FinTech: BIS Shakes The Banking Snow Globe - Anything Could Happen, Nobody Blamed

At least 17 years too late, the Bank for International Settlements (the central bank for central banks) has become very concerned about the impact of technology on the finance world. So concerned, in fact, that it has... produced a report for comment by the end of October.  Cue another vast exercise in global regulatory group-think...

The scenario is already amusing, but the report is laugh-out-loud material. It argues persuasively for every possible outcome, like some management consulting report on e-commerce from the early days of the Internet. Some banks will survive, others won't, for at least 10 significant reasons. Choose your bank, take your pick. Though in reality every bank is probably subject to all 10 in some way or other. 

Recommended actions are lofty and bland. They do not herald a departure from "same business, same risks, same rules" mantra that got the banking industry (and the broader regulated finance sector) into the current mess, nor any realisation that "fintech" doesn't represent the "same business" in the first place. In fact, we heard all the same stuff from central bankers back in April.

Never mind the obvious overall conclusion that the sector as a whole is doomed to wither for being glacially slow to adapt, brittle, hidebound and herd-like. Even central banks and BIS itself are clearly at risk. Maybe that's why some of them (and securities regulators) have now resorted to banning "initial coin offerings" of digital currencies without even being able to coherently explain why. The lack of self-awareness is hilarious. 

Anything could happen, but rest assured none of the this lot will be blamed.

"Fee Banking", Not "Free Banking": The Shameful Overdraft Saga Continues

Readers will recall that UK retail banks are self-regulated when it comes to overdrafts. They lost control of deposits, savings and payments in 2009, but kept control of lending (bizarrely, given the over-extension of credit in the lead up to the crash). They continued to battle savagely against the OFT's attempt to assess the 'fairness' of their overdraft charges for many years before finally offering to charge a bit less in late 2009. By 2013, however, the banks felt the heat was off, and were congratulating themselves on having found "no breaches" of their own Lending Code. Yet in 2014, the FCA found that "overdraft prices were high, complex, confusing and poorly understood". Now a new report reveals:

"Not only are unarranged overdrafts expensive, but in many cases they cost significantly more than [payday] loans. Many consumers are also unaware either that they have used an unarranged overdraft or of the cost implications even if they do."

The FCA's latest analysis suggests there are about 42m current accounts, about 27% of which are in arranged overdraft for 1 to 12 months (staying within a pre-set credit limit) while 10% operate as unarranged overdrafts for 1 to 12 months (no right to be overdrawn at all or in breach of the credit limit). The FCA's analysis "shows that a quarter of people that used unarranged overdrafts used them in four or more months during 2016. Nearly 10% of unarranged overdraft consumers used them for 10 or more months."

The banks' Lending Code does not require a creditworthiness assessment, yet the FCA found that "overdraft users typically have lower credit scores than consumers with current accounts... [and] consumers using unarranged overdrafts have noticeably lower credit scores than the overall population of current account and overdraft users." The FCA adds that it is "concerned that consumers who repeatedly using unarranged overdrafts are being given access to a service that seems unsuitable for them, and which may be contributing to potential financial distress."

This sounds like a clarion call to the claims management industry 

to switch from seeking refunds of PPI premiums

to seeking refunds of unagreed overdraft charges.

No doubt the banks will continue to resist interference with their dastardly overdraft arrangements, claiming that it would mean the end of "free-banking" (which industry insiders refer to as "fee banking" because banks rely on fees arising from the mismatch between actual customer needs and poorly aligned/understood products).

Banks claim that overdrafts are a feature of current accounts, so the FCA should wait to see how the recent attack on those by the competition regulator pans out before taking further action.

But, as the figures show, not all current accounts come with an overdraft, although my sense is that overdrafts are actually a side-effect of shortcomings in banks' legacy technology - the systems can't maintain real time balances, so the bank has no way of knowing the actual account balance or whether an overdraft limit will be breached when each transaction comes through. But that's the banks' problem.  Overdrafts do constitute a form of "credit", whether they are "arranged"  or "unarranged" and the fact they are still self-regulated as 'lending' speaks volumes (current accounts are regulated as "payment accounts" under the Payment Services Regulations).

Lloyds has already lost its nerve, however, and moved to a new charging structure that the FCA says "does not allow a consumer to use unarranged facilities and does not charge a daily fee if they do."

The banks certainly have plenty of cause for alarm. 

In 2014, the FCA took over regulation of the comparatively tiny 'payday lending' market - 1.6m customers borrowing £3bn at its peak in 2013 - and imposed rules that reduced volumes by 42%. But in this case, the FCA is sounding the death knell of unarranged overdrafts entirely:

"Based on the evidence we have to date, we believe there is a case to consider fundamental reform of unarranged overdrafts and consider whether they should have a place in any modern banking market."

Humans, Not Big Data, Must Benefit From Opening Up The Banks

One of the 'good news' items in last year's Autumn Statement was the endorsement of an Open Data Institute report on how innovators could make better use of bank data on our behalf (instead of on the banks' behalf). Last week, the Treasury followed up with a call for evidence "on how best to deliver an open standard for application programming interfaces (APIs) in UK banking and... whether more open data in banking could benefit consumers."

This is important, because enabling our own machines to start crunching our financial data on our behalf is key to humans winning the race against Big Data.

