Optional Annuities Could Mean Working Pensions

Odd that Will Hutton should claim in The Observer, of all places, that making the purchase of pension annuities optional will end in long term social disaster. UK pensions are already a long term social disaster. Hutton himself points out that "400,000 people buy £11bn of annuities every year", yet "the annuity market [has become] overstretched, offering indifferent and often wildly different rates." 

This is because consumers have no choice. There's no competitive pressure at all on the insurance companies or their agents to remove unnecessary middlemen, reduce fees to customers or simplify products. In fact, the Financial Services Consumer Panel recently found that the annuities industry continued to focus on increasing its revenues through product complexity, even when consumers were given the option to shop around. No one in the industry seized the opportunity to make annuities more transparent and better value for the consumer. [Update on 26 March: Legal & General has suggested the market for individual annuities will shrink by 75% - rather endorsing the government decision to make them optional!].

Will Hutton argues that rather than make annuities optional "the response should have been to redesign [the market] and figure out ways it could have offered better rates with smarter investment vehicles". But that seems naive, given the FSCP findings. The industry had that opportunity and declined it. 

It's equally naive to suggest that less demand for annuities will mean losing a valuable opportunity for insurance companies to 'pool the risk' of funding pensions. The industry merely sees risk pooling as a chance to exploit asymmetries of information to line its own pockets. 

The only way for the government to shake up the cosy annuities cartel was to remove the implicit guarantee that everyone would have to buy an annuity. 

Mr Hutton then seeks to set up some kind of moral panic that the 'freedom to buy a Lamborghini' instead of an annuity will result in people simply frittering away their life savings. Not only does this suggest that he'd rather your life savings were placed in the grubby mitts of the annuities industry so they can buy the Lamborghinis, but it also insults the consumers who face the abyss of the annuities market. Their concern clearly arises from the lack of decent returns, not because they're eager to spend the cash on exotic cars.

Finally, Will suggests that the State is entitled to control how you invest your pension money because it allowed you to avoid paying income tax on your pension contributions in the first place. If you agree with that, then presumably you would say the State is entitled to control how you spend every penny of your income that it has allowed you to keep. This of course places a great deal of trust in the State's financial management capabilities that we know from bitter experience is ill-deserved. As a result, it's more likely that citizens will gain greater control over the allocation of 'their' tax contributions, not less (as I've joked about previously). But regardless of whether it's the State or the taxpayer who is in control, neither party wants the State to be saddled with the consequences of an uncompetitive and opaque annuities market. That would only suit the annuities spivs. Again, the only alternative is to expose the market to competition from all manner of transparent savings and investment opportunities. 

Importantly for economic growth, the freedom to avoid annuities opens up the potential for £11bn a year to be invested directly into the productive economy at better returns in much the same way that the new ISA rules will liberate 'dead money' from low yield bank deposits. Not only could we see some pension capital crowd-invested into long term business and infrastructure projects in a way that won't be interrupted by the need to purchase an annuity, but those in draw-down might also consider some 3 to 5 year loans to creditworthy borrowers as a way to generate some additional monthly income.

At Last: ISAs Go To Work

Finally, the last lines of resistance have fallen and the Chancellor has announced that ISAs will go to work: 

"To further increase the choice that ISA savers have about how they invest, ISA eligibility will be extended to peer-to-peer loans, and all restrictions around the maturity dates of securities held within ISAs will be removed. The government will also explore extending the ISA regime to include debt securities offered by crowdfunding platforms."

In addition, from 1 July 2014 ISAs will be reformed into a simpler product, the ‘New ISA’ (NISA), with an overall limit of £15,000 per year. You will be able to hold cash tax-free within your Stocks and Shares NISA (if your provider allows it). And you'll be able to ask NISA providers to switch your money between cash-NISAs and Stocks and Shares NISAs.

As has been pointed out repeatedly, these changes offer a huge boost to the real economy, because savers will be able to lend their 'dead' savings directly to each other and to small firms to help fill the funding gap left by the banks. At the same time, savers will improve the value of their investments, not only by diversifying into a new asset class, but also one that provides a decent return.

In 2012, the Treasury estimated that about 45% of UK adults have an ISA, with a total of £400bn split equally between cash and stocks/shares.  But others had found that cash-ISAs were only earning an average of 0.41% interest (after initial ‘teaser’ rates expire), and 60% of savers never withdraw money from their account. That amounts to £120bn worth of 'dead money', because only £1 in every £10 of bank loans goes to small firms, and we rely on those firms for 60% of new jobs.

