Better Services For SMEs: Follow The Data

I was at a 'parliamentary roundtable' on Tuesday on the perennial topic of small business banking reform. A more official report will be forthcoming, but I thought I'd record a few thoughts in the meantime (on a Chatham House basis). 

It still seems to surprise some people that small businesses represent 95% of the UK's 5.4m businesses - 75% of which are sole traders - and that they account for 60% of private employment, most new jobs and about half the UK's turnover. So-called 'Big Business' is just the tip of the iceberg, since only they have the marketing and lobbying resources to be seen above the waves. As a result small businesses have long been a blind spot for the UK government - until very recently - and the impact has gone way beyond poor access to funding. It includes slow payment of invoices, the absence of customer protection when dealing with big business and lack of alternatives to litigation to resolve disputes.

What's changed?

A combination of financial crisis, better technology and access to data has exposed more of the problems surrounding SMEs - and made it possible to start doing something about them. And it's clear that legislators are prepared to act when they are faced with such data. The EU Late Payments Directive aimed to eliminate slow payments. The UK has created the British Business Bank to improve access to finance, as well as a mandatory process for banks to refer declined loan applications to alternative finance providers and improved access to SME credit data to make it easier for new lenders to independently assess SME creditworthiness. The crowdfunding boom has also been encouraged by the UK government, and has produced many new forms of non-bank finance for SMEs, including equity for start-ups, debentures for long term project funding, more flexible invoice trading and peer-to-peer loans for commercial property and working capital.  Last week, the FCA launched a discussion paper on broadening its consumer protection regime to include more SMEs.

Yet most of these initiatives are still to fully take effect; and listening to Tuesday's session on the latest issues made it clear there is a long way to go before the financial system allocates the right resources to the invisible majority of the private sector.

A key thread running through most areas of complaint seems to be a lack of transparency - ready access to data. This seems to be both a root cause of a lot of problems as well as the reason so many proposed solutions end up making little impact. But the huge numbers and diversity of SMEs presents the kind of complexity that only data scientists can help us resolve if we are to address the whole iceberg, rather than just the tip. That's surely one job for the newly launched Alan Turing Data Institute, for example, although readers will know of my fear that it seems more aligned with institutions than the poor old sole trader, let alone the consumer. So maybe SMEs need their own 'Chief Data Scientist' to champion their plight?

The latest specific concerns discussed were as follows:

• despite much regulatory activity, few bank reforms have actually taken effect - and many are being watered down - with the result that the banking picture is worse, if anything, than it was in 2008. Recent fines and scandals reveal little change in culture from that described in the report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards and most recently in the damning report into the failure of HBOS. In addition, banking is more concentrated (despite a few new entrants); less diverse in terms of ownership structure, competition, regional coverage and financial model; and still only about £200bn or 3% of bank assets are focused on SMEs and GDP producing activities. The trouble is we've known this for some time, but aside from the BBB's activity on access to funding, we still seem unclear on what can be done for SMEs at a regional or local level;

• the recent findings and remedies proposed by the Competition and Markets Authority into business current accounts are widely considered to be weak and unlikely to be effective - try searching the word "data" in the report to see how often there was too little available. The report still feels like the tip of an iceberg rather than a complete picture of the market and its problems;

• austerity imperatives seem to be the main driver for off-loading RBS into private shareholder ownership - the bank pleading to be left to its own devices (not what it suddenly announced to the Chancellor in 2008!) - and trying to kill-off any further discussion of using its systems as a platform for a network of smaller regionally-focused banks (as in Germany);

• bank lobbying has become more powerful - and will become even more so with the merger of their various mouthpieces - we need much more transparency on banks' access to government and the revolving door between the City and Whitehall/Westminster - we should have learned long ago that the interests of large banking groups are not aligned with SMEs (or consumers);

• SMEs lack an effective means of resolving disputes with banks, as the Financial Ombudsman Service has limited jurisdiction; banks refuse to release internal reports related to credit decisions and calling in loans; while the FCA is said to be hiding behind its confidentiality obligations; and banks have too much legal fire power for SMEs to take them on in court - hence moves to take matters into their own hands. The FCA has clearly woken up to this, but it's recent discussion paper shows there's a huge gap to close.

