'Bank' of Dave Goes P2P

I've hugely enjoyed the documentary series tracing Dave Fishwick's valiant efforts to start a small community 'bank' in Burnley high street. 

I say 'bank' because, while it made for good television to say so, Dave didn't necessarily mean "bank" in regulatory terms. His goal was to enable local people to lend to other local people and businesses without profiting unduly. He rightly thought that's what banks are supposed to do, so he was determined to call himself a 'bank' to make the point. And his good-humoured, optimistic crusade has certainly rammed the point home.

While Dave also didn't necessarily set out to launch a peer-to-peer lending marketplace, his path to launch was eerily familiar to those who have done so. The FSA wouldn't speak to us either, prior to the launch of Zopa in March 2005, but was all too keen to discuss the detail afterwards. Fortunately we'd done our homework and didn't have to stop taking money. At least that made for good TV in Dave's case.

Since 2005 a dozen other management teams have also threaded their way through the regulatory maze to directly link savers and borrowers, or investors and entrepreneurs, via online 'P2P' lending or crowd-investing markeplaces. And it's good to see that Dave's journey has led him to adopt the peer-to-peer model on the high street. He may be facing the bricks-and-mortar problems that the online models solve, but at least he's shown there is very real demand for innovation amongst people who still manage their finances by walking around. And the benefits to the 200 local borrowers who are paying a net 5% to local savers are undeniable.

Unfortunately, there are still unnecessary difficulties in structuring these businesses, regardless of whether they facilitate loans or investments in shares or debt. The sources of that uncertainty were summarised here in January 2012, here in February 2012, here in June 2012 and here in July 2012. Industry CEOs and others met policy and regulatory officials to discuss these difficulties at a summit in December 2012, and again last month (as summarised here). The salient points were also explained again in my submission to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards.

However, while it's clear there is plenty of shared frustration and many officials have been supportive in discussions, there is worryingly little sign of actual regulatory change.

We need a lot more war stories like Dave's.

Banks To Repay Cash-ISAs When Teaser Rates Expire?

The government's ISA programme has become a victim of its own success. The Treasury estimates that "around 45%” of UK adults have one or more Individual Savings Accounts. The total amount held is estimated at £400bn, half of which is in either regulated bonds or shares while the other half is held in cash deposits that are being eaten by inflation. 

In 2010, Consumer Focus found that the £158bn which was then held in cash-ISAs was earning an average of only 0.41% interest after initial ‘teaser’ rates expire. They also found that 60 per cent of savers never withdraw money from their account. 

Since then, there has been a campaign to get banks to tell customers when teaser rates expire. But what has been the banks' response?

To cut the 'teaser' rates on cash ISAs (even though the government subsidises lower lending rates).

Meanwhile, the Treasury has also resisted calls to expand the range of assets included in ISAs, which would enable savers to diversify and boost innovation and competition in the retail finance markets, as explained here. 

The implicit message from the government is that consumers only have themselves to blame if they don't move their savings to get the best deal. But the government can't have it both ways. It can't introduce an artificial tax incentive and then ignore the systemic issues that incentive creates. The government should either take responsibility for the behaviour that is driven by its incentives, and re-design them accordingly. Or it should withdraw the incentives.

So, short of opening up the cash-ISA market to real competition, what more can be done to remind people to switch their ISA cash?

The last straw would be for all cash-ISAs to be term deposits which can only last for the duration of the 'teaser' rate. When that rate expires, the cash would have to be paid into the customer's nominated 'ISA holding account', from which it can be re-allocated as the customer sees fit. 

Maybe this will lead to 60% of ISA cash deposits earning no interest at all. But only then could the government really claim that consumers who don't seek out the best return only have themselves to blame.

What's The Beef?

Isn't it fascinating how quickly the FSA reacted to the faintest whiff of horsemeat, yet it's namesake was prepared to leave dodgy banking products lying around the shelves for years? 

And what a remarkable difference in crisis management there is between the average high street food retailer and the finance shop next door!

Seems to me the Treasury's hoping most Brits will prefer the taste of a beaten favourite. 

My Legal Alter Ego Has Been At It Again

Image from Parliament.uk

This time he's made a submission 

To the Banking Standards Commission.

He's a poet and he didn't know it.

Towards A Diverse, Sustainable Financial System

It's not every day you get to brainstorm ways to bring diversity and sustainability to Britain's ailing financial system amidst a broad cross-section of officials, economists, entrepreneurs, think-tanks, technology suppliers and advisers. And yesterday's Finance Innovation Lab workshop was a golden opportunity to do just that.

While the Lab will report the output in due course, I thought I'd share a summary of my notes from the breakout sessions in which I participated. These looked at regulatory barriers and lack of financial awareness. Others explored the unfair advantages enjoyed by estalished providers and ways to encourage innovation. We operated under the Chatham House Rule, hence the absence of names or affiliations.