Hats off to the government and the Treasury for putting in the work to turn this situation around.

We Need Let The Crowd into Financial Services

What a difference a year makes. At an industry event yesterday none other than Nicola Horlick, a well-known fund manager, confirmed her faith in crowdfunding as way of people putting money directly into the lifeblood of the economy, at a time when bank finance for small businesses is limited. Her own film finance vehicle raised £150,000 by issuing shares within weeks of an initial discussion with Seedrs CEO, Jeff Lynn, about how the crowd might help. A year ago, she wouldn't have given it a moment's thought. 

Of course, Nicola was referring to equity crowd-investing, which is the latest type of crowdfunding to burst into life. People have been donating to each other's projects via online marketplaces for nearly a decade and lending to each other online since 2005. Even the UK government is lending along side savers on peer-to-peer lending platforms. 

But these 'direct finance' marketplaces are no longer simply challenging a dozy bunch of retail banks. The addition of crowd-investing in shares and bonds is a direct assault on the sophisticated world of venture capital, private equity and boutique investment banking. 

Silicon Roundabout has launched a rocket attack on Mayfair.

This trend has raised a few bushy eyebrows down at Canary Wharf, where the paint is still wet on the signage at the hastily re-named Financial Services Conduct Authority. Not everyone at the FCA is excited by the prospect of just anyone being able to put a tenner into a business run by Nicola Horlick. In fact, the 'hawks' down there seem to believe that ordinary folk should content themselves with a low interest savings account, a lottery ticket and a flutter on the nags between visits to the nearest pub. If you can't afford to lose a grand, say the hawks, then you've hit the economic buffers. The banks can enjoy the use of your savings for free, while the government enjoys the betting taxes and the excise on your beer and cigarettes.

And we wonder why the poor get poorer.

You might also wonder, as I did yesterday, how 'the government' might explain to the same person who is banned from buying a share in the local bakery why he is still be free to blow £10 on a drug-fuelled quadruped at a racetrack, or donate it to a band that might go triple platinum and never have to share a penny of the upside with those who backed them.

But that's where you're reminded that the government never puts itself in the citizen's shoes; and there's really no such thing as 'the government' anyway. Just individual civil servants at separate desks in separate buildings, each looking at his or her own policy patch and waiting to be told what to do. Collaboration is not a creature common to Whitehall. In that world, no one at, say, the Treasury snatches up the phone to share a bold new vision for driving economic growth from the bottom-up with the folks over at Culture Media and Sport, or Business Innovation and Skills or Communities and Local Government. 

Or do they...?

At least those in Parliament, bless them, did collaborate in response to the ongoing financial shambles. Julia Groves of the UK Crowd Funding Association quoted some choice words on alternative finance from the report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, and I've set out the full quote below (as I have previously). Julia also put it very nicely in her own words: "Wealth is not a skillset." We need to let the crowd into financial services, and we need to keep the 'crowd' in crowdfunding. Let's hope this time the following message permeates all the way to the remaining hawks at Canary Wharf.

"57. Peer-to-peer and crowdfunding platforms have the potential to improve the UK retail banking market as both a source of competition to mainstream banks as well as an alternative to them. Furthermore, it could bring important consumer benefits by increasing the range of asset classes to which consumers have access. This access should not be restricted to high net worth individuals but, subject to consumer protections, should be available to all. The emergence of such firms could increase competition and choice for lenders, borrowers, consumers and investors. (Paragraph 350)

58. Alternative providers such as peer-to-peer lenders are soon to come under FCA regulation, as could crowdfunding platforms. The industry has asked for such regulation and believes that it will increase confidence and trust in their products and services. The FCA has little expertise in this area and the FSA's track record towards unorthodox business models was a cause for concern. Regulation of alternative providers must be appropriate and proportionate and must not create regulatory barriers to entry or growth. The industry recognises that regulation can be of benefit to it, arguing for consumer protection based on transparency. This is a lower threshold than many other parts of the industry and should be accompanied by a clear statement of the risks to consumers and their responsibilities. (Paragraph 356)

59. The Commission recommends that the Treasury examine the tax arrangements and incentives in place for peer-to-peer lenders and crowdfunding firms compared with their competitors. A level playing field between mainstream banks and investment firms and alternative providers is required. (Paragraph 359)."