• the financial infrastructure for SMEs appears not to be geographically diverse - it doesn't yet mirror the Chancellor's "Northern Powerhouse" policy, for instance - despite calls for bank transparency on the geographical accessibility, a US-style "Community Reinvestment Act" and clear reporting on lending to SMEs by individual banks (rather than the Bank of England's summary reporting). There's a sense that we should see some kind of financial devolution to match political devolution, albeit one that still enables local finance to leverage national resources and economies of scale. Technology should help here, as we are tending to use the internet and mobile apps quite locally, despite their global potential;

• Some believe that SMEs need to take more responsibility for actively managing their finances, including seeking out alternatives and switching; while others believe that financial welfare should be like a utility - somehow pumped to everyone like water or gas, I assume - indeed regional alternative energy companies were touted as possible platforms for expanding access to regional financial services. My own view is that humans are unlikely to become more financially capable, so financial and other services supplied in complex scenarios need to be made simpler and more accessible - we should be relying less on advertising and more on hard data and personalised apps in such instances.

• Meanwhile, SME are said to lack a genuine, high profile champion whose role it is to ensure that the financial system generally is properly supportive of them. This may seem a little unfair to the Business Bank, various trade bodies and government departments, but it's also hard for any one of these bodies to oversee the whole fragmented picture. As I suggested above, however, I wonder whether a 'data champion' could be helpful to the various stakeholder in identifying and resolving problems, rather than a single being expected to act as a small business finance tsar. 

 In other words, we should follow the data, not the money...

Building Societies Abandon The Lending Code

A new version of the Lending Code has been released, simply omitting the name of the Building Societies Association which has ceased sponsoring the farcical idea that UK retail lenders should be allowed to regulate themselves.

Banks and credit card issuers still think it's a good idea though...

This Is Not The Time To Let Bank Management Off The Hook

The CEO of UBS yesterday joined other wolves in sheeps clothing big bank leaders in calling for freedom to make 'honest mistakes' (last year it was the crew at HSBC!). 

This is just a confidence trick. After all, the word "mistake" covers many different types of sin and bank culture doesn't seem to distinguish between honest and dishonest ones, as Andrew Hill of the FT has pointed out. He also cites a memo from JP Morgan's CEO as warning against descending into "a culture of back-stabbing and blame" - but from what I understand that's exactly the culture that already prevails, at least amongst rival managing directors. Emails disclosed in numerous scandals reveal that these are dog-eat-dog environments, full of perverse incentives, where everything from taking the credit for other people's efforts to fiddling records to incurring the odd regulatory fine are just speed bumps along the road to fees, profits and this year's bonus.

Ignorance of exactly what is going on at operational level is another aspect of this confidence trick. Recently, the CEO of government-owned RBS told John Snow of Channel 4 News that he "didn't know" whether there were other major scandals waiting to break. I guess it's a tricky question to answer, but it does highlight the conclusion from the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards that these banking groups appear to be beyond management control, enabling those at the top tend to avoid culpability. Remember, too, that many of the recent scandals, like currency market rigging, arose well after the start of the financial crisis. So nothing has really changed since the aptly nick-named 'noughties' (lest we forget Bobby "Dazzler" Diamond's immortal words in 2011!).

And to suggest that regulation might mean big banking groups will tend to take less risk in doing things that customers care about, like lending to small businesses or paying higher returns on savings, is poppycock. They aren't bothering to do this anyway. They just want the freedom to make more money for management, and possibly shareholders. They are simply not customer-led businesses.

For all these reasons, the bank CEOs should continue to be roundly ignored.

Banks Make A Mockery Of Their Self-regulatory #LendingCode

Readers may still be surprised to hear that Britain's retail banks remain self-regulated when it comes to their lending activities.