'Open data' involves enabling public access to data by connecting data sets using uniform resource identifiers ('Linked Data') and publishing data about them in machine-readable formats. While the government and other public institutions have done a good job of opening up public data sets so far, our private institutions are lagging behind, as discussed here. That's because they benefit from making sure we know less than them about our own requirements - 'information asymmetry'.

The Midata initiative was the first to aim at restoring the balance in favour of consumers, by taking aim at energy utilities, telecoms providers and banks. Now the energy companies face being opened up like so many tin cans by smart metering, while the telecoms market looks like it will go from bad to worse. Banks have also proved a tougher nut to crack. Yes, some people can download their current account data via internet banking. But in addition to consumers, there are 4.5 million small businesses out there that need a hell of a lot more than that. So far, it's taken regulatory action just to start the process of improving access to small business credit data and making a market in rejected small business loan applications. Now the Treasury is trying to force the pace on the technology necessary to support all that.

The ODI's recommendations for opening up banking are: 

• banks should agree an open API standard to support third party access to bank data - basically firms that can help you make sense of the data (but Big Data firms will try to persuade you to share it with them too);
• independent guidance should be provided on technology, security and data protection standards that banks can adopt to ensure data sharing meets all legal requirements; 
• an industry wide approach should be established to vet third party software applications and publish a list of vetted applications as open data - this would allow visibility of firms that are acting on consumers' behalf and those who are not;
• standard data on Personal Current Account terms and conditions should be published by banks as open data; and 
• credit data should be made available as open data.

My main concern is that requiring agreement on 'standards' as a precondition for opening up banking will enable the banks to delay the whole process by a decade - as they did with Faster Payments. As was recommended by the security working group in the Midata initiative, I would prefer to see banks required to immediately make their data available to each consumer/SME in whatever open format the banks choose, while adhering to common data security protocols, and leave it to the open data community to figure out how to re-format and display whatever rubbish they dish up.

Apart from complaints by the banks, Treasury officials expect to hear positive contributions from consumer groups, other financial services providers, financial technology firms and app and software designers.

Let's not disappoint them. This is a good opportunity to ensure the government clears the way for innovation that puts you and me at the heart of financial services, without mistakenly creating further barriers in the process.

Why Bankers Make Poor Managers

If UK banks ran our restaurants, we'd all be spending a lot more time in our smallest rooms.

In the latest example, the Financial Conduct Authority found that only 2 of the 164 RBS and NatWest mortgage sales reviewed actually met the required sales standard. Even the banks’ own tests confirmed the problem that borrowers were at grave risk of being sold the wrong type of mortgage. Yet it took the banks nearly a year to stop fiddling and begin taking proper steps to resolve the issues. Worst of all, this took place in 2011 and 2012 - long after the events of 2008 had alerted everyone to just how poorly these banks were managed generally; and after numerous specific failings had been detected in their retail operatons. The same banks had just been fined for failing to screen customers and handle complaints appropriately - and had even failed to enable customers to pay bills or access money. 

Of course, RBS and NatWest are not alone, and the banks' problems are not confined to their retail operations. Most of the major banks are embroiled in scandals arising from lack of operational controls of one kind or another.

Over at heavily-embattled HSBC, the Chairman and Chief Executive have been whingeing about the 'cost of compliance', as if it's a dead weight they're forced to bolt-on to the side of their sales process, rather than a set of largely common-sense business rules that should be embedded in their operations. 

They don't seem to realise what a sad indictment it is on the level of management skill in the financial services industry that successive regulators since 1986 have felt obliged to spell-out in minute detail how to operate a financial services business at every level and in every scenario. As a result, no human could possibly lift a printed version of the FCA's 'Handbook'. 

The same charge can be made for failings in longer term strategy. The government had to force the banks to invest in faster payment processing capabilities, for example, and it took an extensive series of court battles before banks were finally shamed into 'voluntarily' reducing overdraft charges. The most recent indictment on the levels of skill, enthusiasm, initiative, vision and energy at the top of the UK's banks is that the government will have to regulate to make them refer rejected business funding applications to alternative lenders. 

That's right, UK bank executives aren't even up to negotiating simple lead-referral arrangements.

Which begs the question: what do UK bank executives actually do all day?

Why, they fight regulation, of course, and all the operational rigour it seeks to impose.

The Hideous Cost Of Banking 'Standards'

I'm a great fan of trade bodies that introduce necessary self-regulation and create an efficient bridge between industry and officials. But news that UK banks will add to their enormous lobbying efforts by spending an extra £7-10m on a new "Banking Standards Review Board" definitely strikes me as overkill. 

I mean, what's the British Bankers' Association for, if not to ensure decent industry standards? Does the need for a new 'standards' board mean that the BBA has failed? If so, shouldn't it be dismantled? What about the Lending Standards Board? It's role is "to monitor and enforce the Lending Code and to ensure subscribers provide a fair deal to their personal and micro-enterprise borrowing customers." Surely it failed in that aim long ago?  Or is it that such bodies are really just lobbying outfits that merely pay lip service to effective self-regulation? In 2011 alone, The Bureau of Investigative Journalism found that the City spent £92m on lobbying regulators and politicians, which it described as an "economic war of attrition." Even the Confederation of British Industry has been captured by the banks.