Banks To Repay Cash-ISAs When Teaser Rates Expire?

The government's ISA programme has become a victim of its own success. The Treasury estimates that "around 45%” of UK adults have one or more Individual Savings Accounts. The total amount held is estimated at £400bn, half of which is in either regulated bonds or shares while the other half is held in cash deposits that are being eaten by inflation. 

In 2010, Consumer Focus found that the £158bn which was then held in cash-ISAs was earning an average of only 0.41% interest after initial ‘teaser’ rates expire. They also found that 60 per cent of savers never withdraw money from their account. 

Since then, there has been a campaign to get banks to tell customers when teaser rates expire. But what has been the banks' response?

To cut the 'teaser' rates on cash ISAs (even though the government subsidises lower lending rates).

Meanwhile, the Treasury has also resisted calls to expand the range of assets included in ISAs, which would enable savers to diversify and boost innovation and competition in the retail finance markets, as explained here. 

The implicit message from the government is that consumers only have themselves to blame if they don't move their savings to get the best deal. But the government can't have it both ways. It can't introduce an artificial tax incentive and then ignore the systemic issues that incentive creates. The government should either take responsibility for the behaviour that is driven by its incentives, and re-design them accordingly. Or it should withdraw the incentives.

So, short of opening up the cash-ISA market to real competition, what more can be done to remind people to switch their ISA cash?

The last straw would be for all cash-ISAs to be term deposits which can only last for the duration of the 'teaser' rate. When that rate expires, the cash would have to be paid into the customer's nominated 'ISA holding account', from which it can be re-allocated as the customer sees fit. 

Maybe this will lead to 60% of ISA cash deposits earning no interest at all. But only then could the government really claim that consumers who don't seek out the best return only have themselves to blame.

Towards A Diverse, Sustainable Financial System

It's not every day you get to brainstorm ways to bring diversity and sustainability to Britain's ailing financial system amidst a broad cross-section of officials, economists, entrepreneurs, think-tanks, technology suppliers and advisers. And yesterday's Finance Innovation Lab workshop was a golden opportunity to do just that.

While the Lab will report the output in due course, I thought I'd share a summary of my notes from the breakout sessions in which I participated. These looked at regulatory barriers and lack of financial awareness. Others explored the unfair advantages enjoyed by estalished providers and ways to encourage innovation. We operated under the Chatham House Rule, hence the absence of names or affiliations.

The UK financial system is neither diverse nor sustainable. 

There is plenty of evidence that the UK's financial system is suffering from a lack of innovation and competition, and is unsustainable in its current form. Rates of market entry and exit are low, relative to other industries. Few customers switch and customer trust is lowest for financial services on several leading surveys. The unit cost of intermediation remains high in financial services compared to other retail markets, while management and staff have reaped the benefits of any increased operational efficiencies (even while legacy systems remain prevalent). Banks rely on a huge back-book of deposits on which they pay little or no interest to finance loans to fund trading in financial assets rather than loans to productive businesses. After all, a single giant property loan does more to grow the bank's numbers than lending the same amount of money to thousands of small firms. 

Regulatory barriers

 

Against this background, we concluded that the current regulatory framework, including subsidies and incentives, is essentially designed to both protect the 'financial system' and 'customers' - i.e. to minimise the risk that consumers and small businesses, in particular, will be mis-sold 'products' by unscrupulous suppliers. 

In effect, however, that framework obliges policy officials (Treasury) and regulators (FSA) protect the system as it is, rather than to ensure that it evolves to encourage and accommodate innovation in line with customer requirements. That's because the framework and those who police it are organised in silos according to existing product types and types of suppliers, and not according to types of customers' and their day-to-day activities. 

The customer protection regime mirrors this approach, being organised according to limited sets of product types and types of suppliers, as well as types of promotional and business activities in which suppliers are engaged (not their customers). As a result, the impact of regulation, complaints and potential for changes are all viewed through the lens of existing products and firms, and any actual changes reinforce those lines of distinction. 

