Regulatory Creep And Overkill For Closed Loop Payments

The Treasury reports that it received no support for its proposal for voluntary consumer protection codes for ‘closed loop’ or limited network stored value, which are exempt from European E-money regulation. These include store cards, coffee shop cards, fuel cards, transport cards, membership cards, and meal and other voucher systems - nothing like the collapsed retail pre-payment schemes that have previously lost their customers' money Farepak (Christmas hampers) and WrapIt (wedding gifts).

However, the rejection of the need for voluntary codes arguably opens the way for formal regulation, as the Treasury had seemed to be firmly of the view that more protection is necessary for the reasons summarized below. As a next step:

“The Treasury has asked the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) to provide some advice on the prepaid market, the effectiveness of current self regulatory solutions for protecting consumers, and the interaction between the regulated and unregulated sectors. This advice will be fully considered before the Government decides what, if any, action to take.”

Ominous? Well, it depends on what they mean by "prepaid". If the Treasury means retailers who require people to pay for products weeks or months prior to shipment, then I wonder why it's taken them so long to address a really obvious problem. But if they mean gift vouchers to make sure your nephew spends his birthday money on something educational instead of 5kgs of sweets, then this is over-kill.

I’ve extracted the summary of responses on this aspect below:

"3.10 There was little or no support for voluntary codes as a solution to improving the safeguards for consumers in the unregulated sector.

3.11 Responses fell into two broad categories: those that argued that tougher regulation and enforcement than voluntary codes is necessary to address perceived shortcomings in the unregulated sector; and those that felt that there was no justification for action due to the low risk of consumer detriment. The main reason for the general dissatisfaction with voluntary codes was that, although models vary, supervising and enforcing a voluntary code is often thought to be difficult. There are usually no limits to the number of violations a company might have, no financial incentive to abide by a code, and weak rights of recourse for consumers.

3.12 Some respondents argued that no action was necessary because the perceived risks are low. It was also argued that voluntary codes would be unworkable in practice because the average amounts outstanding on unregulated products (mainly gift cards) are less than £30. These responses concluded that the risk of loss per customer did not warrant a new protection mechanism."

Call for Self-regulation of Limited Network Payment Schemes

The UK Treasury is calling for self-regulation to ring-fence funds relating to stored value in “limited network” programmes, citing examples such as store cards, coffee shop cards, fuel cards, transport cards, membership cards, and meal and other voucher systems. The call is part of the Treasury’s consultation on the second E-money Directive which imposes similar obligations on the operators of 'general purpose' stored value programmes. While limited networks will remain exempt from E-money and payment services regulation, the Treasury will consider “whether further [regulatory] action is warranted” if what it sees as adequate self-regulation does not emerge. Consultation ends on 30 November.

Potential reasons cited by the Treasury for segregating limited network funds from operators' own corporate funds include:

• Apparent uncertainty as to the scope of the limited network exemption;
• A large number of consumers/businesses rely on limited network programmes and may suffer if programmes fail;
• A limited network failure may harm the reputation of other limited network programmes as well as regulated e-money providers; and
• Limited networks enjoy a cost advantage over regulated general purpose stored value programmes, partly through not needing to ring-fence funds equivalent to the outstanding stored value.

Whether each of these is really a problem is very much debatable. Guidance can clarify what is considered in or out of the regulatory scope, and the existence of 'grey areas' at the perimeter is no argument for definitively expanding the scope by requiring self-regulation. Of course, not all customers or businesses rely on all limited network programmes, or even the programmes of the same type. Similarly, the failure of one programme does not necessarily reflect on them all. That's clear from the collapse of retailers that entirely rely on pre-payment Farepak (Christmas hampers) and WrapIt (wedding gifts) which have provided the genesis for concern in this area generally, though neither was a stored value programme. Finally, why shouldn't there be cost advantages to running a programme whereby value can only be spent within a limited network, rather than one where stored value can be spent anywhere? The latter is always going to be much larger in scale and purpose, and entail far more operational risk.

While the evidence of detriment is less than clear, positive reasons not to introduce requirements to safeguard customer funds in limited network schemes include:

• The potential for additional requirements to be imposed in the course of the proposed self-regulatory exercise that needlessly increase the cost of operating the network;
• No one operating a dodgy scheme would sign-up for stringent self-regulation;
• It may be far more costly and onerous to ring-fence funds in certain types of limited network programmes than others, so some operators may be unfairly discriminated against by not signing-up on legitimate economic grounds; and
• Increased costs associated with self-regulation may result in fewer limited network payment programmes for customers to choose from and higher retail prices for customers overall.

A proportionate alternative might be to focus on improving the management of operational risk in businesses that rely entirely on pre-payment for specific items, as Farepak and Wrapit did. A nice, long chat with their auditors might also be in order...

Image from Newbusiness.co.uk