Careful What You Incentivise

Two things seem to be choking the flow of money to people and small businesses in the UK: broken regulation and perverse incentives. Yet there's a tendency to focus more on regulation, and to only see the obvious incentives - like bankers bonuses. Some innovative self-regulation in retail finance has been welcomed by the UK government, and banking reform creeps ahead. But all this could prove futile if problems with incentives are not also addressed. To fix those, we need to look below the surface at the more fundamental incentives at play in the financial system. In particular, we need to understand the extent to which the likes of ISA schemes and pension investment rules are limiting competition and innovation in financial services and inhibiting economic growth. I've summarised some recent debate on this below, and added some comments on the government's latest defence of the ISA scheme. I'd welcome your thoughts.

Some of the perverse incentives have been outlined to government by tax colleagues previously (in Annex 3 to this document). In essence, the contention has been that certain tax relief selectively favours banks and the suppliers of regulated investments to the detriment of innovation and competition. In particular, the tax free ISA system funnels ordinary people's savings into UK bank deposits on a vast scale, which the banks then fail to lend. This effectively discourages and inhibits those same people from diversifying, one alternative being to extend finance directly to other creditworthy people and businesses through peer-to-peer platforms. As a result, it's been suggested that the ISA system should be extended to cover such direct finance. Indeed, in his response to the Red Tape Challenge, Mark Littlewood, Director-General of the Institute of Economic Affairs and a 'Sector Champion' said:

"...it is surely worth noting that the present format and definition of the ISA wrap may have raised “barrier to entry” problems for new financial products and it may be beneficial to review these to stimulate innovation in the sector."

But the impact on innovation is merely the tip of the iceberg. It's the impact on the wider economy that must be understood.

There is overwhelming evidence that the UK's small businesses are cash-starved. They represent 99.9% of all UK enterprises and are responsible for 60% of private sector employment. Their output is critical to the UK's economic growth, which has stalled. Yet they face a funding gap of £26bn - £52bn over the next 5 years. Critically, the four banks which control 90% of the small business finance market are lending less and less to them. This is a red flag. You might think from their enormous market share that these banks would consider small business lending to be very important and a retreat from that market unwise. But, as the economist Richard Werner has pointed out, the reality is that only about 10% of the overall credit issued by our banks goes to productive firms. The other 90% goes to fund deals involving financial assets which don't count towards economic growth figures. So for these banks small business lending is actually a sideshow. They clearly make their money elsewhere.

Yet the ISA scheme had lured savings and investments of £391bn from UK adults by the April 2012, half of which is in cash deposits in these same banks. And they pay nothing for it - a paltry 0.41% in interest after 'teaser rates' expire, according to a 'super complaint' by Consumer Focus in 2010. 

In other words, the government appears to be incentivising workers to plough their savings into banks which virtually ignore the sector on which most of those same workers depend for their income. 

Contrast this with the position in Germany, where 70% of the banking sector comprises hundreds of small, locally-controlled banks who provide 40% of all loans to SMEs.  In an ironic twist, the UK government now sees peer-to-peer platforms as a similar conduit for a new German-style government-directed lending programme. But it appears never to have openly considered that the limited scope of the ISA scheme is part of the problem. 

In March, the goverment defended the narrow scope of the ISA scheme for the reasons extracted here. In September, the government gave a different response (see p. 13 here). In the hope of sparking wider debate on the issues, I've set out the current defence of the status quo below (my additions/comments in square brackets). I welcome any comments.

"HM Treasury believes that there is not a strong enough case for [making bad debt relief available to P2P lenders], as creating an exception would add complexity to the tax system and is difficult to justify when other [unspecified] forms of investment do not qualify for bad debt relief. Moreover, the current tax treatment of P2P investors is not necessarily a barrier to further expansion, as witnessed by the impressive growth in the industry in recent years.

...HM Treasury does not believe that P2P loans are suitable for inclusion in ISAs. The risk profile of P2P lending is too high [compared to what? cash ISAs? stocks and shares ISAs?], and it is unlikely that the platform can satisfy some of the [unspecified] features essential to the operation of ISAs.

Consumers tend to view ISAs as a relatively safe and simple investment vehicle [this fails to distinguish between cash ISAs and stocks/shares ISAs. And are they safe?]. ISA investments are thought of as relatively low-risk, and consumers should be able to get access to their funds whenever they wish. This is less likely to be the case with P2P lending than with existing ISA Qualifying Investments [this could be cured by permitting secondary markets in P2P loans]. 