Lord knows how much it really costs to run these lobbying outfits and face savers. But you can bet that customers and/or taxpayers end up paying for them in the end - not to mention the 2000 extra staff that the Financial Ombudsman Service has had to hire since 2012 to deal with the million complaints about payment protection insurance, or the endless Parliamentary time, or the £20bn in PPI compensation that the banks must fund. In fact, the London School of Economics found that poor conduct among the world's top 10 banks, including 5 UK outfits, had cost nearly £150bn by the end of 2012, and there have been vast fines and compensation payments since. 

Isn't it time for the banks to stop talking their way through everyone's money and just get on with the job of supplying decent financial services?

Want Virtuous Banking? Start By Splitting Banks Into More Than Two Pieces

Yesterday I was engaged in a discussion about 'virtuous banking' which seemed to stick on the definition of 'banks' and 'banking'.

No one does 'banking' - not even 'banks'. What we call 'banks' are actually giant corporate groups that carry out a vast range of quite distinct activities. Some are listed here, for example, and some were discussed by John Kay in his report on "Narrow Banking". These group activities tend to be broadly classified as either retail (utility) banking or wholesale (proprietary trading). But some of their activities arguably span this distinction, including the banking groups' role in creating money (by making loans with a central bank as lender of last resort) and money transmission (by co-operating in various payment systems). And of course wholesale business units often provide one or more services to retail business units within the same group. 

Those group activities also face into different national and international markets, with differing levels of profitability, growth, customer needs etc., and require management and staff with wildly different skills and levels of remuneration. But working capital will be allocated to the business units where it will generate the most return for the group as a whole, not according to the needs of, say, small business customers in the UK. And outdated IT systems in areas of low profitability, for instance, might only be replaced or upgraded if they actually fall over rather than to keep pace with the technological innovation. What might appear virtuous to one set of customers may not appear so to others. Taxpayers may not be materially impacted either way, or the impact may be so long term as to avoid detection. But banks are ultimately motivated by solving the problem of group profitabilty at their customers' expense (which makes them 'institutions' rather than 'facilitators', in my view).

Accordingly, figuring out what is 'good' and 'bad' behaviour on a day-to-day basis across a banking group is not only an extremely complex task, but also an archaelogical one. Regulation and internal policy only catches up with bad outcomes once they and their causes are identified. That process is painfully slow. A decade will have passed before any real regulatory changes related to the global financial crisis take effect in the UK, for example. Enforcement lag also means that fines and compensation bills come far too late to be factored into the main board's assessment of the likely return on capital across business units. They just end up as the the group's general 'cost of doing business'.

At any rate, regulation is a poor basis for assessing virtue. In the current framework, direct regulation only addresses some of a banking group's existing bank products and activities, not all of them; and is based on how banks do things, rather than on the activities and needs of customers. Some indirect regulations, like capital adequacy controls and accounting rules, are aimed more generally at how a banking group operates for the public good, but these are open to very broad interpretation in terms of how they impact specific products and activities. Market forces were previously thought to act as a control on behaviour. But the banks' conduct both before and during the global financial crisis has disproved that hypothesis. And they have few genuine competitors because complex regulation, the state guarantee of their liabilities and other subsidies intended to make the banking system safer have merely protected the banks from competition and innovation.

So it seems we can't even begin to be assured of 'virtuous banking' unless we are able to make and enforce that assessment for each business unit within a banking group independently. On that basis, splitting the banks in two is just a start.

Help To Bubble

I just don't get it. The UK is awash with debt it can't shift, yet the UK government thinks it's a great idea to ensure that people get £130bn of mortgages they can't otherwise afford. 

A Treasury spokesperson is quoted in today's FT as saying that "there are rules ensuring that people can pay the mortgage that they have taken on." But if they couldn't have got the mortgage in the first place, how is that so?

It would be fair enough if someone were able to point to specific, unreasonably restrictive bank lending practices and get them changed. Yet neither the Treasury nor the Bank of England has been able to bring the banks to heel, so putting the taxpayer on the hook for 15% of a bunch of new high loan-to-value mortgages seems a little careless to say the least.

But maybe it's too late. Maybe we're just seeing the inevitable consequence of the fact that the UK state is already standing behind £491bn of UK mortgage debt, or 42%. The state simply has to be back even more. The US introduced this nonsense as a 'temporary measure' 70 years ago and, as Gillian Tett recently pointed out, is now behind 90% of the US mortgage market. How's that working out for them? You be the judge.

Welcome to Bubbleland.

Image from LuxLifeMiami.

We Need Let The Crowd into Financial Services

What a difference a year makes. At an industry event yesterday none other than Nicola Horlick, a well-known fund manager, confirmed her faith in crowdfunding as way of people putting money directly into the lifeblood of the economy, at a time when bank finance for small businesses is limited. Her own film finance vehicle raised £150,000 by issuing shares within weeks of an initial discussion with Seedrs CEO, Jeff Lynn, about how the crowd might help. A year ago, she wouldn't have given it a moment's thought. 

Of course, Nicola was referring to equity crowd-investing, which is the latest type of crowdfunding to burst into life. People have been donating to each other's projects via online marketplaces for nearly a decade and lending to each other online since 2005. Even the UK government is lending along side savers on peer-to-peer lending platforms. 

But these 'direct finance' marketplaces are no longer simply challenging a dozy bunch of retail banks. The addition of crowd-investing in shares and bonds is a direct assault on the sophisticated world of venture capital, private equity and boutique investment banking. 

