What Happened To 'Class A' Political Journalism?

My appetite whetted by this week's local electoral melodrama, I've been searching for some Class A political journalism to feed my lust for pragmatism. 

There were little flashes of it from a few of the TV people. Michael Crick, who blew the lid off the Andrew Mitchell stitch-up, was rude as hell to Farrago, no doubt furious at having stuck to him like a leech in the hope of discovering anything coherent and coming up empty-handed. That left the usually mild-mannered Gary Gibbon to go after the rest of the gang. Desperation set in after the AutomEtonian responded to every single question with the line that this week was simply about local councils. He genuinely seemed to forget he was the Prime Minister, and I guess it's easy to see why. This seemed to put Gary in such a foul mood that he went after Flash Nick and Millibore like a mortar crew on speed. Each prevarication was interrupted with a fresh round down the tube, and another explosion of disbelief at the factually-twisted response. 

The only problem with the Gibbon assault was the apparent premise of the questions on capital spending: that it's the job of the state to fill every hole in the infrastructural landscape. Creating a whole new mountain range out of UK public debt is strange medicine indeed, whatever the cause. Ironically, Flash Nick went closest to a straight response, saying that while they'd barely invested a bean of new public money, the coalition has done a great job of attracting private capital to public projects. If that's true, then let's hope they've overcome the planning fallacy, and the PFI vultures leave a little flesh on the state carcass for the rest of us. 

As for Ed, well... 

In the end, the howling in my soul could only be quieted by re-reading "Fear and Loathing on the Campaign Trail '72". Forty years on, nothing has changed. The vicious wheels of the party political machines are still flattening the best interests of the citizens into the road in the rush for power and patronage, and Thompson's substance-fuelled take on the political animal is so brutally right that the recognition will make you laugh like a hyena. This, for example, could have been written today:

"This also reinforced my contempt for the waterheads who ran Big Ed's campaign like a gang of junkies trying to send a rocket to the moon to check out rumours that the craters were full of smack."

Now why doesn't anyone write about politics like that anymore?

Is it merely because today's journalists are sober, or have they abandoned hope that we can produce anything different to the current stage-managed pantomime?

Pragmatism Grows At Night

In "India Grows at Night" the writer and commentator Gurcharan Das shares his insights into how India's growing, pragmatic middle class can achieve the country's necessary political and economic reforms. While inspired by Das's presence in Tahrir Square two years ago, these insights also resonate with the plight of Western democracies whose growth is inhibited by extractive private and public sector institutions.

The title of the book comes from Das's belief that India's knowledge economy powered her economic growth because: 

"Bureaucrats did not know how to regulate it and could not choke it with red tape, in the way they stifled India's industrial revolution through licences, permits and inspectors... India's knowledge economy literally grew at night while the government slept."

But India's problems are not over. Das explains that the "puzzle is... how can a vibrant democracy with a rising economy and an energetic civil society have allowed the state and governance to decay"?  He then describes the evolution of the Indian state from before British rule until today, tracing the tensions between social and official structures, and the shortcomings of the political system and key market failures.

Despite different starting points, this 'decay' also awaits Western democracies who have not been alert to the need for ongoing political and economic reforms. There's an ominous familiarity, for instance, in the complaint that the Indian state is preoccupied with the quantity of schools and other public services rather than their quality - "which is what really drives shared prosperity." The problems in our financial system are well rehearsed.

Das's description of the reasons for India's institutional decay is also echoed in Phillip Blond's explanation of the 'political bankruptcy' in Western countries. I understand them both to be saying that right wing policies allow the concentration of wealth amongst relatively few extractive institutions and their management and investors, rather than creating an environment in which widespread entrepreneurship can flourish. Meanwhile, left wing policies that are designed to 'redistribute' income through taxation and public spending are grossly inefficient by comparison to markets. The self-interest of partisan politics has gone too far, and legislators have no real commitment to the common good. Electoral battles fought along social and cultural lines distract everyone from critical long term issues, as well as being dangerously divisive. As a result, we lack appropriate regulatory frameworks and incentives to address market problems that stifle innovation and competition. Not only does institutional decay reflect the bankruptcy of dogma-ridden political parties, but as that decay constrains growth the economy itself drifts into liquidation.

Das argues that successful reforms will only be achieved through more active political participation by the members of the rising middle class, since they are the most conscious of the problems and the most impatient for the necessary reforms. He argues that the intransigence of existing Indian political parties creates the need for an entirely new, 'bottom-up', liberal political party. Das explains that this is a 'classical' rather than a 'social' liberalism - tolerant on social and cultural matters, yet wary of state intervention where the private sector and the market can be more effective.