Similarly, existing Regulations require ISAs to be operated through an ISA Manager [regulations could include P2P platforms], who invests through persons or firms who are authorised by the FSA, and thus have access to the FSCS [this does not mean you can't lose the principal in your stocks/shares ISAs, or stop banks paying 0.41% interest on cash ISAs]. As far as we are aware, current P2P lending platforms are not conducive to the ISA Manager role, are not regulated by the FSA, and do not offer Financial Services Compensation Scheme (FSCS) protection [any or all of which could be changed by regulation].

Finally, in order to be included in an ISA, P2P loans will require to be listed as a Qualifying Investment. Qualifying Investments are identified generically. It would be extremely difficult to restrict a generic description such as “loan” only to loans made via P2P lending platforms [but none of the qualifying investments are so generic, being limited by reference to 'banks', 'building societies', 'recognised stock exchanges' etc., so why not by reference to 'P2P platforms'?]. Exclusion from the ISA wrapper does not make this type of lending exceptional; rather, it puts it on the same footing as investment in stocks and shares issued by unlisted companies [how are these activities equivalent?]."

UK Takes Joined-up Regulatory Approach To P2P Finance

The UK government has announced a cross-departmental working group to support the sustainable development of peer-to-peer finance (aka 'crowdfunding'), as part of its latest response to the Red Tape Challenge. 

The composition of this working group is testimony to the broad policy implications and opportunities posed by this new form of financial model for consumers and small businesses. The list of members includes the Office of Fair Trading, the Department of Business Innovation and Skills, HM Treasury, the Financial Services Authority and the Cabinet Office. However, it is known that the Department for Culture Media and Sport is also very interested in the potential for peer-to-peer finance to fund the development of the arts and entertainment industry.  

Specifically, that working group will "monitor the appropriateness of the current regulatory regime for peer-to-peer platforms" and take the lead in engaging with the peer-to-peer finance industry.  In the meantime, the government wishes to encourage continued self-regulatory efforts by the Peer-to-Peer Finance Association to address common operational risks, and to engage with policy-makers and regulators.

Other aspects of the government's response to the 'disruptive business models' Challenger Businesses Red Tape Challenge are discussed here.

Credit Drives Growth (Not Interest Rates)

Thanks to IPPR and The Finance Innovation Lab for an invigorating seminar on bank reform this morning. I've noted some of the highlights below, but in summary: Chris Hewett gave a great overview of the range of proposals; Richard Werner debunked the myth that interest rates drive economic growth and explained why the Bank of England must guide bank credit away from speculation and into productive firms; and Baroness Susan Kramer explained the work being done in Parliament.

Chris's 'policy map' in particular is worth studying in particular (zoom out of his presentation to find it). It reveals the ideas that are merely 'a glint in the eye', those that are attracting support and those that are being fought over by stakeholders in a way that is likely to produce change in the near term. 

Richard showed that interest rates do not drive economic growth. Rather, they lag changes in economic growth by as much as a year. So it's a myth that lowering interest rates will increase economic growth, or that raising them will slow growth. Instead, the evidence proves that those in charge of monetary policy merely react to a slowing economy by lowering interest rates, and react to a growing economy by raising them. In other words, economic growth drives the setting of interest rates not the other way around (so GDP growth and interest rates are positively correlated, not negatively correlated as many people suggest).

So the current low Bank of England base rate merely reflects the current economic malaise, and changing it one way or the other won't drive economic growth (GDP). Mortgage rates are already much higher, anyway, and it may be doubted whether banks would pass on any rise to savers.

In fact, Richard observed that the only driver of growth in GDP is bank credit that is used for productive investment. Credit used for consumption merely raises inflation, and credit used to buy financial assets (which don't count towards GDP) merely drives up non-GDP asset prices.

Richard explained the importance of recognising that we derive 97% of our money supply from banks extending credit. They 'create' money every time they make a loan. But here's the killer: only about 10% of credit created by UK banks actually goes to productive firms. The rest of the credit created is used by investment banks, hedge funds, private equity and so on to speculate on non-GDP assets.

In addition, the risk-weightings under bank capital rules discourage banks from lending to small firms (as I've also mentioned before), effectively encouraging lending to fund speculative property deals - even though the overall risk profile of loans to small businesses is lower than lending for speculative purposes, and in spite of the fact that small firms represent 99.9% of all enterprises and are responsible for 60% of private sector employment).

