judgement for each of its customers. You might consider that a supplier is on the cusp of either category. Some will shift categories over time - although the drift from facilitator to institution appears to be easier than reform the other way. Some may never be reformed. Instead, they will gradually wither away while alternative models grow around them. 

Ultimately, however, the success or failure of our institutions and the facilitators that replace them is down to each of us. We are obsessed with ‘our rights’, but we must also realise that each of us bears responsibility for the wellbeing of everyone else. With our rights come duties and obligations that each of us must perform personally. The state cannot perform these obligations for us. The state can only act as a facilitator for our own endeavour. This is “the Personal State”. 

The Personal State is a simple concept. But it is of course a hugely complex dynamic, fraught with deeply-rooted life and death problems. For it to operate effectively, each of us must act pragmatically - in an informed way, rather than by adopting “uninformed, stupid practice”. That means no longer describing problems in terms of political dogma and propaganda. It means thinking critically and practically to identify and solve real problems. It means praising what works and explaining what doesn’t. It means spending, saving and investing our money in productive ways, and declining state benefits we don’t need. It means finding ways to improve the efficiency and productivity of the public sector to reduce public spending. Of course we must punish the gross mismanagement of our institutions and other violations of public trust. Yet we must also encourage entrepreneurs to engage in survivable trial and error, in order to promote innovation, competition and growth. In short, we must help each other wherever we can. 

Now a state like that would be worthy of some lipstick.

Image from Makeup Artist.

Auntie's Fall From Grace: Death Of Another UK Institution

The resignation letter of the BBC's latest director-general reveals deep flaws in yet another of the UK's self-serving institutions.

One assumes the document was the product of some discussion, and that the "unacceptable journalistic standards of the Newsnight film that was broadcast on Friday 2 November" was carefully chosen as the narrowest possible reason for the top bureaucrat to go. Some care was taken not to mention the mishandling of the Jimmy Savile revelations, for example, or the seismic cultural implications of the BBC choosing to spike a story about his criminality in favour of a series of fawning tributes. But isn't it simply the case that a cosy insider is incapable of cleaning the place up? After all, Lord Patten said he only hired Entwistle to make the BBC "10 or 20% better" and it's now a vastly bigger job than that.

This tendency to cover up, to obfuscate, defend and deflect is the stuff of mere politics. It should not feature in the management of a public organisation in the public interest. 

Yet it's what we've come to expect from the British establishment. It permeated the Parliamentary expenses scandal and the conduct that led to the bank bailouts. It resurfaced in the failure of UK banks to honour Project Merlin, their Libor-fixing activities and attitude to international money laundering. It was present in the activities of GlaxoSmithKline that yielded a $3bn criminal settlement. It's there in the evidence to the Leveson Inquiry, the handling of the Hillsborough disaster by South Yorkshire Police and the systemic cover-up of child abuse.

And you can be sure we have not seen the last example. It seems that Britons are fascinated to learn just how rotten the country's institutions really are.

Ignore LIEBOR Tricks And Cheap Politics

Ignore confidence tricks.

As the LIEBOR scandal claims a few scalps, let's not be distracted. As Bobby "Dazzler" Diamond himself has said, the time for remorse is over, and similar characters will no doubt take their place. 

Let's not be distracted by faux outrage from the House of Commons, which has been so meek in its challenge to the banks' self-serving culture that it suddenly chose to deplore last Thursday. After all, allegations of LIEBOR fixing go back many years and all the major UK political parties have declined to regulate it ever since. As the passage of the Financial Services Bill has demonstrated, the Commons will need to be dragged kicking and screaming to pass anything approaching adequate financial regulation.

And let's not be distracted by the crocodile tears and the speculative law suits from major corporations who claim to have unwittingly based their financial transactions on LIEBOR without understanding that it was open to manipulation. They're big enough to look after themselves - and usually do. Remember that they've failed to act on excessive equity underwriting fees charged by investment banks because they can always pass these fees on to retail investors and consumers, and the Office of Fair Trading seemed to have no problem with this. 

So while we should enjoy the revelations of age old scandals, the ritual sacrifice of Chairmen and Chief Executives and the occasional corporate bloodbath, let's not be distracted by them. Because they are not the driver of appropriate reform in a society that regards the accumulation of wealth of such high importance.

Let's focus instead on continuing to reward facilitators - those organisations that exist to solve their customers' problems, rather than to solve their own problems at their customers' expense. It is this trend in our day-to-day behaviour, more than any other, that will reform our society - and maybe even the behaviour of bank executives.

Image from Sulekha.

Rethinking... Financial Services

How time flies when you're having fun. When not engaged in rethinking personal data, I've been experiencing the deep joy of rethinking financial services regulation, now that the Financial Services Bill has reached the House of Lords.

As I've explained in the other place, this is not about flogging a dead bank. This is about enabling the growth of new facilitators - the same kind of evolution towards cost-efficient and transparent financial services that we have already seen in other retail markets. The same evolution that Andy Haldane of the Bank of England has advocated - or Lord Young, for that matter.

My experience so far leaves me optimistic that the UK's creaking regulatory framework can be successfully overhauled. Unlike the MPs in the House of Commons, the Peers are less interested in the politics and more interested in the detail of what works and what doesn't. For that reason, the passage of the Financial Services Bill through the House of Lords provides a rare and invaluable opportunity to confront the government - and the Treasury - with all those gripes and suggestions that have been ignored for years.