The UK financial system is neither diverse nor sustainable. 

There is plenty of evidence that the UK's financial system is suffering from a lack of innovation and competition, and is unsustainable in its current form. Rates of market entry and exit are low, relative to other industries. Few customers switch and customer trust is lowest for financial services on several leading surveys. The unit cost of intermediation remains high in financial services compared to other retail markets, while management and staff have reaped the benefits of any increased operational efficiencies (even while legacy systems remain prevalent). Banks rely on a huge back-book of deposits on which they pay little or no interest to finance loans to fund trading in financial assets rather than loans to productive businesses. After all, a single giant property loan does more to grow the bank's numbers than lending the same amount of money to thousands of small firms. 

Regulatory barriers

 

Against this background, we concluded that the current regulatory framework, including subsidies and incentives, is essentially designed to both protect the 'financial system' and 'customers' - i.e. to minimise the risk that consumers and small businesses, in particular, will be mis-sold 'products' by unscrupulous suppliers. 

In effect, however, that framework obliges policy officials (Treasury) and regulators (FSA) protect the system as it is, rather than to ensure that it evolves to encourage and accommodate innovation in line with customer requirements. That's because the framework and those who police it are organised in silos according to existing product types and types of suppliers, and not according to types of customers' and their day-to-day activities. 

The customer protection regime mirrors this approach, being organised according to limited sets of product types and types of suppliers, as well as types of promotional and business activities in which suppliers are engaged (not their customers). As a result, the impact of regulation, complaints and potential for changes are all viewed through the lens of existing products and firms, and any actual changes reinforce those lines of distinction. 

The perverse nature of this can be seen in the fact that, if I want to allocate £100 to a project that I'd like to support, it's easiest for me to donate the money, a bit more complex if I want the money repaid with interest (as a loan), very complex if I want to be able to freely trade that right to be repaid with interest (a bond) and the most complex thing of all is to receive an equity share in the project. This discourages diversification and the search for opportunities to get a decent return on surplus cash; and limits the availability of funding to new businesses, on which most new jobs depend.

Hard-wiring the markets according to types of products, suppliers and ways of dealing with them also artificially limits the number and range of suppliers, product types, and the corresponding markets. In addition, taxpayer guarantees and subsidies in the form of savings and pension incentives are aligned with existing regulated suppliers and product types. Therefore, the regulations and incentives work together to enable the suppliers in the regulated markets to charge higher fees, make higher margins, reward staff more generously and pay more for marketing - resulting in less innovation and competition.

The overall result is a financial system that is not designed to evolve in line with the requirements of consumers, small businesses or even big business. It is designed to suit incumbent suppliers - those who play well with the system, regulators and policy officials. Yet there is no single set of policy officals or regulators tasked with understanding how the regulations, subsidies and incentives actually work together as a whole or whether they distort any aspects of the financial system within or outside the regulated areas.

A broad range of solutions were suggested, as you can imagine, and the Lab will report on these shortly, and include them in a submission to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. However, suggestions included: 

• creating a Parliamentary Select Committee to focus on encouraging financial innovation;

• limits on market share by product type;

• controls on gross leverage; 

•  separate banks' credit creation process from financial intermediation (the process of allocating that credit);

• central bank guidance to banks on how much to lend productive firms;

• levelling the playing field on subsidies and tax incentives/allowances;

• a target of 200 new local banks by 2016;

• publishing details of national banks' regional/local banking activity;

• making it easier to get low risk financial businesses authorised;

• publishing the amount of the subsidies to major banks and oblige them to set aside a proportion of their subsidy for future crises;

• treating payments systems and credit reference data as utilities (i.e. public goods).

Lack of financial awareness

The scale of financial mis-selling across many different types of products and lack of diversification by investors suggests a widespread lack of understanding of financial services. This was seen to be caused by a lack of financial education, on the one hand; and by product complexity on the other. In turn, product complexity is driven by both regulatory complexity and an unwillingness to invest the extra effort required to simplify products and better align them with customer requirements.

The lack of financial education is essentially a failing of our education system. Yet there is little faith that the Department for Education accepts any responsibility for delivering a sound financial education. It's also clear that no other government department sees this as part of its mission. Rather, financial education seems to be a specialist area confined to universities and business schools or professional bodies. It was felt that this will only change with a determined effort by the Department for Education to measure financial 'literacy', collect best practice for teaching it and including those measures in the national curriculum. Measures of success would include improvements in financial literacy exam results, fewer complaints to the Financial Omudsman Service and improved diversification amongst savers and investors.

Removing product complexity requires a commitment to reducing regulatory complexity, the removal of the regulatory barriers to innovation and competition discussed above, as well as incentives that drive both simpler products and diversification, rather than the concentration of funds into a few regulated asset classes.

In short, more pragmatism and less politics should go a long way.