Richard explained that Project Merlin and the more recent efforts by the Treasury to shame banks into lending to productive firms all fail because the banks can afford to ignore the Treasury. But central banks have been successful in guiding credit to the right sectors previously, because the banks rely on the faith of the central bank to stay in business. The IMF has previously discouraged the use of this so-called "window guidance" because it has been abused in certain countries (e.g. to aid speculators or political cronies). But a transparent programme could work. A longer term alternative is to create new banks that never lend for speculative purposes - in Germany, for example, 70% of banks (about 2000 of them) only lend locally. Spain had a similar system, but then required its local 'cajas' to lend nationally, with devastating effects.

Finally, Richard said that the banks' could lend more to productive firms and still meet their capital requirements. But they need to lower the bar to obtaining credit (which German banks have commonly done during a downturn) and to incentivise staff for making productive loans. Currently, it's easier for bankers to earn bonuses for supporting speculative activity.

Baroness Kramer explained that Parliament is focused on four main aspects of the financial crisis: the market failure to provide bank credit to productive small firms; capital/cost barriers to launching new banks; encouraging peer-to-peer finance platforms; and ensuring that the Financial Services Bill and the up-coming Banking Bill are fit for purpose. 

Susan said that the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Banking Standards should have the membership and resources to get to the root cause of market failures and make improvements to fix them. While the evidence of market failure is clear, more evidence of the underlying problems and causes is very much welcome (even after the deadlines for submissions have expired). There is a belief amongst some in the House of Lords that the same regulator should be responsible for addressing market failure, as well as enterprise risk and market abuse, because they are all linked. The FDIC in the US provides an example of how this can work.

Proposals to reduce capital/costs that prevent the launch of new banks include reduced capital requirements for local banks that won't be systemic; and the regulation of a common banking platform that takes care of most operational risks, so that small banks could simply 'plug-in'. Susan observed that credit unions only cover about 2% of the borrowing population, so are not a replacement for new, local institutions.

Baroness Kramer has led the way in proposing amendments to the Financial Services Bill to proportionately regulate peer-to-peer finance. In the course of discussing those proposals, it appears that the Treasury has conceded that there is already a provision in the Financial Services Bill that could enable such regulation. However that still leaves the job of agreeing the detailed secondary legislation (and any further enabling legislation) required, so the industry should keep up the pressure in that regard.

Finally, Susan praised the white paper that underpins the Banking Bill as containing 'pretty good' language on enabling new entrants to the banking industry. However, it is going to be important for everyone to be vigilant in ensuring the spirit of this is captured in the provisons of the Bill.

Rethinking Personal Data

As part of its 'midata' initiative to empower consumers, the department of Business Innovation and Skills has been consulting on a proposal to give the Secretary of State a general power that "might be exercised broadly or in a more targeted way" to compel suppliers to supply transaction data at a consumer’s request. In the interests of transparency, I've summarised my response to the consultation over on The Fine Print. As previously explained, I should disclose that I've been involved in the midata Interoperability Board from its inception in 2011.

The ECB Won't Really Do "Whatever It Takes"

I can't understand why 'stock markets soared' 2% on yesterday's announcement by the European Central Bank (if there really was a causal link). 

Mario Draghi's threat/promise in late July that the European Central Bank would to do 'whatever it takes' to save the Euro always rang hollow. And yesterday's long-promised follow-up announcement on (some) of the detail only confirmed the lack of substance.

Doing 'whatever it takes' would involve the ECB buying the bonds of troubled Eurozone Zerozone countries unconditionally - regardless of whether those countries operate their economies responsibly. Of course that's a crazy notion, and a long way from what the ECB is really offering to do. Draghi added yesterday that troubled countries would actually have to formally request such purchases and accept "strict and effective conditionality", which roughly translates into all European languages as "austerity". 

Of course that's something Greece and Spain have shown a marked reluctance to accept - understandably. And there seems no real way to force them to do so without sending the boys around, which would shatter the single European fantasy ideal. As Graham Bishop has explained, this has always been the flaw in Zerozone monetary 'union'. There's no credible plan to discipline profligate states. Those who negotiated the Maastricht Treaty believed such states would ultimately behave in the interests of the Zerozone, just as Alan Greenspan thought the boards of Lehman Brothers and others would ultimately refrain from driving their firm into a wall in the interests of shareholders and taxpayers...

So it seems the giant EU foot is intent on kicking this particular urn down the road until it breaks. In the meantime, hopefully Greece and anyone else who is genuinely unable to cope will grasp the opportunity for an amicable parting to recover on their own terms.

Image from JMK Advisors.