Silicon Roundabout has launched a rocket attack on Mayfair.

This trend has raised a few bushy eyebrows down at Canary Wharf, where the paint is still wet on the signage at the hastily re-named Financial Services Conduct Authority. Not everyone at the FCA is excited by the prospect of just anyone being able to put a tenner into a business run by Nicola Horlick. In fact, the 'hawks' down there seem to believe that ordinary folk should content themselves with a low interest savings account, a lottery ticket and a flutter on the nags between visits to the nearest pub. If you can't afford to lose a grand, say the hawks, then you've hit the economic buffers. The banks can enjoy the use of your savings for free, while the government enjoys the betting taxes and the excise on your beer and cigarettes.

And we wonder why the poor get poorer.

You might also wonder, as I did yesterday, how 'the government' might explain to the same person who is banned from buying a share in the local bakery why he is still be free to blow £10 on a drug-fuelled quadruped at a racetrack, or donate it to a band that might go triple platinum and never have to share a penny of the upside with those who backed them.

But that's where you're reminded that the government never puts itself in the citizen's shoes; and there's really no such thing as 'the government' anyway. Just individual civil servants at separate desks in separate buildings, each looking at his or her own policy patch and waiting to be told what to do. Collaboration is not a creature common to Whitehall. In that world, no one at, say, the Treasury snatches up the phone to share a bold new vision for driving economic growth from the bottom-up with the folks over at Culture Media and Sport, or Business Innovation and Skills or Communities and Local Government. 

Or do they...?

At least those in Parliament, bless them, did collaborate in response to the ongoing financial shambles. Julia Groves of the UK Crowd Funding Association quoted some choice words on alternative finance from the report of the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, and I've set out the full quote below (as I have previously). Julia also put it very nicely in her own words: "Wealth is not a skillset." We need to let the crowd into financial services, and we need to keep the 'crowd' in crowdfunding. Let's hope this time the following message permeates all the way to the remaining hawks at Canary Wharf.

"57. Peer-to-peer and crowdfunding platforms have the potential to improve the UK retail banking market as both a source of competition to mainstream banks as well as an alternative to them. Furthermore, it could bring important consumer benefits by increasing the range of asset classes to which consumers have access. This access should not be restricted to high net worth individuals but, subject to consumer protections, should be available to all. The emergence of such firms could increase competition and choice for lenders, borrowers, consumers and investors. (Paragraph 350)

58. Alternative providers such as peer-to-peer lenders are soon to come under FCA regulation, as could crowdfunding platforms. The industry has asked for such regulation and believes that it will increase confidence and trust in their products and services. The FCA has little expertise in this area and the FSA's track record towards unorthodox business models was a cause for concern. Regulation of alternative providers must be appropriate and proportionate and must not create regulatory barriers to entry or growth. The industry recognises that regulation can be of benefit to it, arguing for consumer protection based on transparency. This is a lower threshold than many other parts of the industry and should be accompanied by a clear statement of the risks to consumers and their responsibilities. (Paragraph 356)

59. The Commission recommends that the Treasury examine the tax arrangements and incentives in place for peer-to-peer lenders and crowdfunding firms compared with their competitors. A level playing field between mainstream banks and investment firms and alternative providers is required. (Paragraph 359)."

Either Gillian Tett's On Fire...

Ominous bursts of smoke have been rising from Gillian Tett recently. 

On September 12, the lady who gave us Fool's Gold pointed out that six key aspects of the financial system in 2008 are far worse now. 

The banks are bigger. Shadow banking is bigger. Investor faith hinges on central banking 'wisdom' and liquidity, while the top 5% of bankers are soaking up 40% of that support in bonuses. No one has been jailed for their role in the sub-prime fiasco. And the US government agencies now account for 90% of the mortgage market...

Today's smoke is rising over the Federal Reserve's decision to keep buying smack bonds at the rate of $85bn a month. It appears to have concluded that the West simply can't handle the withdrawal symptoms. Meanwhile, the UK regulatory elite has finally started to ring the bell over the fact that only 10-15% of the money our banks create actually goes to productive firms, while the rest is stoking financial asset bubbles... And, oh look, the real estate agency, Foxtons, has soared on its return to the stock market.

Either Gillian Tett's on fire, or something else sure as Hell is.

Image from JetSetRnv8r.

Banks Can't Even Be Bothered For The Rich

Oh those poor, poor bankers. Now, we're told by Spear's, that the new 'retail distribution' rules have made their lives so complicated they even have to stop fleecing servicing wealthy customers. Bernie Madoff must be relieved to have got out before the well ran dry.

Ironically, for a magazine that bills itself as "the essential resource for high net worths", Spear's argues the bankers' case. The article seeks to persuade wealthy readers to stop being so demanding if they wish to avoid being 'managed out' by private bankers who find them too costly to serve. In particular, customers must stop expecting services aligned to their needs and behave in a way that suits the banks: 

• agree what the banker will do for you up front, then wait for the quarterly reports and limit any discussion to those times instead of pestering for more frequent advice;

• don't change your instructions (the banks already chew through 3% of your return by making 'adjustments' to your portfolio, so don't make it worse); and

• behave as if you're part of a team - cut your banker some slack when he is slow to realise gains or avert losses and, most importantly, recommend him to your friends (bankers just love the bandwagon effect).

Puzzling, until you realise where Spear's probably gets most of its advertising revenue.