That means it's the job of their own Lending Standards Board to check that subscribers are complying with the self-regulatory Lending Code, not the Financial Conduct Authority (although there is a 'memorandum of understanding' between the two bodies written on the back of an envelope somewhere).

Of course, the Lending Standards Board tends to give its own members a clean bill of health...

Which is puzzling, because the LSB has just made the rather unfortunate discovery after reviewing complaints procedures that there is "mixed evidence to indicate that issues, once identified, [are] being reviewed specifically against the requirements of the Code."

In other words, the banks are blowing raspberries at the Code.

So, um, how could the LSB have given the banks a clean bill of health before now?

Does the FCA care? Or, in regulatory speak, "Quis custodiet ipsos custodes?"

It's been a farce from the very beginning.

Why Bankers Make Poor Managers

If UK banks ran our restaurants, we'd all be spending a lot more time in our smallest rooms.

In the latest example, the Financial Conduct Authority found that only 2 of the 164 RBS and NatWest mortgage sales reviewed actually met the required sales standard. Even the banks’ own tests confirmed the problem that borrowers were at grave risk of being sold the wrong type of mortgage. Yet it took the banks nearly a year to stop fiddling and begin taking proper steps to resolve the issues. Worst of all, this took place in 2011 and 2012 - long after the events of 2008 had alerted everyone to just how poorly these banks were managed generally; and after numerous specific failings had been detected in their retail operatons. The same banks had just been fined for failing to screen customers and handle complaints appropriately - and had even failed to enable customers to pay bills or access money. 

Of course, RBS and NatWest are not alone, and the banks' problems are not confined to their retail operations. Most of the major banks are embroiled in scandals arising from lack of operational controls of one kind or another.

Over at heavily-embattled HSBC, the Chairman and Chief Executive have been whingeing about the 'cost of compliance', as if it's a dead weight they're forced to bolt-on to the side of their sales process, rather than a set of largely common-sense business rules that should be embedded in their operations. 

They don't seem to realise what a sad indictment it is on the level of management skill in the financial services industry that successive regulators since 1986 have felt obliged to spell-out in minute detail how to operate a financial services business at every level and in every scenario. As a result, no human could possibly lift a printed version of the FCA's 'Handbook'. 

The same charge can be made for failings in longer term strategy. The government had to force the banks to invest in faster payment processing capabilities, for example, and it took an extensive series of court battles before banks were finally shamed into 'voluntarily' reducing overdraft charges. The most recent indictment on the levels of skill, enthusiasm, initiative, vision and energy at the top of the UK's banks is that the government will have to regulate to make them refer rejected business funding applications to alternative lenders. 

That's right, UK bank executives aren't even up to negotiating simple lead-referral arrangements.

Which begs the question: what do UK bank executives actually do all day?

Why, they fight regulation, of course, and all the operational rigour it seeks to impose.

HSBC Still Doesn't Get It

You would not expect a conglomerate under heavy regulatory fire to use its latest results announcement to campaign against regulation. But that's HSBC for you.

Yesterday, the CEO complained that the group now spends $800m a year on 'compliance and risk programme', an increase of $200m, with more to come next year. In other words, even after years of scandals and massive fines, HSBC remains under-invested in compliance and risk controls.

Even more alarmingly, the Chairman says that such resources would otherwise be spent on customer-facing staff, who he says are becoming too risk-averse. But that's exactly what regulators, customers and taxpayers are afraid of - the biggest banking group in Europe spending an extra $200m a year selling toxic crap without adequate controls over an aggressive salesforce. 

Bizarrely, HSBC's Chairman is also pushing for the ring-fencing of the retail bank to be deferred at the very same time as a major Portuguese bank goes under.

Not a great attitude to regulation from the leadership of a bank that has 3 years to go under the deferred prosecution agreement it signed with US authorities for money laundering and sanction breaches - ending HSBC's involvement in $100bn worth of businesses. That's in addition to claims for market rigging, mis-selling PPI and interest rate swaps, not to mention it's starring role in the 'Magic of Madoff'. 