The perverse nature of this can be seen in the fact that, if I want to allocate £100 to a project that I'd like to support, it's easiest for me to donate the money, a bit more complex if I want the money repaid with interest (as a loan), very complex if I want to be able to freely trade that right to be repaid with interest (a bond) and the most complex thing of all is to receive an equity share in the project. This discourages diversification and the search for opportunities to get a decent return on surplus cash; and limits the availability of funding to new businesses, on which most new jobs depend.

Hard-wiring the markets according to types of products, suppliers and ways of dealing with them also artificially limits the number and range of suppliers, product types, and the corresponding markets. In addition, taxpayer guarantees and subsidies in the form of savings and pension incentives are aligned with existing regulated suppliers and product types. Therefore, the regulations and incentives work together to enable the suppliers in the regulated markets to charge higher fees, make higher margins, reward staff more generously and pay more for marketing - resulting in less innovation and competition.

The overall result is a financial system that is not designed to evolve in line with the requirements of consumers, small businesses or even big business. It is designed to suit incumbent suppliers - those who play well with the system, regulators and policy officials. Yet there is no single set of policy officals or regulators tasked with understanding how the regulations, subsidies and incentives actually work together as a whole or whether they distort any aspects of the financial system within or outside the regulated areas.

A broad range of solutions were suggested, as you can imagine, and the Lab will report on these shortly, and include them in a submission to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. However, suggestions included: 

• creating a Parliamentary Select Committee to focus on encouraging financial innovation;

• limits on market share by product type;

• controls on gross leverage; 

•  separate banks' credit creation process from financial intermediation (the process of allocating that credit);

• central bank guidance to banks on how much to lend productive firms;

• levelling the playing field on subsidies and tax incentives/allowances;

• a target of 200 new local banks by 2016;

• publishing details of national banks' regional/local banking activity;

• making it easier to get low risk financial businesses authorised;

• publishing the amount of the subsidies to major banks and oblige them to set aside a proportion of their subsidy for future crises;

• treating payments systems and credit reference data as utilities (i.e. public goods).

Lack of financial awareness

The scale of financial mis-selling across many different types of products and lack of diversification by investors suggests a widespread lack of understanding of financial services. This was seen to be caused by a lack of financial education, on the one hand; and by product complexity on the other. In turn, product complexity is driven by both regulatory complexity and an unwillingness to invest the extra effort required to simplify products and better align them with customer requirements.

The lack of financial education is essentially a failing of our education system. Yet there is little faith that the Department for Education accepts any responsibility for delivering a sound financial education. It's also clear that no other government department sees this as part of its mission. Rather, financial education seems to be a specialist area confined to universities and business schools or professional bodies. It was felt that this will only change with a determined effort by the Department for Education to measure financial 'literacy', collect best practice for teaching it and including those measures in the national curriculum. Measures of success would include improvements in financial literacy exam results, fewer complaints to the Financial Omudsman Service and improved diversification amongst savers and investors.

Removing product complexity requires a commitment to reducing regulatory complexity, the removal of the regulatory barriers to innovation and competition discussed above, as well as incentives that drive both simpler products and diversification, rather than the concentration of funds into a few regulated asset classes.

In short, more pragmatism and less politics should go a long way.

Careful What You Incentivise

Two things seem to be choking the flow of money to people and small businesses in the UK: broken regulation and perverse incentives. Yet there's a tendency to focus more on regulation, and to only see the obvious incentives - like bankers bonuses. Some innovative self-regulation in retail finance has been welcomed by the UK government, and banking reform creeps ahead. But all this could prove futile if problems with incentives are not also addressed. To fix those, we need to look below the surface at the more fundamental incentives at play in the financial system. In particular, we need to understand the extent to which the likes of ISA schemes and pension investment rules are limiting competition and innovation in financial services and inhibiting economic growth. I've summarised some recent debate on this below, and added some comments on the government's latest defence of the ISA scheme. I'd welcome your thoughts.

Some of the perverse incentives have been outlined to government by tax colleagues previously (in Annex 3 to this document). In essence, the contention has been that certain tax relief selectively favours banks and the suppliers of regulated investments to the detriment of innovation and competition. In particular, the tax free ISA system funnels ordinary people's savings into UK bank deposits on a vast scale, which the banks then fail to lend. This effectively discourages and inhibits those same people from diversifying, one alternative being to extend finance directly to other creditworthy people and businesses through peer-to-peer platforms. As a result, it's been suggested that the ISA system should be extended to cover such direct finance. Indeed, in his response to the Red Tape Challenge, Mark Littlewood, Director-General of the Institute of Economic Affairs and a 'Sector Champion' said:

"...it is surely worth noting that the present format and definition of the ISA wrap may have raised “barrier to entry” problems for new financial products and it may be beneficial to review these to stimulate innovation in the sector."