Definitely a sign that yet another area of the financial services market is ripe for innovation by facilitators.

There Is Not A Great Retail Bank In The UK

Ross McEwan's appointment as CEO of RBS roundly endorsed his remark that he has been "quite surprised by how bad this industry is. There is not a great retail bank in the UK." 

This from a banker who's reported to have twice failed an accounting module, been passed over for top dog at Commonwealth Bank of Australia and to be "more comfortable with people than figures." 

It's hardly an insightful comment, given the enormous publicity surrounding the damning testimony to the Parliamentary Banking Standards Commission, but McEwan is the first senior banker to have the self-awareness to actually admit the appalling state of the industry. As such, the remark even topped today's editorial in the FT. I mean, there's only so much the pink propaganda machine can ignore.

Amidst all this, the Information Commissioner's Office finally revealed the miserable little saga of Bank of Scotland's "chronic and repeated" disclosure of sensitive customer information. Apparently it sent faxes from many different machines to wrong numbers from 2009 to 2012, despite alerts and complaints from mistaken recipients, and notification that the ICO had begun to investigate. The fine: a mere £75,000. Another speeding ticket on the road to oblivion.

Add this to the revelations of UK banks' gross misconduct and poor controls over the past few years, and you have to doubt the wisdom of handing shares in these businesses to the general public. 

Unless, of course, you want taxpayers to experience the banks' terminal decline firsthand. A sort of 'scandal to end all scandals'.  That would be nice.

The Reform Of Our Institutions Won't Come From The Top

It's been a difficult month to finish this post. Every day another dollop of decrepitude is revealed amongst our rotting institutions. Systemic slaughter in the NHS. The convenient collapse of a major police corruption trial through 'missing' evidence. Police concealing the misuse of private investigators and spying on victim's families for the chance to undermine public sympathy. Sunlight on vast pay-offs to the departing management of the Savile-stricken BBC. The lengths to which the unions will go to control the Labour Party and use it to enshrine their own power. The Church of England deciding to turn money lender. And, surprise, surprise yet another massive bank fine...because, yes, any bank that relies on a public guarantee of its liabilities and massive tax subsidies through ISAs and so on should regard itself as a public institution.

It's a core theme of this blog to contrast the decline of faith in institutions that have evolved to suit themselves at our expense, with the rise of facilitators who exist to help us solve problems more effectively for ourselves.

Our institutions won't align with the interests of the those who rely on their services while they suppress evidence of their ineptitude, or while trustees and management quibble over their extent of their responsibilities, or while politicians spend their time blaming each other for the mess. These are sure signs that our institutions are stuck in denial and that the MPs and Ministers whose job it is to supervise them are stuck in their own cycle of blame.

Until our institutions understand and accept the need to align with the consumers of their services, rather than the desires of their pompous managers, they will not evolve into efficient, facilitative organisations worthy of our trust and respect.

But I don't believe that our so-called political leaders or the managers of our institutions have either the self-awareness or the skills needed to achieve this evolution. They are merely products of 'the system' that so desparately needs to evolve.

Sustainable reform will only come come from the grassroots rather than the top down. It will only come when each of us takes personal responsibility for turning things around, whether by exposing institutional failings or genuinely working to solve other people's problems rather than merely our own. 

In other words, both the problem and the solution are in our hands.

A Feast Of Anger And Blame

You have to wonder whether the UK's banking crisis will ever end. After months of wrangling, the regulators have finally decided which UK banks are still short of about £26bn in capital (for now). But yesterday's Parliamentary Banking Standards Commission report points to an endless list of more serious problems that won't be solved by simply leeching yet more billions out of the economy.

The members of the BSC must be highly commended for taking on the long overdue job of trying to bring Britain's banks to heel. Volume 2 of the epic report is an invaluable account of their painful journey, made poignant by the fact that, until quite recently, the members of the Commission actually believed in our rotten financial system. The scale of their disillusionment is almost beyond comprehension. What perhaps started as an investigation into fairly specific allegations of corporate malfeasance resulted in one proud British institution turning on another out of a sense of betrayal. 

So, apart from its entertaining descent into the gory details of British banking, the BSC report represents yet another hammer blow to our faith in society's institutions - this time delivered by one of the ringleaders, namely Parliament itself.

Yet the question remains as to just how far along the 'change curve' we have really travelled. Despite the BSC's list of recommendations, we seem to be merely inching our way through anger and blame, rather than understanding and accepting that the world has truly changed and we need to move on.

While the Commission has voiced great support for alternative finance models and eliminating perverse tax incentives, and the Treasury and FCA have made some proposals to improve the regulatory landscape, the rhetoric from the government continues to put banks at the heart of Britain's economic future, rather than a more open, diverse and innovative financial system.

How much more economic mayhem it will take for society to genuinely 'move on' is anyone's guess.

Political Lipstick On a Pig

Source: Guardian/Observer

The spin doctors are feverishly applying lipstick to RBS, so it can be 're-privatised' in time for the next election. No matter that the bank is still short of capital after five long years of public ownership, that the Exchequer is sitting on a £19bn loss and that the bank continues to lend less and less to the productive economy while soaking up the subsidies.

Renowned for 'group-think', the IMF also seems to have seized on the election as an opportunity to get the politicians to 'clarify the plan' for continued state ownership. Duly emboldened, the Chancellor has dismissed calls by other departments and members of the Banking Standards Commission for the bank to be broken up as not being achievable within the electoral time frame.

