Bailout Fund Ratings And Snake Oil Don't Mix

The response to the downgrade of the Eurozone bailout funds from Aaa has yielded a fascinating political response from the head of the fund. 

Moody's, the ratings agency, says the €700bn European Stability Mechanism (and the the EFSF it replaces) is now a riskier proposition since France lost its Aaa rating earlier this month. It considers that, if the full fund were needed, France would have to stump up 20%. The whole purpose of the fund is to invest in the debt of weaker Eurozone member states whose creditworthiness is highly correlated. So, if one runs into economic trouble, they all do. That also makes for a "highly concentrated credit portfolio." And if push came to shove, Moody's doesn't think France would prioritise it's ESM contributions above its own debt payments. Similarly, in that event it would be unlikely that other member states would make up France's shortfall.

Both the chairman and managing director of the ESM were keen to claim political support for the fund. The ESM's chairman said:

"The 17 euro area Member States are fully committed to ESM [and EFSF] in political and financial terms and stand firmly behind both institutions."

And the ESM's managing director said:

“Moody's rating decision is difficult to understand. We disagree with the rating agency's approach which does not sufficiently acknowledge ESM's exceptionally strong institutional framework, political commitment and capital structure."

Of course, the political reality is actually the flaw in the single market and Euro fantasy: there's no credible plan to discipline profligate states, as the continuing Greek tragedy demonstrates. Those who negotiated the Maastricht Treaty foolishly believed such states would ultimately behave in the interests of the Zerozone, just as Alan Greenspan thought the boards of Lehman Brothers and others would refrain from driving their firms into a wall out of concern for the interests of shareholders and taxpayers... snake oil. 

The only real disciplinary option is for creditor states to 'send the boys around' to the debtor states. In that event all political solutions will have been exhausted, and the 'European Union' long gone. 

So Moody's is right to discount the politics - and the ESM's credit rating.

If the politics is not to further undermine the ESM, politicians have to demonstrate that the disintegration of the Euro zone is survivable. 

When in Doubt, Stay Out

I’m with the Tories on the EU treaty veto. There are just too many unanswered questions for anyone not already implicated to sign up. Even other EU leaders are now saying they'll struggle to sell the treaty nationally. 

Key among those questions is how the EU can democratically enforce its fiscal rules. I say ‘democratically’, because the whole point of the European Union is to avoid the diplomatic equivalent of ‘sending the boys around’.

Graham Bishop tries to address this in his short book, "The EU Fiscal Crisis: Forcing Eurozone Political Union in 2011?".

Perhaps the best place to start is Graham's point that “Wrong behaviour in misleading investors is still wrong even if the motive is patriotism, rather than personal greed.” During the Maastricht Treaty negotiations in the early ‘90s, Graham wrote some papers that “doubted the willingness of finance ministers to discipline profligate states”. The issue was ignored at that time on the basis that member states assumed it would always be in a profligate state's interest to want to do the right thing - a version of the efficient markets hypothesis, royally debunked first by Lehman Bros et al and now Greece. Even Alan Greenspan has had to admit that, left to itself, when any organisation is in trouble it is likely to behave in a way that suits those in 'control', which is why a taxpayers' guarantee constitutes a moral hazhard.

After gamefully attempting to explain the alphabet soup that comprises the EU financial bandaid stability aparatus, Graham recommends four principles of more effective fiscal supervision:

1.       Recognise there is nominal credit risk in the debt issued by a state that can’t print its own money – traditionally, there is assumed to be no nominal credit risk on loans to central governments held to maturity, since it's assumed that if the government needs more money it will simply print it (even though this may create other problems) - this is clearly wrong for Greece, for example;

2.       Make it progressively harder for EU banks to finance the excesses of an EU member state;

3.  Insurers, pension funds and other caretakers of peoples’ savings should be similarly disincentivised from concentrating on risky public debt;

4.      “Develop necessary flanking measures".

Funnily enough, non-Eurozone investors seem to be playing by these rules, even if the Eurozone isn't.

Little wonder private investors are working hard on contingency plans for Eurozone break-up.