But the impact on innovation is merely the tip of the iceberg. It's the impact on the wider economy that must be understood.

There is overwhelming evidence that the UK's small businesses are cash-starved. They represent 99.9% of all UK enterprises and are responsible for 60% of private sector employment. Their output is critical to the UK's economic growth, which has stalled. Yet they face a funding gap of £26bn - £52bn over the next 5 years. Critically, the four banks which control 90% of the small business finance market are lending less and less to them. This is a red flag. You might think from their enormous market share that these banks would consider small business lending to be very important and a retreat from that market unwise. But, as the economist Richard Werner has pointed out, the reality is that only about 10% of the overall credit issued by our banks goes to productive firms. The other 90% goes to fund deals involving financial assets which don't count towards economic growth figures. So for these banks small business lending is actually a sideshow. They clearly make their money elsewhere.

Yet the ISA scheme had lured savings and investments of £391bn from UK adults by the April 2012, half of which is in cash deposits in these same banks. And they pay nothing for it - a paltry 0.41% in interest after 'teaser rates' expire, according to a 'super complaint' by Consumer Focus in 2010. 

In other words, the government appears to be incentivising workers to plough their savings into banks which virtually ignore the sector on which most of those same workers depend for their income. 

Contrast this with the position in Germany, where 70% of the banking sector comprises hundreds of small, locally-controlled banks who provide 40% of all loans to SMEs.  In an ironic twist, the UK government now sees peer-to-peer platforms as a similar conduit for a new German-style government-directed lending programme. But it appears never to have openly considered that the limited scope of the ISA scheme is part of the problem. 

In March, the goverment defended the narrow scope of the ISA scheme for the reasons extracted here. In September, the government gave a different response (see p. 13 here). In the hope of sparking wider debate on the issues, I've set out the current defence of the status quo below (my additions/comments in square brackets). I welcome any comments.

"HM Treasury believes that there is not a strong enough case for [making bad debt relief available to P2P lenders], as creating an exception would add complexity to the tax system and is difficult to justify when other [unspecified] forms of investment do not qualify for bad debt relief. Moreover, the current tax treatment of P2P investors is not necessarily a barrier to further expansion, as witnessed by the impressive growth in the industry in recent years.

...HM Treasury does not believe that P2P loans are suitable for inclusion in ISAs. The risk profile of P2P lending is too high [compared to what? cash ISAs? stocks and shares ISAs?], and it is unlikely that the platform can satisfy some of the [unspecified] features essential to the operation of ISAs.

Consumers tend to view ISAs as a relatively safe and simple investment vehicle [this fails to distinguish between cash ISAs and stocks/shares ISAs. And are they safe?]. ISA investments are thought of as relatively low-risk, and consumers should be able to get access to their funds whenever they wish. This is less likely to be the case with P2P lending than with existing ISA Qualifying Investments [this could be cured by permitting secondary markets in P2P loans]. 

Similarly, existing Regulations require ISAs to be operated through an ISA Manager [regulations could include P2P platforms], who invests through persons or firms who are authorised by the FSA, and thus have access to the FSCS [this does not mean you can't lose the principal in your stocks/shares ISAs, or stop banks paying 0.41% interest on cash ISAs]. As far as we are aware, current P2P lending platforms are not conducive to the ISA Manager role, are not regulated by the FSA, and do not offer Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) protection [any or all of which could be changed by regulation].

Finally, in order to be included in an ISA, P2P loans will require to be listed as a Qualifying Investment. Qualifying Investments are identified generically. It would be extremely difficult to restrict a generic description such as “loan” only to loans made via P2P lending platforms [but none of the qualifying investments are so generic, being limited by reference to 'banks', 'building societies', 'recognised stock exchanges' etc., so why not by reference to 'P2P platforms'?]. Exclusion from the ISA wrapper does not make this type of lending exceptional; rather, it puts it on the same footing as investment in stocks and shares issued by unlisted companies [how are these activities equivalent?]."