So please take that opportunity - whether it's via comments on media stories, through the blogosphere or any contact you may have with the powers that be.

Next stop: Europe.

Image from The Philosopher's Magazine.

Innovation Is Vital For Growth, Not Just Cost-Cutting

There's a lot of concern about how to grow the UK economy. Some have pointed to banks and the public sector as 'the enemies of growth' because they are 'extractive', rather than inclusive 'facilitators'. Government spending is too high, as are taxes, and there's a concern that national public sector pay awards have 'crowded-out' private employers. Banks are not lending. 

But there's much more to this, of course. 

Clearly even the generous private credit available during the noughties merely went on houses and consumer spending, rather than building sustainable and globally competitive businesses, especially in the regions. As Steve Randy Waldman of Interfluidity recently explained in the context of southern Europe's troubles, it's the poor allocation of capital, not lack of finance or high labour costs, that causes "an incapacity to produce tradable goods and services in sufficient quantity." Governments aren't alone in their ability to waste money and other resources.

How do these things fit together?

Experience shows that countries whose governments try to spend more than 30 - 35% of their overall output (GDP) gradually produce less and less. That's because governments impose taxes to pay for spending (and borrowing), and tax is a 'deadweight cost' or economic inefficiency. As output declines, the government receives less and less tax so ultimately must spend less on public services. Those services then start to break down. Eventually, everyone speaks Greek. UK government spending is about 50% of GDP. Yet tax receipts have averaged around 38 per cent of GDP over the last twenty years and have never exceeded 40%. The UK government can a funding gap (deficit) of up to 2.5% of GDP before it becomes a 'structural deficit' - an albatross around the country's neck that takes a special effort to remove - George Osborne's current challenge. By contrast, the Australian and Swiss governments spend around 35% of GDP (source: OECD, IEA, p. 47).

On a regional basis, the UK picture gets worse. Public spending in London and the South East has remained under 40% of regional GDP. But public spending equates to 45% of regional production in the East, and a whacking 70% of what the North East produces. Public spending in England is cruising at 50% of national output, while in Scotland it's at 60% and in Wales and Northern Ireland the good citizens are dragging around a millstone of government expenditure equal to 80% of their GDP  (source: HM Treasury, hat tip IEA, p. 57).

So, if you live somewhere outside London and the South East your community has a choice. Either you ask the government to start spending a hell of a lot less on you. Or you make sure the region produces enough so that government spending only represents about one third of your output. Pick neither and you'll αρχίσουν να μιλούν ελληνικά.

It's possible that high public sector pay rates make both of these tasks harder - it means the government is spending more (on its staff), and it's more expensive for businesses to hire the staff they need, so they charge higher prices and their products are are less competitive.  Public sector pay is mainly agreed centrally, in national pay awards. Those who work in more expensive places than the average, like London, get paid a bit more. But employees who work in places where it's cheaper to live than average don't get paid less. So their communities will find it harder to keep government spending in the right proportion to what their community produces.

But this does not necessarily mean labour costs are the main reason for some regions being more competitive than others. Steve Randy Waldman, of Interfluidity, argues that competitiveness is about capital much more than labour:

"... to the degree that unit labor cost statistics capture what they claim to capture ... European workers, North and South, have come to earn roughly equal pay for equal product. Southern European workers do earn less overall, simply because they produce fewer or lower-value goods and services than their Northern neighbors. [But] unit labor costs are not the problem at all: it is the scale of aggregate output. And what determines the scale of aggregate output? Is it the laziness of workers? No, of course not. We all know that when residents of poor countries emigrate to rich ones, the same weak bodies and flawed characters that produce very little at home suddenly explode into economic vigor. The difference is “capital depth”, broadly construed to include all the physical equipment, business organization, public infrastructure, and governance that collude to enable two small hands and a broken mind to accomplish outsize things. Workers’ pay level is not the problem in Southern Europe [or, say, UK regions]. It is deficiencies in the arrangement of capital, again broadly construed, that have left Greece and Spain unable to produce value in sufficient quantity to compete with their neighbors."

 As a result, Steve suggests: 

1. "If Southern Europe lacks competitiveness, the part of the cost structure that needs to be reformed has to do with rents paid to capital rather than the sticky wages of workers; and

2. "The European periphery was rendered uncompetitive by toxic patterns of capital allocation." For this he cites Arnold Kling's recent paper for the Adam Smith Institute, which concluded:

"...economic progress involves creating new patterns of [sustainable] specialization and trade [PSST]. When new opportunities suddenly emerge, there can be periods in which high productivity growth in industries with relatively inelastic demand creates a surplus of workers. It takes time for entrepreneurs to discover new ways to exploit specialization and comparative advantage, and it takes time for the labour force to adapt to new skill requirements. These real adjustments are needed in order to restore full employment."

In short, the UK and each of its regions needs to foster self-employment and entrepreneurship, by creating an environment in which it's easy to start and grow new businesses. Removing the difference between public and private sector pay may help incentivise public sector workers to move to the private sector - as could laying off more public sector workers. The necessity to find new work may be the mother of invention, after all. But that doesn't remove the ultimate need to focus on fostering the process of creating new businesses for those workers to join.

Image from NE Generation.