This also seems to reflect the "renewed political idealism" and "participative democracy" for which Phillip Blond argues. 

In UK terms, this would seems to place Das's vision for a 'liberal party' somewhere between the Tories and the Liberal Democrats. And it seems quite telling that UK voters have forced those two political parties into coalition.

However, I disagree that the formation of a new political party or even a new political idealism is a necessary pre-condition for achieving political and economic reform.

As discussed in Lipstick On a Pig, the bottom-up approach that Das refers to has already been unleashed, largely enabled by the Internet's 'architecture of participation'. The 'Arab Spring' and developments in sub-Saharan Africa emphasise both the global nature of this phenomenon and its effective political impact. This process of 'democratisation' requires no more structure than the social media and a city square, and its power lies in the fact that it isn't confined to politics or economics. Greater transparency, knowledge and reform in one area creates the desire for change elsewhere. The result is both seismic and chaotic, yet significant reform is bound to be 'messy', not orderly and neat. As a result, I've suggested we're seeing the evolution of a "personal state" in which we're acting pragmatically as individuals in a highly collaborative fashion through the services of facilitators, rather than passively relying on our institutions to set the pace of reform.

New political parties and ideals might well emerge in this environment, but they will be a symptom of reforms achieved by each of us acting personally, not the cause.   

Does Brown's Story Improve With Age?

Plenty of things improve with hindsight, but could the image of Gordon Brown's time in government really be one of them? 

In "Saving the World"?, William Keegan does an admirably succinct job of restoring some balance to the disastrous picture that emerged after 13 years of New Labour. 

In particular, he relies on his deep knowledge of recent global economic history to emphasise the glorified status Gordo attained through ten years as Chancellor, eight years as chairman of the IMF’s political committee, and his almost sycophantic association with Alan Greenspan. It appears to have been this status that enabled Brown to affect disdain in meetings EU finance ministers, to successfully resist his party's urge for Britain to join the Euro, and which culminated in his ability to convene urgent meetings with G20 leaders during 2008.

William also manfully contends that Brown is entitled to both kudos as an outstanding member of the economic elite and shelter in the safe harbour of the “general consensus” – fostered by his idol, Alan Greenspan – “that the sophistication of modern financial markets had reduced the dangers of a crisis.” 

This I don't buy. For all his ‘listening’ and ‘taking soundings’ amongst his fellow members of the economic establishment, Brown was simply afflicted with groupthink (which we've since learned was rife at the IMF). That he appeared to wake up earlier than others was merely because Northern Wreck was the first retail domino to fall and he had to respond. It was just luck. And it was also luck that taking shares in banks was an option open to him, but not to a right wing US administration (as explained in Too Big To Fail).

Another criticism would be that William only seems to trace the financial crisis to the failure of the Bear Stearns funds in 2007. But that was merely when the financial establishment first realised or conceded there was a problem (as also explained in Too Big To Fail). Anyone who's read The Big Short or Fool's Gold will know that many significant players had been saying (and betting heavily) for years that a crisis was brewing amongst the very banks with whom Gordon was enraptured during his long years at the Treasury and in the IMF. Indeed, William hints at this when he explains how the economist Raghuram Rajan was "subjected to brutal criticism by leading colleagues and disciples of Greenspan's" when he warned "the great and the good" of the impending doom at a conference which Brown attended in 2005. 

In that far deeper context, Gordon's surprise (and outrage) at the sorry state of UK bank finances in 2007-08 merely cements his place amongst the elite groupthinkers who had dismissed explicit warnings for many years. Far from being an especially progressive thinker on the subject of banking calamity, he was actually caught flat-footed by the fundamental flaws others had pointed to in his very own financial system. 

In those circumstances it was the least Gordon could do to keep the ATMs working. On that particular front, he was (perhaps) making the best of a bad job. He should not be seen as having engaged in some kind of heroic quest worthy of an exalted place in the history books.

While William patiently contends that Gordon didn't cause the financial crisis itself, he also properly concedes that he did much to ensure it would be a very long journey out of it. He explains Brown’s avowed and deliberate ‘stealth’ approach to taxation and social welfare spending; the refusal to build any social housing; the unbridled expansion of public sector (complete with higher pay and pensions than the private sector); and the creation of many huge off-balance sheet PFI projects under the guise of ‘prudence’. These things, coupled with a feeble understanding of what the banks were up to, are what should combine to prevent Brown's tenure being seen in a positive light.