Of course the election won't wave a magic wand over RBS's inability to operate without massive public subsidy, or its failure to align with the interests of its customers. It will always have cheap ISA money to fall back on, and it's obvious by now that no one will force it to lend more to small businesses. It even recently announced heavy overdraft charges, on top of its many previous expressions of contempt for those it is supposed to serve.

Instead, the government sees the 're-privatisation' as a sweet opportunity to enhance its electoral standing, sexing-up its plans to 'give away' some RBS shares as a sign of its commitment to 'protecting' or 'maximising value' for taxpayers. It's as if laying the blame for the astronomical cost of the bailout at Labour's door somehow resets the counter to zero...

Promising RBS shares to every taxpayer is of course a standard political ploy, designed to prey on middle class greed (the rich couldn't care less, and the paper will be slim comfort to those on lower incomes). On this occasion, however, the proximity of the election might also lead some to describe it, rather aptly, as 'porkbarrelling'.

But the very reason the government wants to foist RBS shares on you is the very reason you shouldn't want them. Free of its chains, this porcine monster will be eager to get its snout back amongst the big, speculative assets as quickly as possible, and your shareholding will be taken as a personal vote in its favour. Some might even naively cheer the beast on, dreaming that their stake in the mystical 'upside' from its activities will somehow compensate them for getting fleeced on the bailout in the first place, and all the disasters that have followed.

Meanwhile the rest of us will wait forlornly - along with the inert, beleaguered customers - until the government finally pours another bucket of publicly funded swill into the banking trough.

Labour Is Still Pushing Financial Capitalism

When Gordon Brown (remember him?) repeatedly proclaimed the "end of boom and bust" he was declaring his belief - along with that of his fellow group-thinkers - that capitalism had found a way to become sustainable. But his support for unbridled growth in everything from investment banking to the Private Finance Initiative eventually revealed he was hooked on financial capitalism, rather than the 'real' capitalism of employment and productivity. Look at how ISAs, for example, have become a drain on the 'real economy'.

Ed Milliband has been trying to repair Labour's image with some lipstick apologies here and there, but old habits die hard.

Recently, the party released "An Enterprising Nation", a report by its Small Business Taskforce. To be fair, there are some good insights into the problems faced by small business, as you would expect from the membership of the taskforce. But, surprisingly, the report contains no proposals for short term solutions, or even medium term solutions. One suspects that either the collective intelligence had already fed all those ideas into the government, or the left wing political establishment doesn't grasp the need to foster an environment in which new businesses can start and thrive today.

Academic as they may be, perhaps the worst of Labour's long term ideas is that of a US-style Small Business Administration. It's an idea I first heard from them in November 2011. And as I pointed out then, the SBA programme had already gained a somewhat unhealthy reputation through David Einhorn's book "Fooling Some of the People All of the Time." Heavy application of the Labour lipstick has now branded this idea the "Spark Umbrella" (a nod to the many local German savings banks, or sparkassen, to which this programme actually bears no resemblance).

Basically, the idea is to saddle the UK with 20 lending vehicles, or "Sparks", funded with £10m of public money (naturally) and £90m drawn, no doubt, from the traditional City suspects. Each Spark would fund its lending to local businesses by selling the loans to the "Spark Umbrella" which would in turn finance the loan purchases by issuing bonds to investors eager to package those bonds into  another set of bonds to sell to... anyone stupid game enough to buy them.

Sound familiar? 

The only way not to end up carrying the can for this, would be to emigrate.

But the UK already has an artificial, publicly subsidised channel for small business lending that limits innovation and competition in the retail financial markets. It's run by the UK's major banks. So we don't need another publicly guaranteed channel to crowd-out sustainable private alternatives. 

I mean, who would start a local lending business knowing that the government was about to launch a publicly funded competitor?

The government should foster an environment in which the private sector can generate alternative finance options, not simply create markets that are ultimately underwritten by the taxpayer.

The fundamental flaw in the Spark Umbrella is its reliance on securitisation (or vertical credit intermediation) to try to overcome the riskier nature of small business lending. That model is hugely expensive in terms of issuing and underwriting bonds that are prone to being mis-priced, particularly in riskier markets, as we have seen. It also creates huge scope for moral hazhard, and traditional financial institutions, intermediaries and speculators are likely to be the only potential winners - as Einhorn's book reveals. There is certainly no guarantee that the loans to small businesses will be competitive with other potential alternatives.

Anyone pointing to the US for solutions also has to understand that, like Germany, it enjoys a much more varied set of small business funding options than the UK, as Breedon reported. So it's possible that the SBA won't have crowded-out US private finance businesses in the way that Spark Umbrella would in our bank-dominated market. 

It's also worth noting that Spark Umbrella is purely debt focused, whereas only 3% of UK small businesses finance themselves by issuing shares.  

Of course, we already have a rapidly growing set of alternative financial services platforms that are beginning to solve the problems that the Spark Umbrella will not. Peer-to-peer lending and crowd-investing provide finance to borrowers and entrepreneurs in small amounts directly from many people at competitive rates from the outset, using both debt and equity finance. There is no need to create new markets for these platforms to grow. However, the government has been dragging its heels on the removal of regulatory barriers and perverse incentives, and that does represent an opportunity for opposition parties. 