I can't imagine that Res Publica's Virtuous Banking report went down terribly well at HSBC HQ.

At any rate, with revenues already down 9% and pre-tax profits down 12%, in the year to June, you can expect a lot more bad news from these bozos. 

Want Virtuous Banking? Start By Splitting Banks Into More Than Two Pieces

Yesterday I was engaged in a discussion about 'virtuous banking' which seemed to stick on the definition of 'banks' and 'banking'.

No one does 'banking' - not even 'banks'. What we call 'banks' are actually giant corporate groups that carry out a vast range of quite distinct activities. Some are listed here, for example, and some were discussed by John Kay in his report on "Narrow Banking". These group activities tend to be broadly classified as either retail (utility) banking or wholesale (proprietary trading). But some of their activities arguably span this distinction, including the banking groups' role in creating money (by making loans with a central bank as lender of last resort) and money transmission (by co-operating in various payment systems). And of course wholesale business units often provide one or more services to retail business units within the same group. 

Those group activities also face into different national and international markets, with differing levels of profitability, growth, customer needs etc., and require management and staff with wildly different skills and levels of remuneration. But working capital will be allocated to the business units where it will generate the most return for the group as a whole, not according to the needs of, say, small business customers in the UK. And outdated IT systems in areas of low profitability, for instance, might only be replaced or upgraded if they actually fall over rather than to keep pace with the technological innovation. What might appear virtuous to one set of customers may not appear so to others. Taxpayers may not be materially impacted either way, or the impact may be so long term as to avoid detection. But banks are ultimately motivated by solving the problem of group profitabilty at their customers' expense (which makes them 'institutions' rather than 'facilitators', in my view).

Accordingly, figuring out what is 'good' and 'bad' behaviour on a day-to-day basis across a banking group is not only an extremely complex task, but also an archaelogical one. Regulation and internal policy only catches up with bad outcomes once they and their causes are identified. That process is painfully slow. A decade will have passed before any real regulatory changes related to the global financial crisis take effect in the UK, for example. Enforcement lag also means that fines and compensation bills come far too late to be factored into the main board's assessment of the likely return on capital across business units. They just end up as the the group's general 'cost of doing business'.

At any rate, regulation is a poor basis for assessing virtue. In the current framework, direct regulation only addresses some of a banking group's existing bank products and activities, not all of them; and is based on how banks do things, rather than on the activities and needs of customers. Some indirect regulations, like capital adequacy controls and accounting rules, are aimed more generally at how a banking group operates for the public good, but these are open to very broad interpretation in terms of how they impact specific products and activities. Market forces were previously thought to act as a control on behaviour. But the banks' conduct both before and during the global financial crisis has disproved that hypothesis. And they have few genuine competitors because complex regulation, the state guarantee of their liabilities and other subsidies intended to make the banking system safer have merely protected the banks from competition and innovation.

So it seems we can't even begin to be assured of 'virtuous banking' unless we are able to make and enforce that assessment for each business unit within a banking group independently. On that basis, splitting the banks in two is just a start.

2013: Levelling The Financial Playing Field

Six years of financial crisis have finally produced some of the legal changes that will expose the cosy world of regulated financial services to innovation and competition. But there is plenty more to do.

During 2013 we've seen consumer credit move to the FCA, the regulation of peer-to-peer lending, and the FCA's proposed rules for how the 'crowd' can lend and invest. And this week the Banking Reform Act implemented the recommendations of the Independent Commission on Banking and key recommendations of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards.

Some may see these changes as a magnificent display in closing the stable door. But I prefer to see it as an opening of the floodgates. 

After all, the European Commission is consulting on its own approach to regulating online financial marketplaces; and the US states are competing with the Securities Exchange Commission on the regulation of crowd-investing.

So 2014 will see a lot of focus on enabling the growth of alternative financial services, at the same time as the banks become even more preoccupied with solving their own problems at their customers expense.

That bodes well for a market that grew 91% in 2013.

But, like I said, there's still a lot of work to do.