Amidst all this, Brown's brief tenure as Prime Minister is almost a footnote - which is strange given his elevation to that role coincided with the peak of his economic profile. William does a good job of highlighting the irony that Gordon really wasn't suited to the job that he'd schemed for so long to obtain. He also points out the irony that Gordon's tendency to dither, vacillate and procrastinate, which had worked to keep Britain out of the Euro, failed when it came to seizing the political initiative with an early general election. 

All in all, an important guide to the Brown years.

Buzzword Bingo!

PR supremo Julia Streets has finally 'opened her kimono' to reveal 'key learnings' from her years as both fan and critic of corporate 'buzzwords'.

Her serious message - very humorously delivered - is that we should avoid creating confusion in the workplace by writing and speaking as simply as possible, especially with people from other countries, communities or industries. For instance, I love her story of the chap who was concerned at the request for staff to 'push the envelope' because he thought they were being asked to offer bribes. And I recall that a London-based colleague I called from New York couldn't understand why I was mildly annoyed at having been 'blown off' for lunch. 

I agree with Julia - as a general rule. We should certainly commuicate clearly. That includes explaining the meaning of words or expressions our target audience might otherwise have to look up. One also has to be careful not to torture metaphors, as Julia points out, or to mix them into a metaphorical stew. And I share her distaste for acronyms. I nearly drowned in them while working at Reuters, until someone told me to look them up in "RAD" on the company intranet. Yes, the "Reuters Acronym Dictionary" had its very own acronym.

But (being a lawyer) I feel obliged to at least make a plea in mitigation for the humble buzzword, if not to defend it altogether.
 

There is a certain richness - and at least mild entertainment - in speaking graphically about an otherwise tedious topic, like law or finance. At a recent conference about regulation, for example, I'll admit to referring to perverse tax incentives as the "elephant in the room", which we were all obliged to politely ignore. I even pointed to the imaginary beast in the corner. It seemed a suitably mild, yet evocative image for a group that included senior policy-makers, and I think people got it... The point of such metaphors is to conjure a reasonably entertaining yet informative picture in the minds of the audience. Preferrably an image that speaks a thousand words which you won't have to.

So I think Julia attacks the metaphorical-buzzword-as-boredom-relief a little unfairly. Although, rather tellingly, she concludes with a helpful guide on how to play 'buzzword bingo', complete with word-grid. 

Overall, this is a very useful book that should be used as the basis of an online resource to which we can all contribute - rather like Roger's Profanosaurus (which even has an app). Follow-up dictionaries in this space could include a guide to words that have been misused to the point they are meaningless (apparently there are 15 you shouldn't use on LinkedIn), and a 'devil's dictionary' of words that contain toxic levels of irony. 

No doubt they too would make a great Xmas present.

Gordon's Crash

Knowing of my attitude towards this country's most recent former Prime Minister, someone cheekily gave me "Gordon Brown Beyond The Crash" for Christmas. By this morning, I'd only managed to wade through to page 50, as I tend not to dwell terribly long in the only place I could bring myself to store and read this particular opus. So I felt it was time to celebrate with some of my early reflections on the tome.

The cover is perhaps the most insightful aspect of this book so far. It is appropriate that Gordo's name appears in red, since this reflects his political bias, his obvious fondness for that side of the accounting ledger, and the state in which he left the country's finances. The grey background connotes Brown-blighted Britain's economic gloom. And the running together of author and title clarifies that it's more autobiography than observations on economic or political theory.

The contents itself draws a very thin veil indeed around the revolutionary idea that globalisation requires international governance (I know, I'm just amazed the idea never occurred to me before reading this book either). Key features of this 'veil' are the liberal use of the word "I" and saccharin praise for dozens and dozens of staff members, advisers and others who drank the Kool-Aid - so many, in fact, and so saccharin as to be patronizing. Which I guess is the point. Ultimately, these people lost Gordo the war, not him - an attitude we saw exemplified in his handling of the infamous exchange with a certain resident of Rochdale: "Who put me in front of that woman?"

Anyhow, having deftly skirted the reasons why the UK's banks were permitted to become under-capitalised in the first place, I'm up to the part where "As I arrived back in London on Saturday morning I went straight into the office to meet Alistair, who was planning to announce the nationalisation of Bradford and Bingley..."

I can't wait for another bowel movement.