True, the government has directed some of the Business Finance Partnership funds through peer-to-peer finance platforms. But that funding goes directly into the businesses who borrow - not through countless intermediaries in the financial markets. Labour needs to recognise the difference.

Horizontal vs vertical credit intermediation from Simon Deane-Johns

'Bank' of Dave Goes P2P

I've hugely enjoyed the documentary series tracing Dave Fishwick's valiant efforts to start a small community 'bank' in Burnley high street. 

I say 'bank' because, while it made for good television to say so, Dave didn't necessarily mean "bank" in regulatory terms. His goal was to enable local people to lend to other local people and businesses without profiting unduly. He rightly thought that's what banks are supposed to do, so he was determined to call himself a 'bank' to make the point. And his good-humoured, optimistic crusade has certainly rammed the point home.

While Dave also didn't necessarily set out to launch a peer-to-peer lending marketplace, his path to launch was eerily familiar to those who have done so. The FSA wouldn't speak to us either, prior to the launch of Zopa in March 2005, but was all too keen to discuss the detail afterwards. Fortunately we'd done our homework and didn't have to stop taking money. At least that made for good TV in Dave's case.

Since 2005 a dozen other management teams have also threaded their way through the regulatory maze to directly link savers and borrowers, or investors and entrepreneurs, via online 'P2P' lending or crowd-investing markeplaces. And it's good to see that Dave's journey has led him to adopt the peer-to-peer model on the high street. He may be facing the bricks-and-mortar problems that the online models solve, but at least he's shown there is very real demand for innovation amongst people who still manage their finances by walking around. And the benefits to the 200 local borrowers who are paying a net 5% to local savers are undeniable.

Unfortunately, there are still unnecessary difficulties in structuring these businesses, regardless of whether they facilitate loans or investments in shares or debt. The sources of that uncertainty were summarised here in January 2012, here in February 2012, here in June 2012 and here in July 2012. Industry CEOs and others met policy and regulatory officials to discuss these difficulties at a summit in December 2012, and again last month (as summarised here). The salient points were also explained again in my submission to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards.

However, while it's clear there is plenty of shared frustration and many officials have been supportive in discussions, there is worryingly little sign of actual regulatory change.

We need a lot more war stories like Dave's.

My Legal Alter Ego Has Been At It Again

Image from Parliament.uk

This time he's made a submission 

To the Banking Standards Commission.

He's a poet and he didn't know it.

Towards A Diverse, Sustainable Financial System

It's not every day you get to brainstorm ways to bring diversity and sustainability to Britain's ailing financial system amidst a broad cross-section of officials, economists, entrepreneurs, think-tanks, technology suppliers and advisers. And yesterday's Finance Innovation Lab workshop was a golden opportunity to do just that.

While the Lab will report the output in due course, I thought I'd share a summary of my notes from the breakout sessions in which I participated. These looked at regulatory barriers and lack of financial awareness. Others explored the unfair advantages enjoyed by estalished providers and ways to encourage innovation. We operated under the Chatham House Rule, hence the absence of names or affiliations.

The UK financial system is neither diverse nor sustainable. 

There is plenty of evidence that the UK's financial system is suffering from a lack of innovation and competition, and is unsustainable in its current form. Rates of market entry and exit are low, relative to other industries. Few customers switch and customer trust is lowest for financial services on several leading surveys. The unit cost of intermediation remains high in financial services compared to other retail markets, while management and staff have reaped the benefits of any increased operational efficiencies (even while legacy systems remain prevalent). Banks rely on a huge back-book of deposits on which they pay little or no interest to finance loans to fund trading in financial assets rather than loans to productive businesses. After all, a single giant property loan does more to grow the bank's numbers than lending the same amount of money to thousands of small firms. 

Regulatory barriers

 

Against this background, we concluded that the current regulatory framework, including subsidies and incentives, is essentially designed to both protect the 'financial system' and 'customers' - i.e. to minimise the risk that consumers and small businesses, in particular, will be mis-sold 'products' by unscrupulous suppliers. 

In effect, however, that framework obliges policy officials (Treasury) and regulators (FSA) protect the system as it is, rather than to ensure that it evolves to encourage and accommodate innovation in line with customer requirements. That's because the framework and those who police it are organised in silos according to existing product types and types of suppliers, and not according to types of customers' and their day-to-day activities. 

The customer protection regime mirrors this approach, being organised according to limited sets of product types and types of suppliers, as well as types of promotional and business activities in which suppliers are engaged (not their customers). As a result, the impact of regulation, complaints and potential for changes are all viewed through the lens of existing products and firms, and any actual changes reinforce those lines of distinction. 

The perverse nature of this can be seen in the fact that, if I want to allocate £100 to a project that I'd like to support, it's easiest for me to donate the money, a bit more complex if I want the money repaid with interest (as a loan), very complex if I want to be able to freely trade that right to be repaid with interest (a bond) and the most complex thing of all is to receive an equity share in the project. This discourages diversification and the search for opportunities to get a decent return on surplus cash; and limits the availability of funding to new businesses, on which most new jobs depend.

Hard-wiring the markets according to types of products, suppliers and ways of dealing with them also artificially limits the number and range of suppliers, product types, and the corresponding markets. In addition, taxpayer guarantees and subsidies in the form of savings and pension incentives are aligned with existing regulated suppliers and product types. Therefore, the regulations and incentives work together to enable the suppliers in the regulated markets to charge higher fees, make higher margins, reward staff more generously and pay more for marketing - resulting in less innovation and competition.

The overall result is a financial system that is not designed to evolve in line with the requirements of consumers, small businesses or even big business. It is designed to suit incumbent suppliers - those who play well with the system, regulators and policy officials. Yet there is no single set of policy officals or regulators tasked with understanding how the regulations, subsidies and incentives actually work together as a whole or whether they distort any aspects of the financial system within or outside the regulated areas.

A broad range of solutions were suggested, as you can imagine, and the Lab will report on these shortly, and include them in a submission to the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards. However, suggestions included: 

• creating a Parliamentary Select Committee to focus on encouraging financial innovation;

• limits on market share by product type;

• controls on gross leverage; 

•  separate banks' credit creation process from financial intermediation (the process of allocating that credit);

• central bank guidance to banks on how much to lend productive firms;

• levelling the playing field on subsidies and tax incentives/allowances;

• a target of 200 new local banks by 2016;

• publishing details of national banks' regional/local banking activity;

• making it easier to get low risk financial businesses authorised;

• publishing the amount of the subsidies to major banks and oblige them to set aside a proportion of their subsidy for future crises;

• treating payments systems and credit reference data as utilities (i.e. public goods).

Lack of financial awareness

The scale of financial mis-selling across many different types of products and lack of diversification by investors suggests a widespread lack of understanding of financial services. This was seen to be caused by a lack of financial education, on the one hand; and by product complexity on the other. In turn, product complexity is driven by both regulatory complexity and an unwillingness to invest the extra effort required to simplify products and better align them with customer requirements.

The lack of financial education is essentially a failing of our education system. Yet there is little faith that the Department for Education accepts any responsibility for delivering a sound financial education. It's also clear that no other government department sees this as part of its mission. Rather, financial education seems to be a specialist area confined to universities and business schools or professional bodies. It was felt that this will only change with a determined effort by the Department for Education to measure financial 'literacy', collect best practice for teaching it and including those measures in the national curriculum. Measures of success would include improvements in financial literacy exam results, fewer complaints to the Financial Omudsman Service and improved diversification amongst savers and investors.

Removing product complexity requires a commitment to reducing regulatory complexity, the removal of the regulatory barriers to innovation and competition discussed above, as well as incentives that drive both simpler products and diversification, rather than the concentration of funds into a few regulated asset classes.

In short, more pragmatism and less politics should go a long way.

Evidence From Non-bankers On Banking Standards

Here's what some of the non-banks have to say about banking standards (from 17:52).

More Sunlight Needed On Perverse Tax Incentives

Our continuing economic woes seem to reveal a UK Treasury that has lost touch with the fundamental tax and regulatory problems in the UK economy and is unwilling to engage openly and proactively on how to resolve them.

Not only did the Treasury lose any grip it had on the financial system when it mattered most during the last decade, but the rocky passage of the Financial Services Bill and the need to create a joint parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards also reveal that any such grip remains elusive. This, coupled with the UK's bizarrely complicated system of stealth taxes and incentives, demonstrates the urgent need for more transparency and openness in how the Treasury is going about the task of addressing our economic issues.

The latest example comes with the news that the government might revisit the bizarre decision to delay the revaluation of business rates, which are still based on the higher rental values of 2008. The task of setting business rates every five years lies buried in the Valuation Office Agency, an 'executive agency' of HM Revenue and Customs within HM Treasury. So it's nicely insulated from anyone who might complain about the impact of the rather occasional exercise of its responsibility. Instead, businesses have complained to Vince Cable, over at Business Innovation and Skills, and he's bravely (insanely?) promised to do what he can. However, the hermetically sealed nature of civil service silos means the Valuation Office Agency can safely ignore the issue.

Anyone else afflicted by perverse public sector tax issues faces the same problem. 

UK-based retailers are wasting their time by complaining they are disadvantaged compared to international businesses that are better able to minimise their tax liabilities. Not only is this a welcome distraction from the bigger issue of how the public sector wastes money, (which the Cabinet Office has been left to address), but the Treasury hides behind BIS, no doubt laughing-off the complaints as an example of businesses not understanding how the arcane world of taxation really works. The trouble is the Treasury doesn't understand how that world really works either. Nobody does. That was the whole point of Gordon Brown's stealth approach to taxation. But this should be no excuse for the department that's supposed to be in charge. The Treasury needs to take responsibility for understanding and explaining how it all works, including the unintended consequences.

Similarly, the Treasury needs to take responsibility for the fact that the UK's small businesses face a funding gap of £26bn - £52bn over the next 5 years. Here, again, BIS has had to act as a human shield, even threatening to launch its own 'bank'. Yet HMT has allowed four major banks to get away with controlling 90% of the small business finance market while only dedicating 10% of the credit they issue to productive firms. This, despite the fact that small businesses represent 99.9% of all UK enterprises, are responsible for 60% of private sector employment and are a critical factor in the UK's economic growth which has slipped into reverse yet again. Meanwhile, the Treasury continues to resist allowing a broader range of assets to qualify for the ISA scheme, which currently incentivises workers to concentrate their savings into low yield deposits with the same banks that are turning away from small business lending just when it's needed most.

More sunlight please!